





























Universal Human Rights in National
Contexts: Application of International
Rights of the Child in Estonia,
Finland and Russia
DISSERTATIONES IURIDICAE UNIVERSITATIS TARTUENSIS 
55 
 













Universal Human Rights in National  
Contexts: Application of International 
Rights of the Child in Estonia,  
Finland and Russia 
Faculty of Law, University of Tartu, Estonia 
 
Dissertation is accepted for the commencement of the degree of Doctor of 
Philosophy (PhD) in law on June 30, 2015, by the Council of the Faculty of 
Law. 
 
Supervisor:  Prof. Lauri Mälksoo (University of Tartu) 
 
Opponents: Prof. Martin Scheinin (European University Institute) Florenze 
Prof. Ria Wolleswinkel (University of Maastricht) 
 
Commencement will take place on September 14, 2015 at 14.00 in the Faculty 
of Law, Näituse 20 room K-03. 
 





















ISBN 978-9949-32-899-4 (print)  
ISBN 978-9949-32-900-7 (pdf) 
 
Copyright: Katre Luhamaa, 2015 
 
 
University of Tartu Press 
www.tyk.ee 
5 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................  8 
FOREWORD..................................................................................................  9 
INTRODUCTION ..........................................................................................  10 
A. Research task and central statements ...................................................  12 
B. Purpose and structure of the research ...................................................  16 
C. Methodology and sources of the research ............................................  19 
CHAPTER 1  
SETTING THE SCENE:  UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS ...........  23 
1 National acceptance of international law ...............................................  26 
1.1  Dualism and pluralism .....................................................................  26 
1.2  Monism ............................................................................................  27 
1.3  Human rights – bridging the gap? ...................................................  28 
2  Position of human rights treaties  in international law ..........................  31 
2.1  International human rights law norms  in the hierarchy of norms ...  36 
2.1.1 Legal nature of international human rights obligations ..........  39 
Rules and principles................................................................  40 
Other typologies of state obligations ......................................  43 
2.1.2 Constitutionalization of international human rights ...............  46 
2.1.3 International human rights monitoring bodies  
as international law-makers ....................................................  49 
Legal status of General Comments or Recommendations ......  53 
Legal status of Concluding Observations ...............................  58 
2.2  Universality or particularity of international human rights .............  60 
2.2.1 Universality argument ............................................................  60 
2.2.2 Criticism of universality claim ...............................................  63 
Traditional values argument ...................................................  65 
2.2.3 Minimum core and margin of appreciation  as the practical 
middle ground .........................................................................  66 
3  International rights of the child .............................................................  68 
3.1  The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child ..............................  70 
3.2  European Convention on Human Rights .........................................  71 
3.3 European Social Charter ..................................................................  73 
3.4 EU law .............................................................................................  74 
4  Position of international human rights in national legal systems  
of Estonia, Finland and Russia ..............................................................  75 
4.1  Human Rights in the Finnish Constitution ......................................  75 
4.1.1 Constitutional values ..............................................................  76 
4.1.2 Position of international human rights treaties .......................  77 
4.1.3 Position and role of the practice of supervisory institutions ...  81 
4.2  Human Rights in the Estonian Constitution ....................................  82 
4.2.1 Constitutional values ..............................................................  83 
6 
4.2.2 Position of international human rights treaties .......................  84 
4.2.3 Position and role of the practice of supervisory institutions ...  86 
4.3  Human Rights in the Russian Constitution .....................................  87 
4.3.1 Constitutional values ..............................................................  88 
4.3.2 Position of international human rights treaties .......................  91 
4.3.3 Position and role of the practice of supervisory institutions ...  95 
5  Concluding remarks ...............................................................................  100 
CHAPTER 2  
Application of selected rights of the child  in Estonia, Finland, and Russia ..  102 
1  Definition of a ‘child’ ............................................................................  104 
1.1  Definition of a ‘child’ in international human rights .......................  105 
1.1.1 Child marriage ........................................................................  108 
1.1.2 Sexual consent ........................................................................  109 
1.1.3 Minimum age of employment ................................................  111 
1.1.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces ......  112 
1.2  Definition of a ‘child’ in Finland.....................................................  114 
1.2.1 Marriage .................................................................................  115 
1.2.2 Sexual consent ........................................................................  116 
1.2.3 Employment ...........................................................................  117 
1.2.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces ......  118 
1.3  Definition of a ‘child’ in Estonia .....................................................  119 
1.3.1 Marriage .................................................................................  121 
1.3.2 Sexual consent ........................................................................  122 
1.3.3 Employment ...........................................................................  123 
1.3.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces ......  124 
1.4  Definition of a ‘child’ in the Russian Federation ............................  125 
1.4.1 Marriage .................................................................................  126 
1.4.2 Sexual consent ........................................................................  127 
1.4.3 Employment ...........................................................................  129 
1.4.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces ......  130 
1.5 Conclusions .....................................................................................  131 
2  Best interests of the child ......................................................................  133 
2.1  Minimum core of the best interests of the child ..............................  134 
2.1.1 Placement into care .................................................................  138 
2.1.2 Family reunification ...............................................................  139 
2.2  Best interests in the Finnish legal system ........................................  142 
2.2.1 Placement into care .................................................................  145 
2.2.2 Family reunification ...............................................................  147 
2.3  Best interests in the Estonian legal system ......................................  148 
2.3.1 Placement into care .................................................................  151 
2.3.2 Family reunification ...............................................................  154 
2.4  Best interests in the Russian legal system .......................................  157 
2.4.1 Placement into care .................................................................  161 
2.4.2 Family reunification ...............................................................  166 
2.5  Conclusion .......................................................................................  167 
7 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS ..............................................................  169 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ..........................................................................................  174 
International treaties and declarations .......................................................  191 
Other instruments of international organisations ......................................  192 
EU legislation ............................................................................................  195 
Judgments of international courts .............................................................  195 
Opinions of the EComSR ..........................................................................  196 
Estonian legislation ...................................................................................  196 
Estonian court cases ..................................................................................  197 
Russian legislation ....................................................................................  197 
Russian court cases ...................................................................................  199 
Finnish legislation .....................................................................................  200 
Proposals of the Finnish Government .......................................................  200 
Finnish court cases ....................................................................................  200 
SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN .........................................................................  202 
Doktoritöö eesmärk, meetod ja teoreetiline taust ......................................  203 
Rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste lepingute ja  lapse õiguste positsioon 
näiteriikides ...........................................................................................  207 
Lapse definitsioon .....................................................................................  207 
Lapse parim huvi .......................................................................................  208 
Kokkuvõtteks ............................................................................................  210 
CURRICULUM VITAE ................................................................................  213 





LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 
ALCSCd Decision of the Administrative Law Chamber of the Supreme 
Court (Estonia) 
CAT  Convention Against Torture  
CCSCd Decision of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court (Estonia) 
CCSCr Ruling of the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court (Estonia) 
CEDAW Convention on Discrimination Against Women  
CLCSCd Decision of the Criminal Law Chamber of the Supreme Court 
(Estonia) 
CoE Council of Europe 
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child 
CRCSCd Decision of the Constitutional Review Chamber of the 
Supreme Court (Estonia) 
ECHR  The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
HE Hallituksen esitys (‘Proposal of the Government’, Finland) 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial  
ICESR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights  
ILA International Law Association 
ILC International Law Commission 
KHO Korkein hallinto-oikeus (‘Supreme Administrative Court’, 
Finland) 
KKO Korkein oikeus (‘Supreme Court’, Finland) 
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
RT Riigi Teataja (‘State Gazette’, Estonia) 
SC en banc Supreme Court en banc (Estonia) 
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
UN United Nations 




Writing this dissertation has been a long but very interesting process. I have 
always been fascinated by the fact that the theories on human rights and the 
practices on the ground are so diverse. Teaching international human rights 
often feels like teaching ideas that are detached from real life and that have 
more to do with human rights advocacies than national realities. At the same 
time, I have always felt that international human rights have had a deeply 
positive effect on many developments in different states. The transition of 
Estonia to democracy is one such example. 
Initially, I planned to analyse whether nation-states understood the general 
values behind international human rights similarly. I was interested in the 
notion of human dignity. This project proved, however, to be too vague to suit 
the purposes of the dissertation. Therefore, the current dissertation touches only 
on the more practical elements of this wider topic. 
As a mother of three sons who is sensitive to the value of human rights, I 
have received first-hand experience on the difficulties relating to the everyday 
micro-level implementation of the rights of a child. This is my primary 
subjective reason for selecting the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and 
the rights of children in general, as material rights for the current work. I still 
have to admit that practical implementation seems now even more complicated. 
Writing the dissertation has connected me with numerous persons in several 
countries, particularly in Estonia and Finland, to name only a few.  
My interest in international human rights was first triggered by Juhani 
Kortteinen, who taught international human rights in Tartu. I would like to 
thank my supervisor, Prof. Lauri Mälksoo, for guidance, patience, and insight. I 
am also indebted to Prof. Matti Mikkola, who inspired and fuelled my interest 
in the rights of the child and supervised me in the University of Helsinki. 
There were numerous encounters in the University of Helsinki and other 
institutions from which my researcher ethics grew. I would also like to thank all 
members of the staff at the Faculty of Law, the University of Tartu, especially 
those who offered support and advice at various stages of this work. I am indebted 
to Prof. Irene Kull for the advice on Estonian civil law. 
I am grateful for my reviewers, Prof. Martin Scheinin and Prof. Ria 
Wolleswinkel, for their helpful and substantive comments. Special thanks are 
due to Christopher Goddard, Kerli Valk and Kadri Vider with the help on the 
language of the dissertation. All the mistakes that remain are, however, mine. 
I would like to acknowledge the financial support received for my research 
from the following grants – an individual research grant (INTLAWRUS) 
awarded to Professor Lauri Mälksoo by the European Research Council, and an 
institutional grant (IUT20-50) awarded by the Estonian Research Council. 
And finally, I would like to thank my friends and my family and especially 
my sons, Uku, Pärt, and Laurits for their inspiration and patience, and for 
showing me the true substance of the rights of the child. I am grateful for my 
husband Andres for things too many to mention here. 
10 
INTRODUCTION 
Claims that any normative order is underpinned by a certain value system are a 
commonplace.1 An international normative order would therefore also require 
the existence of an international value system, which would justify the existence 
of superior norms. World War II triggered a paradigm shift in international 
law – sovereignty as the central concept and value of international relations and 
international law was complemented with new values as the basis for the United 
Nations. 
Although the international law is still a state-centric system, mechanisms 
have been developed that constrain states from acting independently in some 
domestic and international matters. The emergence of the concepts of erga 
omnes obligations and jus cogens norms are exemplary reflections of this as 
they manifest common practices and beliefs among the international community. 
The underlying rationale of constraints on state power is the interests of the 
international community.2  
With the creation of the United Nations, strong emphasis on international 
human rights and their universality, in the sense of worldwide and general 
applicability, is now a commonplace of international law and rhetoric.3 Inter-
national politics of the last 15 years has, however, scattered this conviction and 
raised a question as to the theoretical and practical possibility of universal 
human rights. 
To substantively enforce international human rights, they have to become 
part of states’ constitutional law and domestic legal systems. At the same time, 
national constitutions uphold states’ values and traditions, which might conflict 
with universal, individualist and Western human rights. It is clear that states 
have different motivations for committing to international human rights treaties. 
Beth Simmons argues that whatever the motivation or hoped-for benefit, 
commitment to human rights treaties always brings about a change in states’ 
national legal system.4 Global international human rights instruments consider 
                                                 
1  See e.g., Jure Vidmar, “Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a 
Vertical International Legal System?,” in Hierarchy in International Law the Place of 
Human Rights, ed. Erika De Wet (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 13–
41; Dinah Shelton, “Normative Hierarchy in International Law,” Am. I. Int’l L. 100 (2006): 
291; or Erika De Wet, “The Emergence of International and Regional Value Systems as a 
Manifestation of the Emerging International Constitutional Order,” Leiden Journal of 
International Law 19, No. 03 (2006): 611–32. 
2  See discussion in Vidmar, “Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a 
Vertical International Legal System?,” 15–16. 
3  The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations reaffirms “faith in fundamental 
human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and 
women and of nations large and small”.  
4  Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 77–80. Simmons emphasises that every 
ratification is backed by some benefits and positive developments. Whether states follow 
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human rights vested directly in every human independently of states and their 
constitutions. This view is reinforced by the individual universality claim of 
international human rights as the international human rights order is seen to 
guarantee those rights and obliges states to respect, protect and fulfil those 
rights in their domestic legal systems.5 
Universality of human rights has been challenged in the recent years by the 
‘traditional values’ movement; this opposition has formalised through the 
resolutions of the Human Rights Council of the UN.6 This development might 
endanger the implementation of human rights;7 at its extreme, traditional values 
might justify violations of international human rights and render the protection 
of the individual rights moot.8 This, in turn, would make the universality of 
international human rights an empty concept.  
This possible clash of the human rights’ ideal of universality and de facto 
implementation, together with the recent developments, have triggered current 
research and posed a question of the possibility of the substantive universality 
of international human rights. It might well be that all the states are, in fact, 
following their own traditional or national values when adopting and imple-
menting national laws, and apply and make reference to international human 
rights only when it coincides with already existing national values. 
                                                                                                                       
international human rights substantively depends on the expected benefits. Thus, there are 
also some false positives i.e., states that genuinely do not share the same values but ratify 
because of other expected benefits such as positive publicity, investments; uncertainty over 
consequences; short time horizons. Posner has been critical towards these findings and 
claims that because of the ambiguity of the empirical data, the study does not lead to any 
solid conclusion. Fewer violations of human rights show merely modest causations and can 
not be regarded as compliance with international human rights obligations. Eric A. Posner, 
“Some Skeptical Comments on Beth Simmon’s Mobilizing for Human Rights,” New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 44 (2012–2011): 819. 
5  Henry J. Steiner, Philip Alston, and Ryan Goodman, eds., International Human Rights 
in Context: Law, Politics, Morals: Text and Materials, 3rd ed (Oxford [etc.]: Oxford 
University Press, 2007), Part C “Rights, Duties and Dilemmas of Universalism”, 473 et seq. 
6  Human Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through 
a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind,” October 12, 2009; Human 
Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better 
Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind,” April 8, 2011; and Human Rights 
Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Under-
standing of Traditional Values of Humankind: Best Practices,” October 9, 2012. 
7  As an example, the EU has stated: “human rights are universal, enshrined in inter-
national law, and States have a positive obligation to promote and protect these rights. In 
this regard, given the potential harm … posed by the concept of traditional values in 
undermining the universality and inalienability of human rights.” EU Permanent Delegation 
to the United Nations Office and other international organisations in Geneva, Contribution 
of the European Union: Traditional Values, February 15, 2013. 
8  See e.g., the argumentation used by President Putin before signing the “accession” treaty 
of Crimea. Vladimir V. Putin, “Transcript: speech to a joint session of the Russian 
parliament”, English version published in The Washington Post, March 18, 2014. 
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A. Research task and central statements 
The current dissertation analyses the universality/traditional values debate from 
an internal position and tests these approaches from the perspective of the 
national implementation of the international rights of the child. Human rights 
are supposedly context-neutral. At the same time, they are made through 
international compromise and should be applied in real-life cases and have an 
impact on the ground. For the international human rights regime to be 
successful, or at least functional, the implementation of norms requires relevant 
domestic policies and institutions that are able and willing to carry out the 
requirements of international law in the midst of opposition or debate. 
Moreover, the implementation must resonate with the country’s larger human 
rights agenda to be successful.9  
The universalist claim of international human rights is a mainstream argu-
ment among international human rights lawyers and international human rights 
bodies; it is stressed in the practice of the international human rights courts as 
well as by the political bodies dealing with international human rights law.10 At 
the same time, international human rights treaties create obligations for their 
member states, which are responsible for guaranteeing the respect, protection 
and, fulfillment of these rights in their particular domestic context. 
The correctness of the universality claim can only be tested through analysis 
of the practical implementation of the international human rights norms. For it 
to be true, the national practices have to follow and implement, at least, the 
minimum core of the rights. This, in turn, refers to the functions of the 
international human rights law and the hierarchy of national and the 
international law.11  
There is a variety of questions that need to be answered in this context. Are 
arguments about cultural and traditional values permitted before the 
international treaty bodies, and are they used by the states to justify domestic 
(non)implementation of the human rights norms? Are the standards and 
requirements of the CRC clear? Does the work of the UN treaty bodies and the 
CRC Committee, in particular, support the uniform implementation practice? 
The approach taken might be questioned: If a state chooses not to follow or 
apply international human rights as binding, does it mean that the universality 
argument is rendered moot? The answer should be ‘yes’ when the arguments for 
such non-application are based on different understanding of the substance of 
these obligations compared to the ordinary interpretation given to them by the 
supervisory institutions or arguments of cultural differences and traditional 
values are used; furthermore, the answer should also be ‘yes’ when the inter-
                                                 
9  See further Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, chapter 4. 
10  See e.g., World Conference on Human Rights and United Nations, “Vienna Declaration 
and Programme of Action.” 
11  See e.g., Gertrude Luebbe-Wolff, “Who Has the Last Word? National and Transnational 
Courts – Conflict and Cooperation,” Yearbook of European Law 30, no. 1 (2011): 86–99. 
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national supervisory institutions accept these arguments as valid despite their 
previous interpretation. The signing of a treaty should indicate the states’ 
willingness to apply these norms in good faith and in accordance with the 
objective and purpose of the treaty;12 the universality of human rights through 
application that is similar at least at its core is one of those objectives in 
international human rights treaties. 
There is a variety of general research available on the influence of particular 
human rights treaties on the particular national legal systems with varying 
degrees of intensity and detail. 13  There are also a number of studies that 
comparatively analyse the actual national implementation of specific treaties, 
these analyses tend to be, however, quite general in nature and they traditionally 
analyse the ICCPR or ICESCR. In 1999, Heyns and Viljoen made an 
overreaching analysis of the application of six core treaties of the UN in 
selected states.14 More recently, McGrogan analysed the application of inter-
national human rights in Asia, in the context of universality-cultural 
relativism.15 The CRC has received much less attention; and these analysis are 
more general by nature. 16  As an example, in 2008, Mikkola examined the 
application of selected rights of the child in Finland and Russia.17 Lundy et al. 
have analysed the implementation of the CRC in 12 countries;18 none of the 
states of the current research was included in it. Analyses of national 
implementation of specific rights or international judgments in individual 
member states are, however, common. 
UN treaty bodies, as well as other international human rights courts and 
institutions, analyse the implementation of the respective treaties in national 
legal systems during their supervisory processes. They base their General 
Comments and General Recommendations on such practice and generalize their 
practice as guidance for the states. Implementation of the treaties is analysed by 
                                                 
12  On methods of treaty interpretation, see e.g., Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Inter-
pretation of Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
13  On the implementation of the UDHR, see e.g., Vinodh Jaichand and Markku Suksi, eds., 
60 Years of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Europe (Antwerp: Intersentia, 
2009). On the implementation of the ECHR, see e.g., Leonard M. Hammer and Frank 
Emmert, eds., The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in 
Central and Eastern Europe (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2012). 
14  Christof H. Heyns and Frans Viljoen, eds., The Impact of the United Nations Human 
Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
15  David McGrogan, “Cultural Values and Human Rights: A Matter of Interpretation” 
(University of Liverpool, 2012). 
16  For a recent analysis of the central issues of the rights of the child, see e.g., Karl Hanson 
and Olga Nieuwenhuys, eds., Reconceptualizing Children’s Rights in International Develop-
ment: Living Rights, Social Justice, Translations (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
17  Helsingin yliopiston koulutus- ja kehittämiskeskus Palmenia, Lastensuojelu Euroopassa 
ja Venäjällä, ed. Virge Mikkola (Helsinki: Helsingin yliopiston koulutus- ja kehittämis-
keskus Palmenia, 2008). 
18  Laura Lundy et al., The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child: A Study of Legal 
Implementation in 12 Countries (UNICEF UK, 2012). 
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the states themselves during the reporting process and in the Universal Periodic 
Review. All these documents are valuable sources for the current research.  
The national implementation of international human rights depends on a 
variety of choices that states have made, two of which have central relevance 
for the purposes of this dissertation. Firstly, it depends on the position that 
international human rights occupy in the domestic legal setting. Here, states 
traditionally have a choice between monist and dualist approaches to inter-
national law. To put it crudely, monist states have theoretically fewer possi-
bilities not to apply international human rights in accordance with their 
international supervisory practice. While this debate has been more or less 
concluded in the context of the European Court of Human Rights, this is still an 
issue for international human rights treaties that do not have such a strong 
implementation and supervisory mechanisms. UN human rights treaties are 
supervised by specific treaty bodies that adopt a variety of instruments; the 
domestic legal effect of these instruments in comparison with the practice of the 
ECtHR is less clear. States distinguish between these bodies; their credibility 
and states’ willingness to cooperate with them varies; so do the standards of the 
treaty bodies together with their supervisory practice employed.   
Secondly, national interpretation of international treaty norms depends on 
whether states share the values behind particular human rights norms or whether 
they give their independent interpretation to the values behind them. Here, the 
discussion on the universality, relativity, traditional values and minimum core 
approach to international human rights is of importance. 
Rights of the child should be a particularly appropriate example for the 
current research, as the understanding that children are weaker participants in 
society requiring strong protection does not, in principle, vary in the opinions of 
states.19 This has manifested in the nearly universal acceptance of the CRC.20 At 
the same time, the CRC and the work of the CRC Committee have not received 
too much attention. 
Recent years show an increase in the global emphasis and importance on the 
rights of the child. The year 2014 marked the 25th anniversary of the Convention 
on the Rights of the Child21 (CRC). 25 years of practice mean that most of the 
states have gone through several cycles of reporting, and, thus, there is a 
considerable amount of interpretation available. Furthermore, the importance of 
                                                 
19  This research does not embark on discussion whether the rights of children should be 
protected through the children’s rights paradigm. For this discussion, see e.g., the analysis by 
Lucinda Ferguson, “Not Merely Rights for Children but Children’s Rights: The Theory Gap 
and the Assumption of the Importance of Children’s Rights,” International Journal of 
Children’s Rights 21 (2013): 177–208. 
20  As of 1 August 2015, the CRC has 195 members. Somalia ratified the CRC in January 
2015 but has not completed the ratification process. Sourth Sudan completed its ratification 
process in May 2015. UNICEF, “Press Release: Government of Somalia Signs Instrument of 
Ratification of UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,” January 20, 2015. 
21  CRC, UN GA, GA Res 44/25, annex, 44 UN GAOR Supp (No. 49), at 167, UN Doc 
A/44/49 (1989). 
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the rights of the child were stressed globally when Malala Yousafzai and Kailash 
Satyarthi, two renowned children’s rights activists and advocates, officially 
received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway in 2014. 22  The CRC is 
interesting also in the context of the universal rights and traditional values debate 
as it introduced human rights dogma and language deep into the traditionally 
private sphere – the family as an institution is the central carrier as well as the 
transmitter or enhancer of the tradition and cultural values of a society. 
At the same time, investigating the rights of children has difficulties as in 
contemporary childhood studies children are not a static group.23 Instead, child-
hood is seen as a social phenomenon where children should be viewed not only as 
passive subjects but also as active subjects with their particular social life and 
their environment and as builders and determinants of society.24 Furthermore, the 
capacity of a child is evolving – a child is not merely an adult in miniature but a 
human being under development in need of different degrees and levels of 
guidance, protection, provision, and participation in various stages of their life.25 
Additionally, an interesting tension occurs between the rights of the child 
and the rights of the family and those of the parents. A child acts mainly within 
the family and, therefore, the rights of the child are strongly connected to the 
rights and obligations of the child’s parents. Direction and guidance should be 
given to children to compensate for their lack of knowledge, experience and 
understanding; moreover, their actions must be restricted according to their 
evolving capacities. In other words, the more a child knows, experiences, and 
understands, the more the parents, legal guardians, or other persons legally 
responsible for the child must limit their directions and guidance. Moreover, as 
the child develops, their level of dependence recedes in direct proportion to the 
inverse growth of their degree of autonomy. This emancipation of a child 
touches the heart of some cultures and traditional values. 
The rights of the child cover all traditional human rights, as well as some 
child-specific rights. These rights include: environmental interests, cultural 
protection, education – pre-school and school, public services, status and rights 
of the child in the family; extreme protection against sexual abuse, ill-treatment, 
trafficking, economic use of children, and public care. Still, there are general 
rights and principles that govern the implementation of all the rights of the child. 
These principles are material rights relevant to the current dissertation. The 
                                                 
22  Nobel Media AB 2014, “The Nobel Peace Prize 2014,” Nobelprize.org, December 16, 
2014. 
23  For a recent analysis of the variety of issues children face in different parts of the world, 
see e.g., Karl Hanson and Olga Nieuwenhuys, eds., Reconceptualizing Children’s Rights in 
International Development: Living Rights, Social Justice, Translations (Cambridge [etc.]: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
24  See e.g., Juha Eskelinen and Petri Kinnunen “Lapsuuden loppu vai uusi lapsuus.” in 
Maritta Törrönen and Pelastakaa lapset, Lapsuuden hyvinvointi: yhteiskuntapoliittinen 
puheenvuoro (Pelastakaa lapset, 2001), 10–19. 
25  See e.g., Gerison Lansdown, UNICEF, and Innocenti Research Centre, The Evolving 
Capacities of the Child (Florence, Italy: Save the Children: UNICEF, 2005). 
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Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC Committee or the Committee) has 
defined four such general principles in its General Comment No. 5:26  non-
discrimination (art. 2); the best interests of a child (art. 3 (1)); right to life, 
survival, and development (art. 6); and right to express one’s opinion (art. 12). 
The definition of a child determines the material scope and addressees of the 
CRC. The current dissertation analyses the national implementation of two of 
these general concepts. 
Firstly, the implementations of the definition of the child is analysed through 
some respective age limits (sexual consent, marriage, employment, criminal 
liability, enlistment in armed forces). Secondly, the concept of the best interests 
of the child is analysed as it influences all the procedures relating to children 
and is an interpretative tool that puts other relevant values into a hierarchy. 
 
 
B. Purpose and structure of the research 
The ultimate aim of this dissertation is to analyse the interpretation and 
implementation of selected children’s rights in three states: Estonia, Finland, 
and Russia (hereinafter ‘the states’ or ‘the three states’). In particular, I am 
interested in whether significant differences occur in the national imple-
mentation of the minimum core of these – purportedly universal – rights and 
what factors might cause any such differences. The main hypothesis of the work 
is that even in such a universally recognized document as the CRC, the 
universality claim does not hold true for the understanding and, furthermore, the 
interpretation and practical application of the minimum core of rights in these 
states differs considerably. 
The dissertation is divided into two chapters. The first chapter introduces 
and defines the theoretical and general legal framework for the analysis; the 
second chapter analyses the compliance of the national practice with inter-
national standards. The first chapter begins by discussing theories of national 
acceptance of international law and analyses the position of international 
treaties in the domestic legal systems. Theoretical concepts behind the work 
include the monist-dualist approaches to international law and the relevance of 
these approaches to international and national human rights practice. These 
approaches are hardly new, but they are a backdrop that is used for justifying 
domestic practices. However, I am not only interested in monist or dualist 
solutions on the level of constitutional texts only but rather in their application 
in state practice. The central hypothesis of the first chapter is that monism and 
dualism distinctions do not have notable importance for the adherence to 
international human rights law.  
                                                 
26  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 5. General Measures of Implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, Para. 6)” (CRC/GC/2003/5, 
November 27, 2003). 
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When the universalist-relativist arguments are used by the states, they could 
in principle complement, reinforce, and inform the former monist-dualist 
division. Thus, the second part of the first chapter introduces the universalist-
relativist debate and shows the possible perspectives on the traditional values 
debate. It continues by discussing the theoretical position of international 
human rights in international and national law and the general rules of their 
implementation. This would determine the nature of obligations deriving from 
international human rights treaties, including the way these treaties and their 
subsequent practice are to be applied within the national legal systems. This 
discussion includes an analysis of the legal effect that instruments of the 
reporting procedure (Concluding Observations and General Comments) have. 
The norm-making capacity of international organisations, including human 
rights treaty bodies, is analysed, as states are likely to implement only the 
provisions that they deem binding. The current dissertation concentrates on the 
work of the CRC Committee and the position of their instruments. It remains 
for other researches to analyse the efficiency and credibility of this Committee 
vis-à-vis other UN treaty bodies comparatively. The presumption here is that a 
universality claim does not differentiate between treaties and treaty bodies; 
therefore, it is possible to draw more general conclusions on the universality of 
international human rights from the implementation of any minimum core right. 
The third part of the first chapter introduces a substantive legal framework of 
the research by showing the central aims of the rights of the child, together with 
a general overview of relevant universal and regional instruments and multitude 
of supervisory mechanisms. All three states belong to the UN and the Council 
of Europe;27 Estonia and Finland are also part of the EU. 
The fourth part of the first chapter analyses the position of international 
human rights treaties in the three states (Estonia, Russia and Finland) and their 
supervisory practice. It finishes by concluding whether the distinction of 
monism/dualism is of relevance. Here, the analysis is made on the level of 
constitutional law. There are two hypotheses in this part. Firstly, all three states 
consider international human rights as part of their national legal system; 
secondly, all three states deem supervisory practice of relevant international 
bodies, including the CRC Committee, as binding. 
The second chapter concentrates on national implementation practice of the 
rights of the child in the three states. It asks firstly what the minimum core 
requirements of the substantive rights are and continues by analysing the 
compliance of the national practice with the requirements and the impact the 
international law and the instruments of the CRC Committee has had. The 
impact is understood here as the way in which domestic actors have referred to, 
                                                 
27  The Parliamentary Assembly of the CoE renewed the sanctions against Russia in 
January 2015 due to the conflict in Ukraine; thus, the standing of Russia is controversial. 
PACE, “Citing Ukraine, PACE Renews Sanctions against Russian Delegation,” January 28, 
2015. In July 2015, these sanctions were not abolished. PACE, “Committee Proposes Not to 
Annul Russian Credentials ‘at This Time,’” June 1, 2015. 
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used, and discussed selected standards of the CRC. Domestic actors include the 
governments, parliaments, courts, and selected ombudsmen. The dissertation 
uses secondary sources such as the views of the NGOs and the media for 
illustration of the national attitudes. Compliance is viewed as the extent to 
which policy, legislative, judicial, or other measures have been taken as a result 
of the adoption of the CRC and related international political processes. It refers 
to a state of conformity or identity between an actor’s behavior and a specific 
rule of international law.28 
The first part of the second chapter analyses the definition of a child, and the 
second part deals with the best interest of a child. In both of these cases, the 
minimum core requirements of the CRC are first defined. Here the wording of 
the CRC, relevant General Comments, and state practice are used. In the light of 
these minimum requirements, state practice (legislation as well as court 
practice), together with the political rhetoric, is analysed. The central hypothesis 
of the second chapter is that the states do not fulfil and implement the minimum 
requirements set forth, and, at least some of them use culture or traditional 
values arguments as a justification for it. 
Insight into national implementation of the obligations undertaken by 
signing international human rights treaties is partly analysed through 
constructive dialogue in the United Nations. Thus, the end result has two 
dimensions. Firstly, it shows the way the CRC Committee analyses state reports 
through constructive dialogue. The Committee uses General Comments to define 
the minimum core standards of the CRC; it should examine their application in 
the constructive dialogue. Ultimately, the universal implementation of the CRC 
should be guaranteed by the practice of the CRC Committee as only the CRC 
Committee is in a position to guarantee any type of uniformity. It would be 
interesting to compare the working-methods and instruments used by the CRC 
Committee with those of the other UN treaty bodies. It might well be that the 
CRC Committee is a weak supervisory body and that this is the reason why 
CRC is not implemented uniformly. Such a comparison is not the aim of the 
current dissertation; rather, as the CRC can be regarded as an instrument where 
international consensus is the highest, and as the CRC Committee, as a fairly 
recent treaty body, has had time to learn from the weaknesses of other treaty 
bodies, it is seen as the best instrument for the current research. 
The hypothesis here is that when analysing the state parties’ reports, the 
CRC Committee checks the compatibility of state practice against these mini-
mum core standards. If this is not the case, the objectivity of the standards, as 
well as the interpretative value of the CRC and the GCs, is questionable. It is 
also important to see whether the Committee uses comparative methods in its 
analysis and whether it clearly identifies the standards it aims to apply. The 
                                                 
28  The dissertation follows the approach taken by Kal Raustiala, “Compliance &(and) 
Effectiveness in International Regulatory Cooperation,” Case Western Reserve Journal of 
International Law 32 (2000): 391. 
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existence of such common minimum standards is the substance of the 
universality claim, as indeed is the impression that the CRC Committee gives in 
its General Conclusions.29 
Secondly, this research gives an insight into the implementation ethics of the 
three states – how do they see the international obligations imposed by inter-
national human rights treaties as well as the practice of the supervisory 
institutions? Although the number of countries in this study is low, the research 
looks into the argumentation of each selected state when making implementing 
efforts in order to conclude: what are the central arguments of non-compliance 
or compliance with international human rights standards? Clearly, this is a 
qualitative rather than a quantitative analysis.  
Concluding from the above, this research proposes that a harmonization 
vision is, indeed, behind the work of supervisory committees when they 
scrutinize national legislation and implementation practice by states against the 
standards of international law. The theoretical part of the work proposes that 
these differences in implementation might be present because of the monist-
dualist distinction and/or the philosophical understanding of the function, 
substance, and limitations of international human rights law. 
 
 
C. Methodology and sources of the research 
This dissertation examines a field that is situated at the intersection of public 
international law and constitutional law since human rights law in specific 
contexts is intrinsically linked with both. The central legal method used is the 
comparative method 30  – comparative human rights and, to some extent, 
comparative public (constitutional) law. Here, the dissertation follows the 
proposal of Mattei:31 
in recent years, because of the emphasis of the role of interpreters in the making 
of the law, the assumed universalism in international law has been questioned by 
a variety of new approaches to international law.… Hence it becomes possible to 
compare one vision of international law with another vision, and such an effort 
claims its own academic identity as one of the comparative disciplines, namely 
comparative international law.  
Current dissertation views national legal systems as pluralist legal systems that 
are influenced by several exterior and interior influencers – today, legal 
centrism of nation-states has been replaced by polycentrism with many 
                                                 
29  See e.g., CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14 on the Right of the Child to Have 
His or Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3, para. 1)” (CRC/C/GC/14, 
May 19, 2013). 
30  See e.g., Peter de Cruz, “Comparative Law, Functions and Methods,” Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 2009. 
31  Ugo Mattei and Boris N. Mamlyuk, “Comparative International Law,” Brooklyn Journal 
of International Law Vol. 36 No. 2 (2011): 450–1. 
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competing laws.32 Comparative analysis of the application practice of states 
shows what importance states grant to international human rights instruments 
and their supervisory practice. At the same time, the comparative method sheds 
light on the value of the practice of the treaty bodies. Central to the analysis are 
legal dogmatics i.e., the law in force. This means that besides the comparative 
method, I will also apply the analytical method more generally as, in fact, every 
legal study would do. 
In a number of ways, the states of Estonia, Finland, and Russia have a 
common historical heritage but, at the same time, have several very different 
characteristics. The clash of cultural and historical backgrounds and the effect 
of international human rights as a unifier here present an interesting dilemma. 
All three neighbouring countries have a common geographical location and 
decades or even centuries of shared history under Russian rule. There are, 
however, also vast differences – the main religion in Russia is Orthodox 
Christianity whereas Finland is a Lutheran country and Estonia has the lowest 
number of people proportionally with affiliations, and among those people who 
have affiliations to a Church, there is an almost equal number of Lutherans and 
Russian Orthodox. 
The selection is further intriguing as Estonia was occupied and annexed, 
although illegally, by the Soviet Union and had common foundations in the 
political and legal system for 50 years with Russia during the Soviet period. 
This does not automatically mean that the application of these systems carried 
the same or even similar values or had the same effect on the legal culture of 
today’s states. Both Estonia and Russia have gone through a rapid transition and 
democratization of their legal systems, as well as the central values of society, 
though with quite different outcomes.33 All these make the comparison between 
the countries interesting and might give a real insight into the functioning and 
meaning of the rights of the child and the values behind those rights. 
The approach of the states to the rights of the child has varied. Finland has 
stressed the importance of the rights of the child and is traditionally considered 
to be a state that complies with international treaties. 34  The Estonian legal 
system has formally been opened to all international human rights norms.35 At 
                                                 
32  Husa has proposed a comparativist approach to such pluralist legal systems in Jaakko 
Husa, “The Method Is Dead, Long Live the Methods – European Polynomia and Pluralist 
Methodology,” Legisprudence 5 (2011): 249–271. 
33  For an interesting account on Russia’s recent political history, see e.g., Edward Lucas, 
The New Cold War: How the Kremlin Menaces Both Russia and the West (Bloomsbury 
Publishing, 2012). For a short account of the history of Estonia, see e.g., Andres Kasekamp, 
A History of the Baltic States (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
34  Jasper Krommendijk, “Finnish Exceptionalism at Play? The Effectiveness of the 
Recommendations of UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies in Finland,” Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 32, No. 1 (jaanuar 2014): 18–43. 
35  René Värk and Carri Ginter, “Estonia,” in The European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe, ed. Leonard M. Hammer and 
Frank Emmert (The Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2012), 183–96. 
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the same time, its regulation has often remained formal, and there is little 
substantive legal practice in relation to a number of international human rights 
treaties. Recent empirical research into the rights of the child shows that 
although theoretically the rights of the child are deemed important, the opinion 
of the family and parents still prevails, with little regard to the participatory 
rights of the children.36 Russia, on the other hand, has, in recent years, stressed 
the need to protect children traditionally through the institution of the family; it 
has openly questioned the value of the individual rights of the child.37 Thus, the 
interpretations of Russia, given to a number of provisions of the CRC, reflect 
these values and this, from the outset, is in conflict with the central notions of 
the CRC. 
One might question the choice of states for the analysis. Indeed, it was a 
particular challenge in this study to choose the key states for the analysis taking 
into account the significantly different approaches to balancing the public and 
individual interests in general, which are distinctive of the three countries. It 
might be less challenging to compare legal approaches within more similar 
cultural or historical legal traditions – although it would also have been possible 
to choose three states that historically and culturally would have differed much 
more from each other. 
Nevertheless, all of the selected states are parties to the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child. Furthermore, they are also parties to the European 
Convention on Human Rights38 (ECHR) and European Social Charter (revised) 
(ESC (rev)); 39 all three countries have accepted the jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Thus, we can say they ‘operate’ in the same 
legal field or under the same international obligations. 
As discussed above, one of the questions of this research is whether the CRC 
Committee and the states implement the same – or at least as similar as 
possible – minimum standards. Through this angle, the application of the rights 
of the child in different state parties’ legal systems can be a valuable example 
and contribute to the discussion on the universality of international human 
rights. It has to be noted that this dissertation does not aim to give an exhaustive 
account of all the legislative initiatives and practices of the three states. 40 
                                                 
36  Marre Karu et al., Lapse õiguste ja vanemluse monitooring. Laste ja täiskasvanute 
küsitluse kokkuvõte (Poliitikauuringute Keskus Praxis, 2012). 
37  Vladimir V. Putin, “State Council Presidium Meeting on Family, Motherhood and Child-
hood Policy,” February 17, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6687 (accessed 1.06.2015). 
38  ECHR, Council of Europe, CETS No. 5. 
39  ESC (Revised), Council of Europe, CETS No 163. ComSR stated in a collective 
complaint from the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. France, 
App. No. 14/2003 (EComSR, November 3, 2004), Decision on the merits of 5 September 
2003, para. 36: “Article 17 of the Charter is further directly inspired by the United Nations 
Convention on the Rights of the Child. It protects in a general manner the right of children 
and young persons, including unaccompanied minors, to care and assistance.” 
40  All the legal acts as well as court cases are checked on April 1, 2015. Current 
dissertation does not reflect posterior developments. 
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Comparative material is selected bearing in mind the general purpose of the 
research and thus should rather be taken as examples of implementation practice. 
The standard used was the information that the CRC Committee collects and 
analyses during the constructive dialogue process. 
A meaningful comparison in international human rights law presupposes 
certain cultural sensibility and linguistic knowledge by the researcher – it is 
easier to compare familiar legal systems that operate in familiar languages. In 
the present case, the legal systems of the selected three countries were 
accessible in their original language – a factor that is considered a sine qua non 
for making meaningful comparisons. 
Comparative legal analysis often takes place on the assumption that the 
jurisdictions being compared are operating in separate spheres. In the human 
rights context, however, national legislators, as well as the domestic courts in 
different jurisdictions, are operating in the same or at least in overlapping legal 
space (‘espace juridique’), and their performance is evaluated against their 
international obligations that are then the ‘tertium comparationis’.41 
International and regional instruments central for the current analysis are: 
1. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, where the substance of a 
number of provisions is further supported by the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) 42  and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).43 In some instances, certain 
ILO treaties have relevance. 
2. The ECHR and the practice of the ECtHR as creating possibly stricter 
minimum standards for the protection of some rights of the child; and the 
ESC (Rev) together with the supervisory practice of the European 
Committee on Social Rights (EComSR). 
 
Material rights central for the current research are part of the rights of children 
and general principles of the rights of a child in particular – these include a 
definition of the child and the best interests of the child. The progress of states 
is periodically analysed by the CRC Committee, who concludes whether 
standards of the CRC have been met. The same is also done in the practice of 
the ECtHR when it applies the rights of the child, as well as the EcomSR. This 
research takes a step further and looks at whether and how these standards are 
used in national legislation as well as in the practice of domestic courts. This 
gives an indication as to the value or importance these particular human rights 
standards have for member states. 
 
 
                                                 
41  See also the discussion in Christopher McCrudden, “The Pluralism of Human Rights 
Adjudication,” in Reasoning Rights: Comparative Judicial Engagement, ed. Liora Lazarus, 
Christopher McCrudden, and Nigel Bowles (Rochester, NY: Hart Publishing, 2014). 
42  ICESCR, UN GA, GA Res 2200A (XXI). 
43  ICCPR, UN GA, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 999, p. 171 and vol. 1057, p. 407. 
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CHAPTER I 
SETTING THE SCENE:  
UNIVERSALITY OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
No legal system can exist without a value system, and some view international 
human rights as representing that in international law. Since the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, international human rights 
have been referred to as a universal morality of international law.44 That is to 
say that international human rights aim at defining universal rights that are 
obligatory for all the national legal systems that have accepted these inter-
national treaties.45 
The current chapter constructs the foundation for the dissertation – it 
introduces and defines the theoretical and general legal framework for the 
analysis, and analyses the general position and role that international human 
rights treaties have in the three states. 
There is wide-ranging disagreement in contemporary international scholar-
ship about the effect as well as the content of international human rights. 
Mendus pointed out as long ago as 1995 that “in recent years, as political com-
mitment to human rights has grown, a philosophical commitment has waned.”46 
In the past few decades, this philosophical debate has been followed by the 
cultural relativist discussion and the claim that international human rights, 
including the rights of the child, represent Western value-imperialism that 
insists on imposing its values on the rest of the world.47 
One can see international human rights as having had a positive and 
liberating effect for the global protection of individual rights. As an example, 
                                                 
44  See e.g., the discussion in Seyla Benhabib, “Another Universalism: On the Unity and 
Diversity of Human Rights,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical 
Association 81, No. 2 (November 1, 2007): 7–32; or Romuald R. Haule, “Some Reflections 
on the Foundation of Human Rights – Are Human Rights an Alternative to Moral Values?,” 
in Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, ed. Armin von Bogdandy et al., vol. 10 
(Leiden; Biggleswade: Martinus Nijhoff, 2006), 367–395. 
45  World Conference on Human Rights and United Nations, “Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action” para. 1 in particular. For a wider discussion and critical views, see 
e.g., Jack Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” Hum. Rts. Q. 29, No. 2 
(2007): 281–306. An alternative view has been to regard international human rights as a 
political overlapping consensus. See e.g., Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human 
Rights,” Fordham L. Rev. 66, No. 2 (January 1, 1997): 273. 
46  Susan Mendus, “Human Rights in Political Theory,” Political Studies 43, No. s1 
(August 1995): 1. Classical examples of this debate are arguments of Nussbaum, who has 
stated that human rights form "reasonable conditions of a world political consensus" in 
Nussbaum, “Capabilities and Human Rights”; and Walzer, who has argued that human rights 
constitute the "core of a universal thin morality" in Michael Walzer, Thick and Thin: Moral 
Argument at Home and Abroad (University of Notre Dame Press 1994), 54. 
47  See e.g., Makau Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors: The Metaphor of Human 
Rights,” Harv. Int’l L.J. 42 (2001): 201–46. 
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the international court practice has granted international human rights a 
prominent position in international law; the ICJ affirmed as long ago as 1980 in 
the Tehran Hostages case that: 
Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to 
physical constraint in conditions of hardship is itself manifestly incompatible 
with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as with the 
fundamental principles enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.48 
Therefore, as Rodley points out, the UDHR has been slowly given the status of 
general international human rights law.49 In their effect, international human 
rights are safeguards and constraints against domestic political decision-making. 
As Dworkin puts it, “rights are political trumps held by individuals.”50 The 
effectiveness of these constraints, however, depends on the good will of each 
state, as the international community seldom interferes with domestic matters of 
states for the protection of international human rights. 
There are also those who consider the rhetoric of international human rights 
law stronger than its true potential or functioning. As an example, even if 
sufficiently detailed international standards and international practice are 
available, domestic courts are still likely to reflect on domestic constitutional 
values rather than universal ones. 51  Koskenniemi, for one, argues that the 
rhetoric of human rights is not as powerful as it seems because international 
human rights do not hold a coherent set of normative demands that could be 
resorted to in the administration of society.52 His argument does not deny the 
principal importance of international human rights but proposes that they do not 
have the quality of legal norms but function rather as general principles. The 
                                                 
48  United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. 
Iran), (1980) I.C.J. Reports 1980, p. 3 (ICJ) [91]. 
49  Nigel Rodley, “Is There General International Human Rights Law?” EJIL: Talk!, 
October 16, 2014, http://www.ejiltalk.org/is-there-general-international-human-rights-law 
(accessed October 16, 2014). For a more detailed discussion on general international law, 
see e.g., Rüdiger Wolfrum, ed., “General International Law (Principles, Rules, and 
Standards),” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, MPEPIL 1408 (Oxford, 
2010); or Menno T. Kamminga, “Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights 
Law on General International Law,” in The Impact of Human Rights Law on General 
International Law, ed. Menno T. Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (Oxford University Press, 
2009), 2. 
50  Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 
xi. Dworkin elaborates on his theory of rights in Ronald Dworkin, Is Democracy Possible 
Here? Principles for a New Political Debate (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 
2006), 31; and Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2000), 120–210. 
51  See similar discussion relating to erga omnes obligations in Vidmar, “Norm Conflicts 
and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical International Legal System?” 25. 
52  Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Oxford ; Portland, Or: Hart, 
2011), 133. 
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current dissertation shows whether it is possible to find clear normative 
requirments from the provisions of the CRC. 
This is why setting the scene first requires analysis of the position of inter-
national human rights treaties and the practice of the supervisory institutions 
within the international law system. It helps to establish the true potential of 
these treaties and instruments and gives an indication of the expected effect for 
national legal systems. Secondly, the position of international treaties within 
domestic legal systems is analysed with reference to the monism and dualism 
theories.  
As discussed below, the way that international human rights treaties function 
in a given legal system depends on several criteria among which the approach 
of the state to international law is of importance. Traditionally this is believed to 
be determined by whether the legal system recognizes the concept of monism or 
dualism.53 Although international treaty bodies and human rights courts stress 
the supremacy of international human rights norms as well as their direct 
applicability in national legal systems, this choice is at least formally still in the 
realm of national sovereignty.54 Nevertheless, as the aim of international human 
rights treaties is their enforceability and the possibility for individual justiciable 
claims, they all foresee exhaustion of domestic legal remedies and require 
domestic justiciability.55 
Secondly, application of international human rights norms might depend on 
the acceptance or rejection of the universality claim of international human 
rights standards. This has been especially clear in the recent discussion on 
‘traditional values.’ As an example, it was noted by the Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women that: “Cultural relativism is often used as an excuse to 
permit inhumane and discriminatory practices against women in the community, 
despite clear provisions in many human right instruments”.56 All these concepts 
form a theoretical framework for the empirical study in the second chapter. 
Thirdly, national acceptance and implementation of particular and more 
detailed interpretations of the state obligations by supervisory institutions 
depend on whether these institutions are seen as being credible interpreters of 
the treaty. They also may depend on the tools employed by the treaty bodies. 
Thus, the positions of the interpretative instruments of the treaty bodies and 
those of the CRC Committee in the national legal systems are analysed. 
                                                 
53  For recent analysis, see e.g., Jordan J. Paust, “Basic Forms of International Law and 
Monist, Dualist, and Realist Perspectives,” in Basic Concepts of Public International Law – 
Monism & Dualism, ed. Novakovic (Belgrade, 2013), 244–65. 
54  See on the UK example Craig William Alec Webber, “The Decline of Dualism: The 
Relationship between International Human Rights Treaties and the United Kingdom’s 
Domestic Counter-Terror Laws,” 2012. 
55  See e.g., art. 7 (h) of the Optional Protocol to the CRC; art. 3 (2(a)) of the Optional 
Protocol to the ICESCR. 
56  UN Economic and Social Council, Integration of the Human Rights of Women and the 
Gender Perspective. Violence Against Women., January 31, 2002, para. 1. 
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1 National acceptance of international law 
The effectiveness of the global human rights regime depends on national 
implementation or recognition of international human rights. Norm creation is, 
thus, internationalized, while the application or enforcement of rights is almost 
entirely up to the member states. This is further made obvious by the work of 
the international monitoring bodies. With the exception of a few regional 
systems where international human rights courts are present, global inter-
national monitoring bodies engage in political dialogue with states and are able 
to use mainly persuasion as a tool. 
As will be discussed below (chapter 1, part 4), Estonia and Russia are 
formally monist legal systems while Finland represents a dualist legal system. 
Analysis of the implementation practice, however, shows that Russia is de facto 
a dualist country while Finland is de facto a monist country. Of course, this 
confusing situation also raises the question of the analytical usefulness of the 
two labels, monism and dualism. As De Wet points out, in reality, the difference 
between monist and dualist systems has always been one of degree.57 
 
1.1 Dualism and pluralism 
Domestic application of international human rights treaties is still an area 
governed by domestic constitutional regulation. According to the dualist 
doctrine,58 international law and domestic law are separate and self-contained 
regimes that govern different subjects and legal relations. While the inter-
national law regulates the conduct of states and interstate relations, the domestic 
law regulates a whole range of relations from those between the state organs 
and individuals as well as those between individuals themselves.59 International 
law and international human rights rules can enter the national legal system 
through rules of reference, and this is traditionally regulated by the relevant 
constitutions of states. This, in turn, means that the concrete position or rank of 
international law in these legal systems is not predetermined. The classical 
dualist view60  does not accept the prevailing understanding of public inter-
                                                 
57  Erika De Wet, “The Constitutionalization of Public International Law,” in The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, 1st 
ed (Oxford, U.K: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1212. 
58  Giorgio Gaja, “Dualism – a Review,” in New Perspectives on the Divide Between 
National and International Law, ed. Janne E. Nijman and André Nollkaemper (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2007), 52–62. Dualism is a ‘traditional’ theory explaining the relationship 
between international and national law. 
59  Ibid., 52–54. 
60  Until the World War II, dualism was globally accepted and prevailing doctrine. As 
Dupuy points out, contemporary dualism recognises the role of the international orga-
nisations and accepts that international law regulates the rights of individuals vis-à-vis states. 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, “International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law,” Max Planck 
Encyclopedia of Public International Law, MPEPIL 1056, April 2011, para. 5–10. 
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national law according to which international law takes precedence over 
domestic law.61 This also means that international law cannot reach individuals 
directly without acts of incorporation.  
The dualist doctrine strongly emphasizes state sovereignty and the lack of 
formal sanctions in international law.62 It would, thus, be logical that dualist 
countries would not regard the provisions of international treaties as rules, but 
would rather apply them as guidelines or principles. This would further mean 
that a dualist country would not regard outcomes and recommendations of 
political dialogue with treaty bodies as binding. 
Central to the dualist claim, then, is the understanding that domestic insti-
tutions cannot apply international law directly in their jurisprudence – indi-
viduals and domestic institutions cannot legally be the addressees of inter-
national law.63 Simmons claims that as adjustment costs are high, dualist law 
systems provide initiatives for governments to go slow with treaty rati-
fications.64 Finland, as the only dualist example in the current research, confirms 
this hypothesis as it ratified the ECHR very late, in 1990; as will be discussed, 
this was also one of the inducers of constitutional change in Finland. 
 
1.2 Monism 
The monist doctrine views the relationship between international and domestic 
law as being part of a uniform legal order.65 Within this legal system, inter-
national law is generally seen to be supreme and can be invoked before the 
national courts without prior incorporation.66 The monist approach ensures the 
binding character of international law and aims at preventing norm conflicts 
between legal systems. This, however, does not imply the invalidity of domestic 
law conflicting with international law.67 
                                                 
61  De Wet, “The Constitutionalization of Public International Law,” 1211–12. 
62  Dupuy, “International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law,” para. 21. In the extreme 
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2 (August 2014). 
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64  Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 71–77. 
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Dupuy, “International Law and Domestic (Municipal) Law,” para. 12–18. 
66  We can leave here aside the antiquated variation of monism according to which both are 
the same legal order, but domestic law dominates. The hierarchy of legal norms is prin-
cipally dependent on the national constitutional order. 
67  Gaja, “Dualism – a Review,” 53. 
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From the perspective of monist theory, international law can be, and is 
addressed to individuals as well. Thus, those rules of international law that intend 
to govern the conduct of state organs and individuals are directly applicable to 
their norm addressees irrespective of any intermediary role played by municipal 
laws.68 Dupuy points out that monists state stress as the obligation of the state to 
bring a national legal system into conformity with international law. This 
obligation is backed by the state responsibility.69 
Monist theory has especially been emphasizing the supremacy of hierarchi-
cally more important values and norms. One example that is frequently made is 
the supremacy of international human rights norms as hierarchically central to 
the modern international law system.70 
Following the argumentation of Simmons, as the implementation costs of 
monist countries should be relatively small, these states should be relatively 
receptive towards international human rights treaties unless there are some 
reverse costs that are higher.71 As discussed below, typically of monist states, 
the Russian Federation and Estonia acceded to international human rights 
treaties very quickly in the beginning of their transitions. After the initial 
momentum, Russia has gradually delayed acceptance of new international 
human rights obligations, and there are even discussions of turning officially 
towards dualism. Estonia formally fulfils the requirements of international 
human rights law; the substantive implementation of these norms is often 
superficial and formal. 
  
1.3 Human rights – bridging the gap? 
Nijman and Nollkaemper find that the segregation of national and international 
law is diminishing. They list the following trends: 1) emergence of common 
values (including international human rights); 2) dispersion of authority 
(globalisation has changed the reality, and the state has lost its controlling 
power); 3) deformalization (relationship between international and national law 
steps away from formal positivism and allows for numerous additional 
authorities).72 For practical purposes, this would diminish the monist-dualist 
division as only the monist view would adequately support these developments. 
                                                 
68  Ibid. 59. 
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International human rights law has the capacity to reconcile international and 
national law and reform both the dualist and monist understandings; due to its 
specific characteristics, it creates direct applicability that depends on national 
practice. Nollkaemper for one suggests that direct effect in international law can 
have both the function of a sword and the function of a shield – they enter 
national legal order to protect individual rights; often, however, they legitimize 
the non-application of international law. 73  Vidmar concludes that the UN 
Security Council considers serious national violations of international human 
rights to be a threat to peace and security and to permit recourse to measures 
under chapter VII of the UN Charter.74 Furthermore, there are examples where 
domestic courts have relied directly on international human rights treaties.75 
This has, in particular, been the case within regional systems with international 
human rights courts overseeing compliance with international obligations.76  
It is still currently impossible to conclude that international human rights law 
could function as supranational law and be applied directly without taking into 
account national legal orders. As discussed below, this has brought about 
discussion of the importance and position of international human rights treaties 
in international law as well as the constitutionalization of international law. The 
choice between monism and dualism is presumed to have practical consequences 
for the way international law norms, including treaty norms and international 
practice, function and influence national law. This is particularly important for 
the full and principled implementation of international human rights law. 
Firstly, this choice influences whether international human rights treaties 
have a direct effect on the national legal system and can, thus, be directly relied 
on in the national legal system by individuals.77 In dualist states, international 
treaties require national implementation mechanisms. They could potentially 
distort the meaning of norms or the court system might limit the possibility to 
rely on treaty norms in the absence of such implementation mechanisms or 
when those implementation mechanisms do not correspond to the requirements 
                                                 
73  André Nollkaemper, “The Duality of Direct Effect of International Law,” EJIL Vol. 25, 
No. 1 (2014): 108–109. 
74  Jure Vidmar, “International Community and Abuses of Sovereign Powers,” Liverpool 
Law Review 35, No. 2 (August 2014). It would be wrong to assume that all human rights 
have such character; moreover, as Vidmar puts it: “one should not overstretch the effect of 
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75  Nollkaemper cites examples from other jurisdictions such as Australia, where the 
Australian High Court acknowledged the legal status of the CRC in Australia, even though it 
had not been made part of Australia’s legal system in the case of Minister of State for 
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Teoh, [1995] ILDC 779. 75 André Nollkaemper, “The 
Duality of Direct Effect of International Law,” EJIL Vol. 25, No. 1 (2014): 110. 
76  See e.g., André Nollkaemper and Janne Elisabeth Nijman, New Perspectives on the 
Divide Between National and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007). 
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International Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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of the treaties. There have been cases in the practice of the ECtHR where states 
have used the argument of dualism, claiming that this was the reason the 
national courts could not apply an international treaty.78 
While the ECHR has a strong supervisory mechanism through which direct 
application of the ECHR has clearly been stressed, 79  the same does not 
necessarily apply to UN human rights treaties. However, the UN treaty bodies 
have also emphasised the primacy and direct effect of all human rights treaties 
in national legal systems. The CESCR Committee has stated: 
In general, legally binding international human rights standards should operate 
directly and immediately within the domestic legal system of each State party, 
thereby enabling individuals to seek enforcement of their rights before national 
courts and tribunals. The rule requiring the exhaustion of domestic remedies 
reinforces the primacy of national remedies in this respect. The existence and 
further development of international procedures for the pursuit of individual 
claims is important, but such procedures are ultimately only supplementary to 
effective national remedies.80 
Secondly, when a monist state accepts a constitutionality review, international 
human rights treaties have the potential to function as standards of 
constitutionality. This depends on the status those international human rights 
treaties enjoy in the given legal system. This would require acceptance of these 
treaties as higher than national legislation, sometimes even giving them equal 
status to basic rights. Based on the above, the hypothesis is that monist states 
are more prone to apply international human rights standards directly and also 
give effect to international supervisory practice.  
Alternatively, national compliance with international human rights standards 
might prove to be disconnected with this division. Instead, other factors, such as 
principled acceptance of the human rights value system together with the 
universality of human rights, or the separation of powers and the existence of a 
strong and independent judiciary, might prove to be more relevant for 
compliance. Hillebrecht argues that compliance with international human rights 
standards presupposes strong and independent domestic institutions (courts in 
particular) that advocate compliance: “Domestic institutions not only provide a 
check on executive authority, but they also can become important partners in 
compliance”.81  
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Therefore, the existence of actual as opposed to the merely formal separation 
of powers and substantive not mere rhetorical support for the human rights ideal 
by state institutions could be more relevant indicators. Furthermore, domestic 
and international cooperation between domestic powers (including all levels of 
the government, legislator, and judiciary) are key to implementation. That is, 
implementing human rights per the interpretation given to them by international 
supervisory institutions is a political process. To understand the implementation, 
we must understand the value system of a particular country together with the 




2 Position of human rights treaties  
in international law 
International human rights treaties are part of the international law, but due to 
the nature of the obligations created by them, they are substantively different 
from traditional reciprocal international agreements. This has been recognized 
both by the legal practice as well as theory. Thus, it has to be questioned 
whether and how the general international law applies to these treaties. This 
would help to determine the nature of obligations deriving from international 
human rights treaties, including the way these treaties together with their 
subsequent practice have to be applied to the national legal systems. It would be 
impossible to analyse the implementation of international human rights in the 
national legal systems without clear understanding of what the international 
requirements for such implementations are. 
The UN Human Rights Committee has stressed in the General Comment No. 
24 that the requirements of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties are: 
inappropriate to address the problem of reservations to human rights treaties. 
Such treaties and the Covenant, in particular, are not a web of inter-State 
exchanges of mutual obligations. They concern the endowment of individuals 
with rights. The principle of inter-State reciprocity has no place [vis-à-vis such 
treaties].82 
In addition, the international human rights regime consists not only of 
international human rights standards and their interpretation; instead, their full 
realization depends on the application of international treaty norms in national 
jurisprudence – the national upholding of the values of international human 
rights treaties is vital for the full application of this regime.  
                                                 
82   HRC, “General Comment No. 24: Issues Relating to Reservations Made upon 
Ratification or Accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols Thereto, or in Relation 
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Thus, the International Law Commission has included international human 
rights law in the category of self-contained regimes and lex specialis.83 The ILA 
upheld an alternative view and stressed the need to reconcile general 
international law and human rights.84 
Brilmayer has analysed the difference between international human rights 
treaties and traditional treaties and observed that international human rights 
developed rapidly through written agreements that fulfill, in essence, the 
requirements of traditional treaties. Still, “International rights agreements are 
so different from traditional treaties that they might better be analysed as a 
distinct jurisprudential phenomenon.”85 The central difference is that human 
rights treaties do not protect the reciprocal interests of contracting parties86 but 
the interests and rights of ‘non-parties’ (i.e., individual rights holders who are, 
by the traditional conservative account, not subjects of international law). This 
means that the ordinary treaty rules are not applied here – enforcement is not 
left to an individual state whose rights are violated. Instead, the entire 
international community is activated with enforcement of an obligation erga 
omnes.87 Additionally, countermeasures in kind are a not permitted response to 
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a breach; it would violate the rights of the subjects of the treaties and, thus, be 
against the aim and purpose of these treaties. According to Brilmayer, “[human 
rights] agreements are not reciprocal exchanges of conditional promises but 
parallel and independent commitments to respect pre-existing moral norms – 
‘pledges’”.88 
International human rights law is still characterised by voluntarism – states 
freely pledge themselves to protect the rights of persons under their jurisdiction 
and, in the better part of the cases, have placed themselves under the scrutiny of 
international supervision by international judicial, semi-judicial bodies, or 
specific political dialogue. Schlütter notes that if human rights have the 
character of lex specialis that differentiate them from the rules of general 
international law, interpretation of human rights treaties must also take into 
consideration this particular nature, or even develop special rules of inter-
pretation.89 She further observes that scholars agreeing with the lex specialis 
nature of human rights highlight the particular character of human rights treaties 
as ‘lawmaking’ treaties, while underscoring the high degree of abstraction and 
vagueness of human rights norms as well.90 
Without denying the special nature of the obligations undertaken in 
international human rights treaties, Brilmayer’s argument is convincing – 
international human rights treaties are legal agreements that are including 
voluntary commitments (with the exception of customary international law and 
erga omnes obligations). Thus, the states also freely accept international 
scrutiny by either international judicial bodies as well as by supervisory 
committees.91 There is, however, a difference between the functioning of the 
human rights treaty bodies and all other court-like or judicial bodies that are 
involved in international conflict resolution. As Moravcsik puts it: 
Unlike international institutions governing trade, monetary, environmental or 
security policy, international human rights institutions are not designed primarily 
to regulate policy externalities arising from societal interactions across borders, 
but to hold governments accountable for purely internal activities.92 
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Some of these systems have proved to be successful (examples of this are the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights),93 while the legal relevance of others is often questionable despite fairly 
universal acceptance by states.94 At least the ICJ recognized the influence of 
human rights monitoring systems in its Nicaragua judgment: 
where human rights are protected by international conventions, that protection 
takes the form of such arrangements for monitoring or ensuring respect for 
human rights as are provided for in the conventions themselves.95 
Thus, it has been the opinion of the ICJ that international human rights moni-
toring mechanisms create an adequate system for international human rights 
monitoring. 96  Therefore, the observation by Brilmayer, namely that pledges 
seem more stable than they really are, can be contested. She is of the opinion 
that as international human rights treaties look like treaties, it is assumed that 
signatory states will treat them like treaties.97 Still, as there is no reciprocity 
guarantee supporting the enforcement of these agreements, it cannot be taken 
for granted that states will comply altruistically, or that other states will or could 
compel them to comply with these obligations. Reciprocity is substituted by 
international adjudication – voluntary individual and state-to-state complaints 
procedures and political control. 
It is clear that research focusing only on international law is not sufficient for 
understanding the relevance and substantive impact on international human 
rights. As McCrudden has put it, implementation of international human rights 
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Agreements,” 201. 
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standards on the national level has to be analysed to “understand better the 
developing content and implications of international human rights law.”98 This 
is the space where the potential of international human rights lies.  
There are also a number of obstacles and challenges in the international and 
national implementation of human rights law. Firstly, the relationship of 
international human rights law to the national law has numerous layers; inter-
national treaties establish diverse and sometimes conflicting human rights 
obligations; at the same time, their monitoring mechanisms are relatively weak. 
Secondly, even when possibilities are available for international adjudication, 
they require, as a general rule, exhaustion of domestic remedies. As Slaughter 
points out, basic human rights issues are regulated both by national constitutions 
and international human rights treaties. Interpretation and application of these 
treaties fall under the obligations of both the national adjudicator and to an 
international body, and as these jurisdictions join, the result is a “genuinely 
global community of courts and law.”99 
A consensus exists that implementation of international human rights should 
primarily be achieved through action at the national level. This means, in the 
first place, the inclusion of international human rights provisions in the national 
legal order. This is particularly essential in states belonging to the ‘dualistic 
school’; this action could also be required from states belonging to the ‘monistic 
school’. The effect and meaning of a treaty, then, only derives from domestic 
legal provisions.  
This means that provisions without self-executing character should always 
be translated into national provisions to be enforceable. Furthermore, sometimes 
legislative reform is necessary in order to comply with an international treaty – 
states must attune their national policy to the ratified provisions of a treaty. 
Thirdly, the domestic courts play a significant role in the implementation process; 
at the same time, they often use international human rights only in the cases 
they can be shown as supporting argument for already formulated decision.100 
Most international human rights treaties create an international supervisory 
system with the task of monitoring national progress; and, in some cases, with 
the possibility of individual complaints mechanisms. On the UN level, the treaty 
bodies’ system is complemented with the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) at 
the Human Rights Council, where all international human rights treaty 
obligations of states are analysed through a mainly political process.101 
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2.1 International human rights law norms  
in the hierarchy of norms 
A normative hierarchical order would require the existence of an agreed formal 
hierarchy and an international value system, which would justify the existence 
of such superior norms. The concepts of erga omnes obligations and jus cogens 
norms reflect such a value system. As Vidmar emphasises, “they manifest a 
strong sense of international community, which is ‘glued together’ by the inter-
national value system.”102 
International law is generally seen as having a horizontal nature – the rules 
and principles of international law are not hierarchical to each other, nor are 
there ranks between different types of sources of international law. 103  The 
position of international human rights norms within the general international 
law is relevant on two different levels. Firstly, it is important to specify whether 
there are international legal obligations that should be given precedence over 
international human rights law norms. Secondly, it will help to indicate what 
kind of obligations international human rights law imposes on states. 
States traditionally adhere to international human rights law through 
accession to relevant treaties. Human rights form a bulk of norms that are con-
sidered to have jus cogens quality. As McCorquodale asserts: 
some human rights create legal obligations on a state irrespective of whether it 
has ratified a particular treaty, either because the human right is part of 
customary international law and so binding on all states or by virtue of a rule of 
jus cogens, which no state can derogate from or evade by contrary practice.104  
There are a number of universal treaties covering a range of subjects as well as 
themes;105 the international human rights law system is further complicated by 
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the different institutions interpreting these treaty norms. Furthermore, there is 
the possibility of regarding international human rights law norms as either 
principles or rules and, thus, allowing arguments for the different treatment of 
these norms. 
At the same time, domestic law is usually organised with a clear hierarchy; 
the position of international human rights provisions within these systems 
depend on the approach the state has taken regarding the position of 
international treaties within their constitutional law. While the position of 
international law norms within the legal system is clearly defined in dualist 
countries, this is not necessarily the case in monist legal systems. At the same 
time, one of the successes of monist approaches to international law has been 
ideological – international law and human rights, in particular, have been seen 
as enjoying supremacy over national law and being part of general international 
law.106 One of the expressions of this approach has been found in the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, which prohibits justifications of 
nonperformance based on national law.107 
De Wet proposes that the core values underpinning contemporary 
international law108 are linked to the UN Charter: 
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107  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT; 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 
January 1980, 1155 UNTS 331) art. 27 stipulates: “A party may not invoke the provisions of 
its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty.” Scheinin points out that 
the VCLT has considerable limitations in relation to international human rights treaties, as it 
does not formally acknowledge the whole range of actors in international law, nor does it 
fully acknowledge existence of semi-judicial interpreters of such treaties. He, therefore, 
proposes that VCLT should be applied to international human rights treaties with caution; 
rather, international human rights might be “embryonic form of a global constitution”. 
Martin Scheinin, “Impact on the Law of Treaties,” in The Impact of Human Rights Law on 
General International Law, ed. Menno T. Kamminga and Martin Scheinin (Oxford 
University Press, 2009), 27–30.  
108  Erika De Wet, The International Constitutional Order (Amsterdam: Vossiuspers UvA, 
2005), 7; and Erika De Wet and Jure Vidmar, Hierarchy in International Law the Place of 
Human Rights (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), chap. 2. 
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as the latter´s connecting role is not only structural but also substantive in 
nature. In addition to providing a structural linkage of the different communities 
through universal state membership, the UN Charter also inspires those norms 
which articulate the fundamental values of the international community.109 
The heart of these values in international human rights is often linked with 
art. 1 (3) of the UN Charter, which stresses the value of international human 
rights when specifying the purposes and principles of the UN.110 These values 
have helped to build up comprehensive universal and regional systems of 
international human rights treaties and bodies dealing with their supervision. At 
the same time, there are also other general values and principles, such as the 
principle of humanity, that are central to general international law, and these are 
often seen as superior to other legal norms.111 One of the reasonings for such an 
interpretation comes from art. 103 of the UN Charter;112 although it does not 
specify what norms would prevail in a conflict of norms, it is often interpreted 
as referring to jus cogens norms; erga omnes obligations and obligations under 
the Charter. Some also include here the rights entailed in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights.113 As is discussed below, the traditional values 
movement is aimed at positioning traditional values among such other universal 
values. 
It can be claimed that all the global international human rights instruments 
adopted under the auspices of the UN are part of this “international bill of 
rights”.114 At the same time, others claim that the reference to human rights in 
the art. 1 (3) is too vague to place international human rights top of the 
international hierarchy of norms.115 Still, the international community has tried 
to stress the importance of international human rights and the centrality of 
international human rights norms in several declarations. As an example, the 
                                                 
109  De Wet, The International Constitutional Order, 9. 
110  Art. 1 (3) of the UN Charter states that one of the aims of the UN is: “To achieve 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, 
or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and 
for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” 
111  The Martens clause is one representation of such a humanity clause. For a recent 
account, see e.g., Rotem Giladi, “The Enactment of Irony: Reflections on the Origins of the 
Martens Clause,” European Journal of International Law 25, No. 3 (August 1, 2014): 847–
869. 
112  Article 103 of the UN Charter reads: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under 
any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
113  See generally De Wet, “The Constitutionalization of Public International Law,” 1213–
19; and Vidmar, “Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical 
International Legal System?” 
114  Vidmar, “Norm Conflicts and Hierarchy in International Law: Towards a Vertical 
International Legal System?” 
115  Anthony Aust, “The Role of Human Rights in Limiting the Enforcement Powers of the 
Security Council: A Practitioner`s View.,” in Review of the Security Council by Member 
States, ed. Erika De Wet, André Nollkaemper, and Petra Dijkstra (Intersentia, 2003). 
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centrality of international human rights was stressed in the 1993 Vienna 
Programme of Action together with the need to incorporate international human 
rights standards in domestic legislation;116 such references are a commonplace. 
 
2.1.1 Legal nature of international human rights obligations 
International human rights are traditionally viewed as applicable positive law.117 
At the same time, human rights have foundations in moral thinking and 
sociology.118  There is a strong tension between these different functions of 
human rights. On the one hand, international human rights protect the individual 
against arbitrary intervention by the state and government. At the same time, 
enjoyment of international human rights strongly depends on the assistance of 
the state. 
A number of theorists stress that international human rights and moral rights 
amount in principle to the same thing.119 Others stress the need to separate 
justiciable rights from moral rights and doubt whether international human 
rights as such are legal rights at all. As Tomuschat observes, 
No watertight dividing line exists between human rights as legal concepts and 
their reflection in moral and religious thinking. If human rights had their only 
basis in positive law, their effectiveness would be structurally threatened.120 
There are a number of ways international obligations could be conceptualized; 
these approaches are relevant for the current dissertation as far as they help to 
understand the practical obligations some norms of the CRC entail. Firstly, it is 
possible to analyse norms of international human rights treaties through the 
classification of rules and principles. This is a theory used mainly when 
analysing constitutional rights but is easily transferred also to international law 
and international human rights in particular. Secondly, it is possible to divide 
human rights based on their corresponding obligations. Here, the tripartite 
                                                 
116  The program “urges Governments to incorporate standards as contained in inter-
national human rights instruments in domestic legislation and to strengthen national struc-
tures, institutions and organs of society which play a role in promoting and safeguarding 
human rights.” World Conference on Human Rights and United Nations, “Vienna Decla-
ration and Programme of Action,” para. 83. 
117  See e.g., Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, 3rd ed, 
The collected courses of the Academy of European Law vol. 13/1 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 3. 
118  For a recent account of the historical overview of the philosophical foundations see 
Jarna Petman, Human Rights and Violence: The Hope and Fear of the Liberal World. ([S.l.]: 
Hart Publishing, 2014), pt. 1; and the discussion in Sabine C. Carey, The Politics of Human 
Rights: The Quest for Dignity (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010). 
119  See e.g., generally the discussion by James Griffin, “The Presidential Address: Dis-
crepancies between the Best Philosophical Account of Human Rights and the International 
Law of Human Rights,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 101, New Series (jaanuar 
2001): 1–28.  
120  Tomuschat, Human Rights, 9. 
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division of respect, protect and fulfill is traditionally used. Thirdly, it is possible 
to differentiate between human rights norms based on the expected end-result – 
obligations of result and conduct. Besides, the level of commitment to the 
norms might vary depending on whether these norms are ‘hard law’ or ‘soft 
law’. 
 
Rules and principles 
The international legal theory proposes that a difference exists between rules 
and principles.121 Hart as a representative of legal positivists has discussed this 
differentiation through the concepts of legal norms as coercive orders and moral 
commands. Legal norms are backed by the coercive power of the state while 
moral commands do not have such backing. 122  Dworkin, representing the 
natural law, sees a substantive difference between legal rules and principles in 
the concreteness of norms together with the preciseness of obligations. Dworkin 
proposes in his “Taking Rights Seriously” that: 
the difference between legal principles and legal rules is a logical distinction. 
Both sets of standards point to particular decisions about legal obligations in 
particular circumstances, but they differ in the character of the direction they 
give. Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion /whereas/ principles have 
the dimension of weight and importance.123 
Therefore, in his understanding, principles are applied in a more-or-less manner 
while rules create precise and concrete rights or obligations. Legal systems 
commonly have some kinds of general principles applicable to that legal 
order.124 Alexy has emphasised that the application of legal principles is also 
problematic for the justification of legal judgments as principles allow for 
exceptions and may be mutually inconsistent and even contradictory; they do 
not have all-or-nothing applicability. For their actual interpretation, they require 
concretization via subordinate principles and particular value-judgments with an 
independent material content.125 
This does not mean to say that it is impossible to base arguments on a system 
of values and goals, that is, to argue from an axiological-teleological system or 
                                                 
121  Interestingly, this is one point where the legal positivists and natural law supporters are 
in agreement. For an overview of the Hart-Dworkin debate, see e.g., Scott J. Shapiro, “The 
‘Hart-Dworkin’ Debate: A Short Guide for the Perplexed,” U of Michigan Public Law 
Working Paper No. 77 (February 2, 2007). 
122  H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 2012). See also the 
discussion of Hart`s positions on international law more generally Mehrdad Payandeh, “The 
Concept of International Law in the Jurisprudence of H.L.A. Hart,” European Journal of 
International Law 21, No. 4 (November 1, 2010): 967–95. 
123  Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 24–26. 
124  Robert Alexy, A Theory of Legal Argumentation: The Theory of Rational Discourse as 
Theory of Legal Justification (Clarendon Press, 1989), 4. 
125  Ibid., 4–5. Alexy also explaines that many of the implications of understanding 
fundamental rights as principles include the need for optimization. 
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on some other system. However, it does clarify that this kind of argumentation 
is never entirely conclusive. 126  All international human rights norms have 
practical goals. Wolfrum suggests that legal principles help to systematize legal 
norms. They may also function as tools of interpretation, application, and, in 
particular, assist in the progressive development of international law by 
showing the direction for it.127  
As international human rights treaties are meant to be applied at all levels of 
the national legal system, the practical value of the principles lies in the use of 
them in the legal argumentation.128 According to Alexy, there are three pos-
sibilities for the inclusion of principles as value-judgments in legal argu-
mentation:129 
1. appeal to value-judgments of the community (this could mean local, regional 
or global community); 
2. reference to the inner evaluative coherence of the legal order; 
3. appeal to some objective order of values. 
 
There is no dispute on the understanding that international human rights treaties 
create legal obligations that are strongly connected with their underlying 
morality; thus, they function at least to some extent both as norms and as 
principles in international law.130 
There are also those who consider international human rights norms as 
something other than either rules or principles. David Feldman proposes that 
human rights represent a desirable state, an aspiration, and protection of human 
rights can improve the chances of that aspiration.131 Dorothy Jones argues that 
one of the significant developments in international law since the UN Charter is 
what she calls the ‘declaratory tradition’.132 This tradition establishes a certain 
style of reasoning in international documents according to which leading 
principles are delineated in order to produce a common standard of under-
standing and interpretation of legal norms. She proposes that the concept of 
‘human dignity’ is the best example of this tradition. This is supported by Dicke, 
who claims that functional analysis shows that the dignity of human beings in 
                                                 
126  Ibid., 5. 
127  Wolfrum, “General International Law (Principles, Rules, and Standards),” 7. 
128  ‘Legal argumentation’ has to be understood in the broadest sense and including all 
levels of the governance and decision-making. 
129  Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, 11–13. 
130  As Koskenniemi puts it: “The usefulness of rights lies in their acting as “intermediate 
stage” principles around which some communal values and individual interest can be 
organised.” Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law, 134. See also the discussion in 
Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 71–80. 
131  David Feldman, “Human Dignity as a Legal Value: Part 1,” PL Winter (1999): 682.  
132  Dorothy V. Jones, “The Declaratory Tradition in Modern International Law,” in 
Traditions of International Ethics, ed. Terry Nardin and David Mapel, Cambridge Studies in 
International Relations (Cambridge University Press, 1992), 42–61.  
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the UDHR is a formal, transcendental norm to legitimize human rights 
claims.133 
Current thesis takes the view that even though contemporary human rights 
include such aspirations and values, their norms are practically usable, and, thus, 
some of these norms function as principles and some of them function as rules. 
Still, there remains a question of who has the rights or, indeed, an obligation to 
decide which norms in the human rights treaties are principles, what is the 
allowed leeway, and which norms are rules in the meaning of the above theories. 
Institutionalisation of international human rights134 has meant that there are 
numerous international human rights treaty bodies and international human 
rights courts or quasi-judicial organs that interpret the respective treaty norms 
and give them precise content. While the substance of norms in terms of the 
individual rights they create is relatively straightforward, the substance and 
extent of the corresponding obligations is often unclear and needs both intern-
ational as well as domestic interpretation. 
As discussed above, the distinction between rules and principles has 
practical consequences for the national implementation. Thus, the current dis-
sertation follows the distinction formulated by Alexy whereby rules are norms 
that require something definite, and they are, thus, definitive commands. By 
contrast, principles are norms requiring that something has to be realized to the 
greatest extent possible, given the factual and legal possibilities involved. Thus, 
principles are optimization requirements; this in turn means that they can be 
satisfied to varying degrees.135  Functionally, this distinction helps in under-
standing the state obligations that particular rights carry and whether a par-
ticular right gives a state some margin. 
The practice of the CRC Committee explicates clearly between ‘principles and 
provisions,’ and it has defined a number of norms that create ‘general 
principles’:136  
                                                 
133  Klaus Dicke, “The Founding Function of Human Dignity in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights,” in The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights Discourse, ed. David 
Kretzmer and Eckart Klein (The Hague ; New York: Kluwer Law International, 2002), 118. 
For general discussion of the principle of human dignity and its functions see the debate of 
Christopher McCrudden, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights,” Eur 
J Int Law 19, No. 4 (September 1, 2008): 655–724; Paolo G Carozza, “Human Dignity and 
Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply,” Eur J Int Law 19, No. 5 (2008): 931–44, 
or Christopher McCrudden, ed., Understanding Human Dignity (British Academy, 2013).  
134  Institutional legal theory as developed e.g., by Neil MacCormick stresses that law is an 
institutional normative order. Neil MacCormick, Institutions of Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2007). 
135  Robert Alexy, “Rights and Liberties as Concepts,” in The Oxford Handbook of Com-
parative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, 1st ed (Oxford, U.K: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 291. 
136  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 5. General Measures of Implementation of the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 and 44, Para. 6)” (CRC/GC/2003/5, 
November 27, 2003), para. 12 in particular. 
43 
1) Definition of the child (Article 1)137; 
2) Non-discrimination (Article 2); 
3) Best interests of the child (Article 3);  
4) Right to life, survival, and development (Article 6); and 
5) Respect for the views of the child (Article 12). 
 
According to the CRC Committee, these norms first and foremost require 
legislative and administrative measures. In the General Comment No. 14, the 
Committee finds that principles express “the fundamental values of the Con-
vention”; and that the task of the principles is to guide interpretation and imple-
mentation all the rights of the child.138 The Committee considers these “prin-
ciples” to be general measures of implementation,139 i.e., they have to be taken 
into account for the implementation of all the provisions of the CRC. Although 
the CRC Committee does not state it directly, it seems to follow the logic 
proposed by Alexy to an extent. The CRC Committee sees general principles as 
objective values that should be taken into account in relation to all norms and 
standards of the CRC. The fact that these norms are considered to be principles 
does not mean that they automatically entail progressive development. To 
complicate things further, next to their principal quality, these norms can also 
entail individual rights and function as rules bringing along concrete obligations. 
 
Other typologies of state obligations 
There are different ways international obligations included in rules could be 
divided. Such typologies are abstract instruments that help clarify the content of 
international treaty norms. Wolfrum proposes that the following types of 
obligations can be distinguished in international law.140 (1) Obligations of result – 
goal-oriented obligations where a state has to ensure a particular factual 
result.141 (2) Obligations of conduct – a state has to undertake a particular action, 
depending on a particular obligation, and an end result might also be 
required.142 (3) Goal-oriented obligations – states have to undertake a particular 
process leading to a particular direction, and a specific result is not defined.143 
(4) Obligations that address natural and juridical persons – states have an 
obligation to guarantee the fulfillment of these obligations in their national 
                                                 
137  Definition of a child is not a traditional principle. Rather, it defines the subjects of the 
CRC.  
138  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14 on the Right of the Child to Have His or 
Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3, Para. 1)” (CRC/C/GC/14, May 
19, 2013), para. 1. 
139  Ibid., para. 6. 
140  Wolfrum, “General International Law (Principles, Rules, and Standards),” para. 67. 
141  Ibid., paras 74–83. 
142  Ibid., paras 84–93. 
143  Ibid., paras 94–99. 
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law. 144  (5) Obligations of conduct require states to undertake a particular 
conduct irrespective of the end result; obligation of result requires the state to 
ensure the obtainment of a particular result, leaving the choice of means to the 
state. Each of these obligations requires a different type of action from the state 
and helps to substantiate the more precise obligations that different human 
rights norms entail.145 
The practice of the UN treaty bodies show that they have traditionally 
resorted to using tripartite obligations of ‘respect, protect and fulfill’;146 some-
times, a fourth obligation of ‘promote’ is also included.147 There are even some 
treaty bodies that organise their General Comments following the logic to these 
obligations.148 The CRC Committee is using the tripartite typology of obli-
gations often in its General Comments, and has defined such obligations as 
follows: “to respect freedoms and entitlements, to protect both freedoms and 
entitlements from third parties or from social or environmental threats, and to 
fulfil the entitlements through facilitation or direct provision.”149 Furthermore, 
the CRC Committee stresses the interdependence of the rights.150 
Writings on the international rights of the child use an additional typology of 
child-specific obligations – the ‘three P’s’ of ‘provision, protection and 
participation’.151 Provision means, in this context, the right to get one’s needs 
fulfilled; protection means the right to protection from harmful practices; 
participation refers to the right of a child to be heard on decisions affecting his 
                                                 
144  Ibid., paras 100–104. 
145  Ibid., paras 105–107. 
146  The Human Rights Committee is a notable exception here that does not utilise the 
tripartite obligations as clearly as other treaty bodies. Still, also the HRC uses the language 
of respect, protect, and fulfill in its practice. See e.g., HRC, “General Comment No. 35: 
Article 9 (Liberty and Security of Person)” (CCPR/C/GC/35, December 16, 2014), where 
the HRC refers in para 63 to obligation to respect; and in para 7 to obligation to protect. It 
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147  This typology was developed to its current state by Asbjørn Eide in relation to economic, 
social, and cultural rights. Asbjørn Eide, UN Special Rapporteur for the Right to Food, The 
Right to Adequate Food as a Human Right: Final Report submitted by Asbjørn Eide, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1987/23 (1987), paras 67–69. For an overview of typologies of obligations 
used by different treaty bodies, see e.g., Tomuschat, Human Rights, 141–146. For a more 
detailed overview, see e.g., Ida Elisabeth Koch, “Dichotomies, Trichotomies or Waves of 
Duties?” Human Rights Law Review 5, No. 1 (January 1, 2005): 81–103. 
148  See e.g. CESCR Committee, “General Comment No. 21: Right of Everyone to Take 
Part in Cultural Life” (E/C.12/GC/21, December 21, 2009) paras 48–54. 
149  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 15 on the Right of the Child to the Enjoyment 
of the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (art. 24)” (CRC/C/GC/15, April 17, 2013), para. 
71. 
150  See e.g., CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14,” para. 16 
151  This typology was first proposed by Thomas Hammarberg in “The UN Convention on 
the Rights of the Child – And How to Make It Work,” Human Rights Quarterly 12, No. 1 
(February 1990): 100. For critique on this typology see Ann Quennerstedt, “Children, But 
Not Really Humans? Critical Reflections on the Hampering Effect of the ‘3 P’s,’” The 
International Journal of Children’s Rights 18, No. 4 (November 1, 2010): 619–635. 
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or her life. In substance, two of these obligations refer to the two first tripartite 
obligations. Only the obligation to participate is specific to the rights of the 
child and refers to the right of the child to be heard (art. 12 of the CRC). As the 
more complete tripartite typology of obligations together with general principles 
of the CRC cover the ‘three P’s’, the current dissertation does not consider this 
typology the most useful tool. 
As is shown below, CRC norms that are classified under the general prin-
ciples create a variety of obligations; some of them are principles and others are 
clear rules, some entail some elements of both categories. Thus, labeling any 
norms as principles should not mean that they cannot create obligations that are, 
in substance, rules. Current research shows that the definition of a child 
includes precise age limits that should be regarded as rules requiring specific 
end results. The best interests of the child, on the other hand, function both as 
principles and as rules; they includw a whole range of the above obligations. 
An additional distinction of human rights obligations relates to their binding 
force. International ‘soft law’ relates to non-binding obligations that never-
theless can produce some legal effects.152 According to Thürer, soft law de-
scribes principles, rules, and standards governing international relations that do 
not stem from one of the sources of international law enumerated in art. 38 (1) 
ICJ Statute.153  
The dissertation uses practice of the UN treaty bodies for substantiation of 
the legal obligations entailed in the CRC. Such practice fulfills the ‘soft law’ 
requirements; thus, the legal validity and effect of such norms has relevance for 
the current research. The assumption here is that the UN treaty bodies as well as 
the EComSR are supervisory bodies who have the authority for informal 
international lawmaking. Thürer notes that such soft law has importance for the 
national legal system as it interprets international law and, thus, gives guidance 
                                                 
152  Guzman and Meyer propose that there are four complementary reasons or instances 
when states use international soft law: 1) finding a consensus for coordination of activities; 
2) to avoid higher losses but still keep the possibility for positive developments; 3) to have 
more flexible rules; and, 4) ‘international common law’ created by international institutions 
that gives cooperation-minded states the opportunity to deepen cooperation in exchange for 
surrendering some measure of control over legal rules. Andrew T. Guzman and Timothy L. 
Meyer, “International Soft Law,” Journal of Legal Analysis Vol. 2 (2010): 171–172. 
153  Daniel Thürer, “Soft Law,” Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 
MPEPIL 1469, March 2009, para. 5. According to Thürer, there are four distinctive cha-
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stem from a formal source of law and thus lack binding legal force. Fourth, soft law, despite 
its legally non-committal quality, is characterized by a certain proximity to the law, and 
above all by its capacity to produce certain legal effects.” Ibid., para. 9. 
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for the national implementation of the treaty obligations. It, still, does not 
formally enter into the hierarchy of legal norms of national legal systems. Thus: 
“By opting for soft law as a non-binding instrument of international relations, 
governments have a means to avoid parliamentary or other democratic influence 
on, or interference with, the elaboration of international agreements. Thus, the 
constitutional system of competence may be circumvented.”154 
It has to be noted that international treaty bodies themselves see at least some of 
the instruments they adopt as being binding to the states. As an example, the 
Human Rights Committee has formalised a follow-up procedure and asks the 
states to provide information vis-à-vis to the violations ascertained.155 The CRC 
Committee has not formalised similar procedure. The precise effect of some of 
the instruments adopted by the UN treaty bodies is further discussed below. 
  
2.1.2 Constitutionalization of international human rights 
Alexy proposes that human rights enter positive, i.e. national, law through 
constitutional rights and, thus, constitutional rights match the requirements of 
human rights.156 The trend to the internationalization of constitutional law and 
the comparative constitutional law has been noted by a number of authors.157 As 
Chang and Yeh point out, one of the features of this trend is incorporation of 
international human rights in the domestic constitution, often making rights 
guaranteed by the domestic constitution identical with rights entailed in 
international human rights treaties – this is the global triumph of rights-based 
discourse.158 
The current research concurs with the view that a harmonization vision is 
behind the work of the supervisory committees when they scrutinize national 
                                                 
154  Daniel Thürer, “Soft Law,” para. 31. 
155  HRC, “Note by the Human Rights Committee on the Procedure for Follow-up to 
Concluding Observations” (CCPR/C/108/2, October 21, 2013). Similar procedures are also 
adopted by the CAT, CERD, CEDAW, CRPD, and CED committees. 
156  Robert Alexy, “Rights and Liberties as Concepts,” 290. 
157  See e.g., Scheinin, “Impact on the Law of Treaties,” 29–31; Herman Schwartz, “The 
Internationalization of Constitutional Law,” Human Rights Brief 10 No. 2 (2003): 10–12; or 
Wen-Chen Chang and Jiunn-Rong Yeh, “Internationalization of Constitutional Law,” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, ed. Michel Rosenfeld and András 
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Oxford University Press 2014).  
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Heyns and Viljoen, “The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
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Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level. 
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legislation and implementation practice of states against the standards of 
international law. It has to be remembered, that every state is bound by a dif-
ferent international global and regional layers of human rights law, and the 
practice of a state is viewed and scrutinized by different international 
institutions that might apply different standards. As Peters puts it, international 
law has progressed from a law of coordination between states to a law of close 
cooperation that reaches far into the realm of traditional domestic concerns and 
thus, international law has constitutionalized.159 
One of the features of constitutionalization is the emergence of trans-
governmental networks, consisting of various international organisations and 
disaggregated components of the state, which interact and cooperate in relation 
to a particular area.160 As described by De Wet, within a network there would be 
a criss-cross interaction of norms with a possible additional hierarchy. This 
interaction would be both horizontal in nature (between different international 
organisations with a functional overlap) as well as vertical (between the 
international organisation and the state). 161  As will be discussed below, it 
ultimately depends on the national constitution of the state whether and how 
particular international treaties and the outcome of these networks enter the 
domestic legal system and what is their position in those systems. 
One area where constitutionalization and trans-governmental co-operation is 
perhaps clearest is the regime of international human rights law. As discussed 
below, this is one of the rare regimes where states have accepted the 
compulsory, even if subsidiary, jurisdiction of international bodies and, more 
importantly, have granted exceptional rights for individuals to bring cases 
against them.162  
As an example, it has been a consistent claim of the ECtHR that the ECHR 
is the “constitutional instrument of European public order in the field of human 
rights.”163 However, as Slaughter warns, it is a system of vertical checks and 
balances as national courts adhere to the supremacy of international courts – up 
to a point. When an international tribunal moves too far out with the prevailing 
                                                 
159 Anne Peters, “Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of 
Fundamental International Norms and Structures,” Leiden Journal of International Law Vol. 
19 (2006): 579–610. 
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161  De Wet, “The Constitutionalization of Public International Law,” 1222–24. 
162  See e.g., Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, The Constitutionalization of 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009) ch. 2 in particular. 
163  See e.g., Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), App. No. 15318/89 (Eur. Ct. 
H.R., March 23, 1995) [75]; Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom (Grand Chamber), 
App. No. 55721/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 7, 2011) [141]. See further discussion in Paolo 
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Journal of International Law 97 (2003): 38. 
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national consensus, the national courts do not follow.164 The practical tool of 
operation with which the ECtHR tries to overcome this dilemma is the use of 
the margin of appreciation, whereby the member states are given room to decide 
politically sensitive matters themselves.165 
However, the attitudes of the member states differ on the nature and direct 
application of international treaties. While the ECHR and its direct application 
today receive no major objections, in the case of the CRC, views have differed. 
As an example, Germany upon ratification made a declaration according to 
which the CRC is not domestically applicable.166 Indeed, a number of reser-
vations have been made to the CRC where states have limited the direct appli-
cation of certain rights, and there are states parties whose courts have initially 
denied the CRC´s self-executive character.167  
The CRC has global acceptance; nevertheless, the influence of it is not as 
high as could be expected when taking into account the number of ratifications. 
It is a common frame of references for the other and more general international 
human rights treaties and bodies on the issues of the rights of the child.168 
However, it has not gained the relevance some of the other UN treaties have 
gained. It could be that rights of the child, in general, are a conceptually 
difficult branch of law for the states as they often require more interference with 
the family life, untraditional flexibility of the decision maker, or application of 
general and relative principles. It could also be that the existence of such a vast 
amount of human rights treaties and supervisory bodies has scattered the focus 
of the states; then it is easy to use the CRC as a pronouncement of general 
attention to children. 
 
                                                 
164  Slaughter, The New World Order, 82. It has to be noted that her observations follow 
further the domestic application of international treaties by the US Supreme Court. Similar 
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existing national constitutional court.” Quoted in Alastair Mowbray, “Interlaken Declaration 
– The Beginning of a New Era for the European Court of Human Rights, The,” Hum. Rts. L. 
Rev. 10 (2010): 523. 
165  See e.g., discussion in Geir Ulfstein, “The European Court of Human Rights as a 
Constitutional Court?,” Festschrift to the 40th Year Anniversary of the Universität Der 
Bundeswehr, Munich: “To Live in World Society – To Govern in the World State”, 
Forthcoming; PluriCourts Research Paper No. 14–08. (March 19, 2014): 2. 
166  This declaration was withdrawn on 1 November 2010. The declaration read: “The 
Federal Republic of Germany also declares that domestically the Convention does not apply 
directly. It establishes state obligations under international law that the Federal Republic of 
Germany fulfils in accordance with its national law, which conforms with the Convention.” 
167  See the examples in Tomuschat, Human Rights, 175. 
168  See e.g., Ursula Kilkelly and Laura Lundy, “Children’s Rights in Action: Using the UN 
Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 as an Auditing Tool,” Child and Family Law 
Quarterly Vol. 18, No. 3 (2006): 331–350. 
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2.1.3 International human rights monitoring bodies  
as international law-makers 
International organisations and UN treaty bodies, in particular, are central to the 
international protection of human rights as they supervise the implementation of 
treaties and interpret international treaties.169 Evaluations of the effectiveness 
and the role and position of the UN human rights treaty bodies in national legal 
systems has varied.170 In the beginning of the new millennium, Connors argued 
that UN treaty monitoring is an “empty diplomatic ritual” that “should be 
disbanded;”171  Clapham went further and stated that the “treaty bodies are 
becoming more and more peripheral.”172 Even after the creation of the Human 
Rights Council and the introduction of the Universal Periodic Review system in 
2006, Morijn still finds that while the concerns and deficiencies of the treaty 
body system are widely known, hardly any structural reform has taken place.173 
A report of June 2012 by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
compiled various proposals for strengthening the treaty body system. These 
included a comprehensive reporting calendar and a simplified, aligned reporting 
process.174 The treaty bodies have limited enforcement tools at their disposal 
(e.g. reports, recommendations and general comments); reporting by states has 
increased as a consequence of pressure applied in the Human Rights Council’s 
Universal Periodic Review process.175 It has also meant a diversion of resources 
away from the treaty bodies to support that process. At the same time, UN 
treaty bodies have the obligation to interpret the treaties and guarantee that they 
are implemented universally among the member states. 
                                                 
169  For general analysis of international organisations as law-makers, see e.g., José E. Alvarez, 
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175  See e.g., Nadia Bernaz, “Reforming the UN Human Rights Protection Procedures: A 
Legal Perspective on the Establishment of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism,” in 
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International human rights at the UN level are supervised through the 
political process and the Human Rights Council, which carries out both the UPR 
and deals with specific human rights issues. Treaty bodies regularly supervise 
the implementation of international treaties and report their findings to the 
Human Rights Council or the General Assembly. The mandate of the treaty-
based bodies of the UN is strictly limited to the respective treaty, and they take 
a non-conflictual stance towards states that violate a treaty and engage them in 
political dialogue. Furthermore, treaty bodies are expert bodies and do not 
represent particular member states.176 
Although these bodies receive their legitimacy from the respective human 
rights treaties, the general legal nature and force of the instruments (General 
Comments and Concluding Observations in particular) adopted by these bodies 
is unclear.177  The position of views based on individual communications is 
considerably clearer, and many states have opened their national legal system to 
changes, including revision of a court decision, when a treaty body has 
ascertained a violation of some rights in its communication process.178 
As the current research concentrates on the application of the rights of the 
child, the position and possible legislative power of the CRC Committee is of 
relevance.179 The current part discusses the law-making capacities and legal 
effect of instruments of human rights treaty bodies in general and cites 
examples from the practice of the CRC. 
As Pauwelyn convincingly proposes, the institutional legal theory180 could 
assist in analysing the nature of obligations or norms created by this kind of 
expert body.181 In reality, scepticism seems to be growing among states parties 
to human rights conventions towards the further development of substantive 
human rights by their treaty bodies. States seem to fear that – through 
interpretation – the treaty bodies could further encroach on their sovereign sphere 
                                                 
176  For a detailed analysis, see e.g., Helen Keller and Geir Ulfstein, UN Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press, 2012). For a general 
overview of the functioning and competences of the UN treaty bodies, see e.g., Peter-Tobias 
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Law, May 2008; or Tomuschat, Human Rights, chap. 11. 
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and consequently exceed the bounds of their original consent to the treaty in 
question.182 
For the interpretative statements of the treaty bodies to have any theoretical 
or real effect on national law, they should, firstly, be regarded as having legal 
relevance or binding force. Non-binding norms may have legal effects, which 
makes them relevant for lawyers. At the same time, however, ignoring the non-
binding nature of norms does not lead to a formal infringement or to legal 
consequences. There is disagreement among those who argue in favour of a 
sharp line between law and non-law and those arguing for the existence of a 
grey zone.183 In practice, this division may not always be clearly visible, and 
some states follow the positions of international treaty bodies even if they do 
not regard these as law, and vice versa. Thus, it is relevant how these statements 
are generally perceived in international law as well as within the relevant 
national legal systems. 
Generally, in order for some statement to have legal force i.e., be able to 
create legal rights and duties, it has to be performed by a competent actor. Both 
the creation of ‘legal acts’ and the existence of ‘legal competence’ are important 
elements for this analysis. Legal norms deriving their validity from a legal 
instrument have been issued. 
UN treaty bodies typically issue three different types of instrument: 
1. General Comments / Recommendations184; 
2. views on individual cases or communications185; 
3. concluding observations on state reports186. 
 
As the individual communications procedure of the CRC Committee has as of 
March 2015 just been accepted and to date there have been no communications, 
this function and its outcomes are not analysed here. 
In principle, states parties agree only to the provisions of the treaties as 
binding. Thus, any subsequent practice by supervisory bodies could be used as 
an interpretational aid.187 The interpretation rules of customary international law 
                                                 
182  There are convincing examples of the reluctance of states to implement e.g. the quasi-
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187  See generally on treaty interpretation Enzo Cannizzaro, ed., The Law of Treaties Beyond 
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see e.g. Eirik Bjorge, The Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties (Oxford University Press, 
52 
laid down in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention apply to human 
rights treaties as much as they apply to other international law treaties. Art. 31 
of the VCLT regulates treaty interpretation generally – central to this are the 
principle of good faith and the context of the treaty.188 Documents and decisions 
of supervisory bodies are secondary to treaty interpretation and are covered by 
art. 31 (3) b of the VCLT, according to which “there shall be taken into account, 
together with the context any subsequent practice in the application of the 
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its inter-
pretation”. In addition, art. 32 of the VCLT allows for supplementary means of 
interpretation. Thus, the instruments adopted by the treaty bodies should fall 
under these categories.  
Schlütter discussed, whether the practice of the treaty bodies could also be 
seen as ‘state practice’, and concluded that such an approach is problematic.189 
Practical problematics of this issue is also visible in the current dissertation. 
Among other issues, implementation of the definition of a child is analysed; 
concrete age limits used as minimum core obligations do not derive from the 
text of the CRC but the practice of the CRC Committee. At the same time, this 
practice also represents some consensus between the states – states have tacitly 
accepted this obligation as there have been no objections to such an 
interpretation. 
There is a possible tension between the positions of interpretative bodies on 
the one hand and member states on the other. Supervisory bodies have been active 
in using dynamic interpretation, at times exceeding the original wording of treaty 
rules, and have even extended material obligations as binding upon the state.190 
The CRC does not per se authorize the Committee to adopt any new 
standards or interpretations of the CRC; nor does it grant the CRC Committee 
any judicial or quasi-judicial powers. Only after the Optional Protocol to the 
CRC on the Communications Procedure191 entered into force in 2014 is the 
CRC Committee able to accept individual communications. As of 1 May 2015 
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there are 15 members of the protocol and no communications have been 
submitted. 
As a word of caution, Krommendijk proposes that the implementation and 
use of international supervisory instruments and the process of reporting has 
more impact in countries with the considerable bureaucratic and financial 
capacity to participate in the process.192 This could mean that the real reason 
behind the approach by a state towards international soft law instruments does 
not have legal-theoretical reasons but depends on the state’s own well-being and 
similar other practicalities. 
 
Legal status of General Comments or Recommendations193 
General Comments or Recommendations form part of international practice 
subsequent to conclusion of a human rights treaty that may be viewed as 
conforming with the scope of application of article 31 (3) b of the VCLT. As 
briefly discussed above, none of the core UN human rights treaties or their rules 
of procedure regulate the legal position or legal nature of General Comments/ 
Recommendations. There is also no general consensus among states on the 
effect and legal nature of these instruments – they have not always become 
accepted as hard law by states parties to the relevant treaty. In legal scholarship 
General Comments have been defined as follows: 
[They are] means by which a UN human rights expert committee distils its 
considered views on an issue which arises out of the provisions of the treaty 
whose implementation it supervises and presents those views in the context of a 
formal statement of its understanding to which it attaches major importance. In 
essence the aim is to spell out and make more accessible the ‘jurisprudence’ 
emerging from its work.194 
As to their legal status or effect, it is clear that the term ‘General Comments’ 
implies that they have no legally binding effect as such. Their main purpose is 
to assist and guide states parties to the treaties in preparing their reports to be 
submitted to the CRC Committee; and they can have up to three meta-functions: 
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legal analytical; policy recommendation; and practice direction. 195  As the 
quality of information contained in the reports is decisive as to effective and 
substantive monitoring by the bodies, the reports are a vital instrument in the 
implementation of states parties’ legal obligations under the treaties.  
While the decisions of the regional human rights courts often find domestic 
acceptance as binding interpretations of the treaties196, this is not the case with 
the instruments adopted by the UN treaty bodies. 197  A 2004 report by the 
International Law Association addressed the impact of statements of UN 
Human Rights treaty bodies. The ILA summarised their finding on General 
Comments as follows: 
Governments have tended to stress that, while the views, concluding obser-
vations and comments, and general comments and recommendations of the 
treaty bodies are to be accorded considerable importance as the pronouncement 
of an expert body in the issues covered by the treaty, they are not in themselves 
formally binding interpretations of the treaty. While States will give them careful 
consideration, they may not give effect to them as a matter of course.198 
As will be discussed below (chapter 1 part 4), the three states of the current 
study have been receptive towards the General Comments of the UN treaty 
bodies and they have referred to General Comments both in the preparatory 
works of their respective parliaments as well as in the practice of the highest 
courts. The nature of these references has, however, varied. 
The CRC is temporally one of the latest of the core UN human rights treaties; 
and by the time it was adopted, the other treaty bodies such as the Human 
Rights Committee had adopted several General Comments as well as having 
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created some ‘jurisprudence’.199 Still, regulation of the activities of the CRC 
Committee in articles 43–45 is vague, it does not explicitly give the CRC 
Committee the right to adopt binding interpretations of the treaty and specify 
the legal effect or nature of the instruments the committee adopts. 
The legal basis for the General Comments can be found in the “Rules of 
Procedure”200 adopted by the CRC Committee; art. 77 stipulates that the Com-
mittee may prepare General Comments based on the articles and provisions of 
the CRC ‘with a view to promoting its further implementation and assisting states 
parties in fulfilling their reporting obligations’. The Committee may include 
such General Comments in its reports to the General Assembly. The CRC 
Committee has, as of 1 May 2015, made 18 General Comments and the wording 
of the comments states that its aim is to “outline states parties’ obligations”201. 
Several of the General Comments of the CRC Committee reflect the 
experience of monitoring bodies in the consideration of states parties’ reports, 
but the monitoring task ultimately aims to improve the human rights situation of 
a reporting state. Hence, General Comments tend to have a quasi-legislative 
character. In that sense, they are not a mere reflection of the human rights 
situation of a state party. Rather, they could and should reflect goals for the 
attainment of which the monitoring bodies wish the state party to strive and 
serve as an authoritative interpretation of the provisions of treaties.202 
It has been pointed out that General Comments are based upon the 
experience gained by the Committee through examination of state reports. The 
Committee summarizes its findings and makes them available to all the member 
states. These comments relate to a) interpretation of specific provisions of the 
CRC; b) general issues (e.g. reporting, NGO participation); c) thematic. The 
general aim of these comments is to improve implementation of the CRC and 
guide governments in implementing the CRC.203 
In its first General Comment on the right to education, adopted after 10 years 
of functioning of the CRC in 2001, the Committee did not specify the legal 
nature or effect of the Comment. Only in the section dedicated to implemen-
tation did the Committee emphasize the need to adopt concrete implementation 
measures and policies at national level in order to fulfil the obligations set forth 
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in the Convention.204 It has, however, in several of its points used commanding 
language and, as an example, defined the values which the school environment 
must reflect.205 In later Comments, the CRC Committee has defined the aim of 
each General Comment at the beginning of the document.206 Furthermore, the 
language of the Committee has lately become stronger.207 
It is somewhat confusing that the CRC Committee also has the right to make 
recommendations based on information received during the reporting process or 
from other sources. These recommendations have traditionally followed general 
days of discussion or relate to the practical functioning of the Committee and 
they are addressed to the General Assembly.208 To date, the CRC Committee 
has adopted 18 General Comments; the latest General Comment, No. 18, is a 
joint comment with the CEDAW Committee on harmful practices.209 
In principle, Keller and Grover point out three meta-functions that General 
Comments could have.210 
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1.  Legal analytical function – by interpreting rights, clarifying their scope of 
application, as well as setting out legal tests and factors for determining a 
violation. As an example, the CRC Committee emphasized in General Com-
ment No. 14 that the right to non-discrimination is not a passive obligation 
but requires positive measures to ensure effective enjoyment of rights.211 In 
General Comment No. 13 on the right of the child to freedom from all forms 
of violence, the CRC Committee provides a non-exhaustive list of harmful 
practices.212 
2.  Policy recommendation – assisting state or non-state actors (including 
international and national NGOs) with thinking through policy issues and 
determining what legislative, political or other action to take. Providing 
support to NGOs for the preparation of shadow reports. As an example, 
General Comment No. 14 of the CRC Committee emphasized that it aims to 
promote a real change in attitudes leading to full respect for children as 
rights holders.213 In General Comment No. 18 the Committee stressed the 
need to establish and support social and cultural norms challenging the 
practice of female genital mutilation.214 
3.  Practice direction – providing guidance to domestic courts and authorities on 
how to interpret and apply specific Covenant guarantees, where this is 
possible. As an example, in General Comment No. 14, the CRC Committee 
dedicated a separate section to procedural safeguards that decision-makers at 
different levels should take into account and follow.215 General Comments 
direct the practice of the Committee itself during constructive dialogue with 
the member states and evaluation of periodic reports. As an example, the 
Committee drew the attention of the Russian Federation to five different 
General Comments in its Concluding Observations.216 
 
General Comments are also practice directions for the Committee itself in 
evaluating state reports. As will be discussed below, General Comments are 
cited in the Concluding Observations on state reports as examples of legal 
standards as well as policy and implementation recommendations. 
Thus, it can be concluded that General Comments in general as well as the CRC 
Committee’s General Comments in particular amount, at least, to ‘soft law 
instruments’ and are sources of non-binding norms that interpret and add detail 
to the rights and obligations contained in the respective human rights treaties. 
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Legal status of Concluding Observations 
Article 44 sets out the obligations of states parties to the CRC to report to the 
CRC Committee within two years of ratification and then every five years.217 
Article 44 (1) of the CRC provides that states parties undertake to submit 
reports on measures they have adopted to give effect to the rights recognized in 
the CRC, and gives the CRC Committee authority to review these reports and 
that “the Committee may make suggestions and general recommendations based 
on information received … and shall transmit such suggestions and General 
Recommendations to any state party concerned and … to the General Assembly, 
together with comments, if any, from states parties.”218 
State reporting procedure is, in essence, a ‘constructive dialogue’ between 
the supervisory body and the reporting state. In it, some voice is also given to 
the NGOs who have the right to submit shadow reports and recommend 
questions for discussion. This is still often perceived as the weakest process 
among existing human rights monitoring mechanisms219 – there is no establish-
ment of violations of rights; it can only result in Concluding Observations by 
the treaty body concerned that do not go beyond an expression of concern, 
usually in rather broad terms and with equally broad recommendations. 
Concluding Observations are not binding on the member states, and they 
contain suggestions and recommendations to come closer to full implementation 
of the CRC. It has been pointed out that Concluding Observations do not 
amount to condemnation for non-fulfilment of treaty obligations,220 i.e., they 
cannot be regarded as a proof of violation of obligations within the meaning of 
state responsibility. 
They do, however, contain the view of the Committee and, in principle, 
should be observed as a basis for implementation and action by the member 
states. It can be observed that correct and politically sensitive formulation of the 
concluding observations is relevant for the success of the reporting procedure. 
As Kjaerum puts it, “the aim is to carry out a constructive dialogue in a non-
judgmental atmosphere”.221 
  
                                                 
217  For general overview see Kälin, “Examination of State Reports.” 
218  Art. 45 (d) of the CRC. 
219  For literature overview see Kälin, “Examination of State Reports,” 17–19; for imple-
mentation statistics see Pillay and OHCHR, Strengthening the United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty Body System, sec. 2.3.1. 
220  See e.g. Verheyde and Goedertier, Articles 43–45, para. 38. 
221  Morten Kjaerum, “State Reports,” in International Human Rights Monitoring Mecha-
nisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, ed. Gudmundur Alfredsson, Jonas Grimheden, 
and Bertrand G. Ramcharan (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2009), 21. 
59 
Constructive dialogue generally consists of the following stages:222 
1. States submit their reports following the Reporting Guidelines.223 The report 
should indicate relevant legislative, judicial, administrative and other infor-
mation, including statistical data, to give the Committee a good basis for its 
analysis. States parties are requested to give information about ‘factors and 
difficulties encountered’ and ‘progress achieved’, while ‘implementation 
priorities’ and ‘specific goals’ for the future are also requested. 
2. Reports are made public and interested parties are invited to submit their 
shadow reports; 
3. A pre-sessional working group of the Committee draws up a list of issues 
that are communicated to the state party. The list of issues is intended to give 
the government a preliminary indication of the issues which the Committee 
considers to be priorities for discussion. It also gives the Committee the 
opportunity to request additional or updated information in writing from the 
government prior to the session. 
4. States have an opportunity to address the list of issues in writing. 
5. Based on the information received, the constructive dialogue includes dis-
cussion of the report in an open and public meeting of the Committee; this 
results in a summary of records. 
6. After discussion with the state party, the Committee will, in a closed meeting, 
agree on written Concluding Observations, which include suggestions and 
recommendations. The Concluding Observations usually contain the fol-
lowing aspects: positive features (including progress achieved); factors and 
difficulties impeding implementation; principal subjects for concern; sugges-
tions and recommendations addressed to the state party. 
 
Typically of other UN human rights treaties, the CRC is supervised by an expert 
committee.224 Art. 43 of the CRC establish the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC Committee). Art. 43 (8) gives the Committee the right to establish 
its own rules of procedure. The functions of the Committee are listed in art. 44; 
similarly to all UN treaty bodies, states have to submit to the Committee regular 
reports “on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights 
recognized herein and on the progress made on the enjoyment of those rights”. 
These reports should include both positive developments as well as indicating 
factors involving difficulties. These reports are often complemented with 
shadow reports by national or international interest groups or NGOs. 
                                                 
222  For details see OHCHR, Report on the Working Methods of the Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies Relating to the State Party Reporting Process, (HRI/ICM/2011/4, May 23, 2011). 
223  CRC Committee, “Treaty-Specific Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of 
Periodic Reports” (CRC/C/58/Rev.3, March 3, 2015). 
224  For a general and historical overview, see e.g. Sharon Detrick, A Commentary on the 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (The Hague [etc.]: Nijhoff, 1999), 41–
43; or Verheyde and Goedertier, Articles 43–45. 
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2.2 Universality or particularity of international human rights 
International human rights have traditionally been linked with the enlighten-
ment project as well as with different schools of natural law.225 This philo-
sophical-historical outlook has evolved into the debate of values.226 
 
2.2.1 Universality argument 
Central to the debate is the claim that international human rights represent 
European stories, myths and metaphors that continue to set the conditions for 
understanding international law’s past as it does for outlining its future.227 This 
has been countered by the claim of Forst that international human rights have 
four central dimensions that all have to be taken into account when discussing 
their applicability.228 Firstly, they have a moral dimension representing the uni-
versal moral claims of the international community. Secondly they have a legal 
dimension representing different binding international and national legal norms. 
Thirdly they have a political dimension expressing the standard of basic politi-
cal legitimacy and, fourthly, the social dimension of applicability. He proposes 
that the difference of opinions on the position of international human rights 
treaties is caused by the difference in focus on one of these elements.229 
Arnold, on the other hand, proposes that theories on the universality of inter-
national human rights deal with the inner or outer dimensions of international 
human rights. The outer dimension consists then of the acceptance rate of 
international human rights treaties while the inner dimension looks at the 
substance of rights and the specific characteristics of protection.230 
                                                 
225  For recent analysis, see e.g. Anthony Robert Sangiuliano, “Towards a Natural Law 
Foundationalist Theory of Universal Human Rights,” Transnational Legal Theory 5, No. 2 
(August 29, 2014): 218–40.; James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 
2008), chap. 1.1.; or Charles R Beitz, The Idea Of Human Rights (Oxford University Press 
2009). 
226  For a historical account of the universalism vs relativism debate, see e.g. Michael K 
Addo, “Practice of United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies in the Reconciliation of 
Cultural Diversity with Universal Respect for Human Rights,” Hum. Rts. Q. No. 3 (2010): 
601. 
227  As Koskenniemi puts it, “The histories of jus gentium, natural law, and the law of 
nations, Völkerrecht and Droit public de l’Europe are situated in Europe; they adopt a 
European vocabulary of ‘progress’ and ‘modernity’.” Martti Koskenniemi, “Histories of 
International Law: Dealing with Eurocentrism,” Rechtsgeschichte 19 (2011): 155. 
228  Rainer Forst, “The Justification of Human Rights and the Basic Right to Justification: A 
Reflexive Approach,” Ethics 120, No. 4 (juuli 2010): 711–12. 
229  Ibid., 713–16. 
230  See e.g. Rainer Arnold, The Universalism of Human Rights (Springer Science & Busi-
ness Media, 2012), xix – xxi. 
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This division has been substantively analysed in the work of Donnelly, who, 
having looked at different expressions of the universality claim, observed that 
the following universality theories have been present:231 
1. Conceptual and substantive universality. 232  Conceptual universality states 
that if there are human rights, they are universal in the sense that they belong 
equally to all humans;233 this does not reflect on the substance of rights nor 
does it grant a specific list of rights the status of international human rights. 
This, in turn, shows why national implementation is of central importance 
for the substantive protection of rights. 
2. Historical or anthropological universality refers to the fact that most cultures 
or practices have recognised or even practised international human rights in 
their history. While these practices often agree with the central values of 
society, there is disagreement as to the necessary steps to realize these values 
as well to understanding how these values restrict the functioning of 
government.234 
3. Functional universality. Human rights ideas and practices arose from the 
social, economic and political transformations of modernity. Thus, human 
rights grant individuals the best protection in a society dominated by markets 
and states, i.e., human rights are an attractive remedy for some of the threats 
to human dignity.235 
4. International legal universality. Acceptance of the central international 
human rights treaties is quite universal. Six core central human rights treaties 
have relatively universal coverage.236 States that do not follow their inter-
national human rights obligations do not lose their legitimacy as sovereignty 
still trumps international legal obligations; however, acceptance of 
international human rights is seen as a precondition for full political 
                                                 
231   Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights.” For a longer account see Jack 
Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice (Cornell University Press, 2013), 
chap. 6. It has to be noted that some forms of universality discussed by Donnelly are not 
relevant here i.e., the current research does not enter into philosophical discussion on the 
nature of humans or look deeper into different cultural or religious understandings of uni-
versality. For a longer account of these issues, see e.g. Griffin, “The Presidential Address.” 
232  Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” 382–83. Benhabib here uses 
the term “essential universalism”. Benhabib, “Another Universalism,” 11–12. 
233  Buchanan stresses the distinction between human rights as moral rights on the one hand 
and international legal rights constraining the state on the other hand. See e.g. Allen 
Buchanan, “The Egalitarianism of Human Rights,” Ethics 120, No. 4 (juuli 2010): 679–710. 
234  For analysis of the central world religions and their attitude to rights in international 
human rights treaties see Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, chap. 5. 
235  Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” 286–88. 
236  As of 21 October 2014, each of the 6 central UN human rights convention (CEDAW, 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CRC, CAT, CERD) has an average of 174 members, while total 
membership of the UN is 193. Thus, an average of 90% of states accept the 6 central human 
rights treaties. What is particularly interesting is that there are 195 members of the CRC. For 
a typical analysis, see e.g. Tomuschat, Human Rights, chap. 4. 
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legitimacy.237 As Benhabib argues, this universality does not presuppose an 
acceptance of a concrete theory of human nature or a philosophical under-
standing of international human rights law.238 
5. Overlapping consensus universality. The moral equality of all human beings 
is strongly endorsed by most leading comprehensive doctrines in all regions 
of the world. Although a great number of possible practices could be the 
basis of central egalitarian values, human rights have, for the time being, 
become the preferred option.239 
 
The last two understandings of universality have been central as well as 
strongly present in the work of the UN treaty bodies; they also form the basis of 
the current research. There is a strong consensus among states that certain 
human rights are globally protected and that these represent the values of the 
member states. This consensus is visible in a number of resolutions and 
declarations of the international community.240 
It has to be stressed that universality in international human rights cannot be 
confused with uniformity. International human rights do take into account the 
different positions of different groups as well as in some cases allowing for 
economic, development-based, or cultural arguments in the application of treaty 
norms.241 Carozza argues that there “is an inherent tension in international 
human rights law” between upholding a universal understanding of human 
rights and “respecting the diversity and freedom of human cultures.”242 He 
argues that human rights do not form a set of uniform norms but rather form a 
new ius commune that “is a metaphor for a complex of human rights norms and 
legal relationships that combine unity and universality with pluralism and dif-
ferentiation.”243 McGrogan, on the other hand, stresses that it is more relevant 
                                                 
237  Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” 288–89. 
238  Benhabib, “Another Universalism,” 13. 
239  Donnelly, “The Relative Universality of Human Rights,” 289–91; see also Benhabib, 
“Another Universalism,” 12. 
240  The most cited of these being the Vienna Programme of Action, which emphasized that: 
“The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all States to 
fulfil their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance and protection of, 
all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter of the 
United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and international law. The 
universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond question. /.../ Human rights and 
fundamental freedoms are the birth right of all human beings; their protection and 
promotion is the first responsibility of Governments.” World Conference on Human Rights 
and United Nations, “Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action,” para. 1. 
241  The latter has been especially important for implementation of economic, social and 
cultural rights. See e.g. CESCR Committee, “General Comment No. 3: The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations (Art. 2, Para. 1, of the Covenant)” (E/1991/23, December 14, 1990). 
242  Carozza, “Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law,” 1. 
243  Carozza, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A Reply,” 934. 
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whether the actual interpretation of international human rights and their imple-
mentation differs due to these theoretical differences.244 
 
2.2.2 Criticism of universality claim 
Cultural diversity is a social fact – cultures differ across both time and space. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the diverse understanding and application of 
international human rights shows the impossibility of universal understanding 
and application of these rights in a diverse cultural context. Cultural relativists 
have several angles through which to contest the universalism claim of 
international human rights.245 
Twining has identified the following types of relativist positions:246 (i) strong 
cultural relativism (i.e., that rights depend on culture rather than upon universal 
norms); (ii) acknowledgement of cultural differences (still only the Western 
concept of human rights is the basis for universal norms); (iii) moderate cultural 
relativism (a common core of human rights is derived from overlapping values 
of different cultures); (iv) harmonization of cultural pluralism with international 
standards by internal reinterpretation of cultural tradition; and (v) an enriched 
version of rights can be developed by intercultural discourse, which can lead 
towards a new form of universalism. 
Most of these approaches emphasise the Western heritage and history of 
international human rights, albeit they emphasise different elements of these. 
Human rights, as a matter of historical fact, did develop in the West, and their 
background is strongly rooted in Christian culture247. Interestingly, Donnelly 
points out that “what we view today as western culture is a result, not a cause, 
of human rights ideas and practices.”248 Therefore, he concludes, no culture is 
by nature either compatible or incompatible with international human rights; 
compliance with them depends on the level of development of the specific 
culture and society.249 
                                                 
244  McGrogan, “Cultural Values and Human Rights: A Matter of Interpretation,” 14. 
245  Brems is of opinion that it is uncorrect to label non-Western critics to international 
human rights as “cultural relativism”. She sees the universality-relativity debate as being on 
the modalities of universal human rights. Eva Brems, “Inclusive Universality and the Child-
Caretaker Dynamic,” in Reconceptualizing Children’s Rights in International Development: 
Living Rights, Social Justice, Translations, ed. Karl Hanson and Olga Nieuwenhuys 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2013), 199–200. 
246  William L. Twining, General Jurisprudence: Understanding Law from a Global Per-
spective, Law in context (Cambridge, UK ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 
412. 
247  For a general philosophical analysis of the foundations of international human rights, 
see e.g. David Kretzmer and Eckart Klein, The Concept of Human Dignity in Human Rights 
Discourse (The Hague; London: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 
248  Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 107. 
249  Ibid., 107–8. 
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A second view notes that human rights are relative because human beings 
are constrained by the limits of their own existence. This can be in terms of 
culture, religion, economy, ethnicity, class, and so on. Since a nation has its 
own culture, religion, ethics or other traditional values, and since these values 
must be respected, the relativists argue, the imposition of “universal values” is 
not permissible.250 As an example, Mutua views the international human rights 
narrative naming cultures of states as savages-victims-saviours.251 
Onuma, while developing his transcivilization perspective on international 
human rights, includes in this list an idea that regards human rights as part of 
the contemporary West-centric intellectual discourse that dominates the entire 
world.252 He proposes that neither the universal nor the relativist approaches to 
international human rights are flawless and, thus, that the international human 
rights system requires alternative or at least complementary mechanisms to the 
strictly legal approach to human rights.253 
Alternatively, the functionalist approach to international human rights looks 
at the functions of rights and grounds them in their practical significance. In this 
approach international human rights limit the sovereignty of states as this is 
practically unavoidable for the substantive implementation of the international 
human rights treaties.254 
Chimni in 2006 presented the ‘third world approach’ to the universality of 
international human rights law and argued that the third world sees the 
universality of international human rights as a feature of recolonization. He 
goes further and claims that “international law is the principal language in 
which domination is coming to be expressed in the era of globalization. It is 
displacing national legal systems in their importance and having an unprece-
dented impact on the lives of ordinary people,” bringing with it the spreading of 
neo-liberal goals.255 
                                                 
250  See further the discussion in Klaus-Georg Riegel, “Inventing Asian Traditions: The 
Controversy Between Lee Kuan Yew and Kim Dae Jung,” Development and Society vol 29, 
no 1 (2000): 75–96. 
251  See e.g. Mutua, “Savages, Victims, and Saviors.” and Makau Mutua, Human Rights: A 
Political and Cultural Critique (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), chap. 1 in 
particular. 
252  Yasuaki Onuma, A Transcivilizational Perspective on International Law: Questioning 
Prevalent Cognitive Frameworks in the Emerging Multi-Polar and Multi-Civilizational 
World of Thetwenty-First Century, Hague Academy of International Law (Leiden ; Boston: 
Nijhoff, 2010). 
253  Yasuaki Onuma, “In Quest of Intercivilizational Human Rights: Universal vs. Relative 
Human Rights Viewed from an Asian Perspective,” Asia-Pac. J. on Hum. Rts. & L. 1 (2000): 
70, 78 et seq. 
254  See e.g. Joseph Raz, “Human Rights Without Foundations,” Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 14/2007 (March 1, 2007). For critique on the theory of Raz, see e.g. 
Pavlos Eleftheriadis, “Human Rights as Legal Rights,” Oxford Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 51/2010 (June 10, 2010). 
255  B.S. Chimni, “Third World Approaches to International Law: A Manifesto,” Inter-
national Community Law Review 8 (2006): 3. 
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Critical observation of relativist claims shows that these theories do not 
explain why such a vast number of states still freely ratify and show interest in 
implementing different international human rights treaties. Moreover, as 
McGrogan suggests, these theoretical views do not indicate or even hint to what 
extent different international treaties should accept cultural relativist arguments.256 
The rights of the child present an excellent example where a huge dis-
crepancy exists between the text of the convention and the number of states’ 
parties, on the one hand, and the traditional or special interpretation of the rights 
contained in the CRC on the other. Furthermore, the preamble of the CRC 
recognises the traditional values’ arguments and emphasises: “Taking due 
account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people 
for the protection and harmonious development of the child.” There are a 
number of dangerous traditional practices associated with such arguments; child 
marriage, female genital mutilation and the circumcision of boys, limiting 
access to medical services without the consent of a parent, limiting the 
educational rights of girls, and so on, are only some examples of everyday 
occurrences where the rights of children are limited or even violated on the 
grounds that the practices conform to cultural or traditional values. Furthermore, 
the family, community, society and educational institutions occupy a central 
role in maintaining and passing on the values of any society, including the 
values of human rights and traditional values. 
 
Traditional values argument 
Currently, one of the strongest challengers to the universality of human rights is 
the traditional values argument, which has recently succeeded even in the 
Human Rights Council of the UN. 257  As McCrudden points out, different 
sources that are seen to generate traditional values, understand and define this 
notion differently – they might represent (1) national sovereignty (or the values 
of the nation); (2) religious practices (as well as beliefs); (3) traditional societies 
(indigenous practices); and, (4) conservative political thought. 258  Thus, con-
fusion exists as to what exactly is meant by ‘traditional values’ in the resolu-
tions of the Human Rights Council as there is “no clear-cut, universally agreed 
                                                 
256  McGrogan, “Cultural Values and Human Rights: A Matter of Interpretation,” 16. 
257  The United Nations Human Rights Council has passed three different resolutions on 
traditional values. Human Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms through a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind,” October 12, 
2009; Human Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through 
a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind,” April 8, 2011; and Human 
Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better 
Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind: Best Practices,” October 9, 2012. 
258  Christopher McCrudden, “Human Rights, Southern Voices, and ‘Traditional Values’ at 
the United Nations,” U of Michigan Public Law Research Paper No. 419 (May 28, 2014). 
66 
definition’ of what is meant by ‘traditional values’”. The variety of definitions 
was also visible in submissions by stakeholders.259 
As the case-studies of Estonia, Finland, and Russia will show while all of 
these countries have used some notion of tradition in their argumentation before 
the CRC Committee, nevertheless, the substance given to these notions has 
differed from expressions of national sovereignty and national legal custom to 
conservative orthodox values. 
 
2.2.3 Minimum core and margin of appreciation  
as the practical middle ground 
Much of the debate regarding pluralist legal orders is characterised by polarised 
presumptions that disregard the complexity and variety of local situations. 
While recognising that cultural differences are significant and real to people, 
complexity exists in the relationship between law and culture; at the same time, 
culture is a dynamic process that is continuously contested both socially and 
politically.260 
The most common approach analyses human rights norms from the 
perspective of the individual. The rights approach is interested in subjective rights. 
The common deficiency of this system is drawing conclusions on the subjective 
nature of rights without fully discussing all the obligations imposed on the state. 
Another way of analysing these norms is from the perspective of state 
obligations and the discretion given to states in the application of rights. 
Thus, the alternative to absolute cultural relativism comes from an approach 
claiming the existence of a minimum core of international human rights, a core 
that is not dependent on cultural values.261 Classification of state obligations 
helps to analyse the material scope of rights in order to conclude the minimum 
measures the state has to take in order to provide full realization of a specific 
right. Furthermore, as the consequences of obligations differ, the consequences 
of violations of rights can be looked at in a more systematic way. 
The minimum core of rights refers to rights that have to be guaranteed 
irrespective of available resources or other considerations. As an example, the 
CRC Committee has referred to the minimum core approach as follows: “Core 
obligations are intended to ensure, at the very least, the minimum conditions 
                                                 
259  OHCHR, Summary of Information from States Members of the United Nations and 
Other Relevant Stakeholders on Best Practices in the Application of Traditional Values 
While Promoting and Protecting Human Rights and Upholding Human Dignity, 
(A/HRC/24/22, June 17, 2013). 
260  On pluralist legal orders see further e.g. International Council on Human Rights Policy, 
When Legal Worlds Overlap: Human Rights, State and Non-State Law (Geneva: Inter-
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under which one can live in dignity.”262 The CESCR Committee has stated further 
that: “a minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every State 
party.”263 
The subsidiarity of human rights264 or margin of appreciation is the practical 
tool through which national policy preferences and values receive acceptance in 
international human rights. The ECtHR has developed this principle through its 
case-law and, where no European consensus could be found, states have the 
right to refer to their national values when applying international human rights.265  
The margin of appreciation should not, however, infringe on the minimum 
core of rights. At its minimum, states do not have the freedom to decide 
whether and how to apply the CRC. This minimum core of requirements cannot 
be seen as allowing limitation of the ‘right to participate’. This is one example 
where the progressive realisation is in the core of a right. Generally, gradual the 
progressive protection should still be discussed in a constructive dialogue 
between states and the treaty body.  
An extreme representation of the subsidiarity of the human rights approach 
is referenced to traditional values. With the strong support of the Russian 
Federation, on 27 September 2012 the UN Human Rights Council adopted its 
third resolution on traditional values. 266  This resolution on the one hand 
recognises international human rights as universal rights but on the other hand it 
stresses the significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds that have to be taken into account 
when applying these rights.267 As an exception to the typical procedure, this 
resolution was accepted by vote – 25 in favour, 15 against, and 7 abstentions.268 
                                                 
262  CRC Committee, Day of General Discussion on ‘Resources for the Rights of the Child – 
Responsibility of States,’ September 21, 2007, paras 48–49. 
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The passing of this resolution showed a clear difference of opinion between the 
‘West’ and ‘the rest’ (including states from Africa, Asia and the Middle East). It 
is still too early to conclude whether this marks a change in the universality 
rhetoric of international human rights or rights of the child, and whether the 
minimum core concept with a wider margin of appreciation will become a norm. 
 
 
3 International rights of the child 
This dissertation uses children’s rights and, in particular, the CRC as a 
substantive instrument. The CRC is an instrument that deals specifically with 
the needs and problems of children. Thus, it could be regarded as a lex specialis 
vis-à-vis general international human rights treaties. The CRC covers the whole 
range of rights: the civil and political rights as well as the economic, social and 
cultural rights of children. This, in turn, means that the norms of the CRC cover 
the whole range of obligations described in part 1.2.1.1. The comprehensive 
nature of the Convention, its focus on child well-being and welfare, and its 
legally binding nature mean that it is a good basis for assessing the situation of 
and opportunities for children. The current part introduces the central instru-
ments and defines the international legal framework of the dissertation. Precise 
legal obligations deriving from selected norms of the CRC are defined in 
Chapter 2. 
The rights of the child function in two complementary but also sometimes 
mutually exclusive directions. On the one hand, most measures for the pro-
tection of children have a protectionist character i.e., different age limits should 
protect children who might not understand the full complexity of the world. At 
the same time, children also need empowering and, thus, limits set by laws 
could hinder this goal.269 
Rights of the child have many layers and objectives.270 They should ensure 
the current interests and rights of the child; and, at the same time, they should 
also look ahead and guarantee the ‘future interests of the child’. There is also a 
possible tension between the individual rights of the child, the rights and needs 
of the family and the rights of other children in the family; and, thirdly, the 
rights of the responsible parents (together and separately) in connection to the 
                                                 
269  Wall argues that children’s rights will adequately transform societies only when the very 
concept of “human rights” is reimagined in light of childhood. John Wall, “Human Rights in 
Light of Childhood,” The International Journal of Children’s Rights 16, No. 4 (September 1, 
2008): 523–43. 
270  Freeman has presented comparative arguments in connection to the best interests of the 
child. These tensions and considerations have relevance, however, in connection to all the 
rights of the child. Michael D. A. Freeman, Article 3: The Best Interests of the Child, Com-
mentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child v. 3 (Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2007), 2–4. 
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said child. 271  Thus, implementation of the rights of the child is a delicate 
balancing act where all these considerations have to be weighed and evaluated. 
There is an additional problem of decision-making and representation. When 
adults have the right and capacity to decide what rights to actively realise, the 
majority of the rights of the child are protected through some representative i.e., 
children are politically and economically powerless. 
It is possible to use all the typologies discussed in part 1.2.1.1 for the con-
ceptualization of the rights of a child. Firstly, the tripartite division (respect, 
protect, provide) could be used.272 Secondly, rights of the child might be divided 
into general human rights (e.g. the right to life, right to work) and child-specific 
rights (e.g. the right to engage in play).273 Most often, children’s rights are divided 
into three groups, also known as the ‘three P-s’ (provision, protection and 
participation).274 
The debate over children’s rights always entails a social construction of 
childhood.275 The modern conception of childhood sees children as distinctly set 
apart from adults, marked out by their individuality, dependency and vulner-
ability; yet, at the same time, inextricably bound to their parents and the family, 
and in the inevitable process of becoming adults;276  the CRC with its near 
universal acceptance represents this prevailing perception of the child.277 
                                                 
271  Brems discusses the dension between the rights of the child and those of the parents in 
Eva Brems, “Inclusive Universality and the Child-Caretaker Dynamic.” 
272  The CRC Committee frequently uses this typology in its General Comments. See e.g. 
CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 16: State Obligations Regarding the Impact of the 
Business Sector on Children’s Rights” (CRC /C/GC/16, March 15, 2013). 
273  See e.g. Michael Freeman, The Future of Children’s Rights (Hotei Publishing, 2014), 111. 
274  See further e.g. Jens Qvortrup and European Centre for Social Welfare Policy and 
Research, Childhood as a Social Phenomenon: An Introduction to a Series of National 
Reports (Vienna, Austria: European Centre, 1991), 121–30. Quennerstedt is of opinion that 
this division does not fully reflect the substance of the rights of the child and hampers the 
full protection of the rights of the child. Examples of such rights could be as follows: 
provision rights (e.g. the right to health, education, family, recreation, and the like, that 
ensure the full development of the child according to the child’s abilities and potential); 
protection rights (e.g. the right to be protected against discrimination, unfair treatment, 
physical and sexual abuse); participation rights (e.g. the right to express one’s opinion, to be 
included). 
275  For introduction of the relationship of childhood and the rights of the child, see e.g. 
Trevor Buck, International Child Law, 3. ed. (London: Routledge, 2014), chap. 1. 
276  For a recent account of the historical development of the concept of childhood, see e.g. 
Michael Freeman, “Introduction,” in Law and Childhood Studies: Current Legal Issues Vol. 
14 (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
277  Holzscheiter has analysed the creation and transformation of the emancipated child 
presented in the CRC through the drafting of the CRC from the perspective of the 
international relations theory in Anna Holzscheiter, Children’s Rights in International 
Politics: The Transformative Power of Transnational Discourse, Transformations of the 
state (Basingstoke (Hampshire) ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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According to modern theories of childhood, children are present here and 
now as subjects and active social actors in their own right.278 As children, they 
are human beings who share social environments with adults. The cornerstone 
of the international rights of children is that children are competent according to 
their age to make choices and to act on them. CRC has moved the focus from 
the protection of children to the protection of the rights of the child.279 
 
3.1 The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child was adopted by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 20 November 1989 and entered into force 
on 2 September 1990. In comparison with other international human rights 
treaties, it entered into force shortly after adoption. The CRC acquired a very 
large number of states parties in a relatively short period of time. To date, it has 
the largest number of states parties – as of 1 May 2015, it has 195 states parties. 
There are three optional protocols to the CRC. The Optional Protocol to the 
CRC on the involvement of children in Armed Conflict280 was adopted in New 
York on 25 May 2000 and entered into force on 12 February 2002. As of 1 May 
2015 it has 154 parties including Finland, Estonia, and the Russian Federation. 
The Optional Protocol requires that states make a declaration during ratification 
and specify the age of conscription in the given member state. 
The Optional Protocol to the CRC on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution 
and Child Pornography281 was adopted in New York on 25 May 2000 and 
entered into force on 18 January 2002. As of 1 May 2015, it has 169 states 
parties including Finland, Estonia and the Russian Federation. The Optional 
Protocol to the CRC on a Communications Procedure was adopted in New York 
on 19 December 2011 and entered into force on 14 April 2014. As of 1 May 
2015, it has 17 parties; the states of the current research have not joined it. 
                                                 
278  See further e.g. Michael Freeman, “Towards a Sociology of Children’s Rights,” in Law 
and Childhood Studies: Current Legal Issues, ed. Michael Freeman, Volume 14 (Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 30–38; Julia Fionda, ed., Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart 
Publishing, 2001); or Ann Quennerstedt, “Transforming Children’s Human Rights—From 
Universal Claims to National Particularity,” in Law and Childhood Studies: Current Legal 
Issues, ed. Michael Freeman, Volume 14 (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
279  See for critique of this development e.g. Barbara Arneil, “Becoming Versus Being: A 
Critical Analysis of the Child in Liberal Theory,” in The Moral and Political Status of 
Children, ed. David Archard and Colin M. Macleod (Oxford University Press, 2002), 70–93; 
and Harry Brighouse, “What Rights (If Any) Do Children Have?,” in The Moral and 
Political Status of Children, ed. David Archard and Colin M. Macleod (Oxford University 
Press, 2002), 31–52. 
280  UN GA, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the In-
volvement of Children in Armed Conflict” (A/RES/54/263, May 25, 2000), United Nations, 
Treaty Series, vol. 2173, p. 222. 
281  UN GA, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of 
Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography” (A/RES/54/263, May 25, 2000). 
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The obligations entailed in the CRC are clarified by the CRC Committee; in 
its General Comment No. 5,282 the Committee defined the general obligations 
under the CRC and stated that the first and foremost obligation in art. 4 of the 
CRC is to ensure that domestic legislation is fully compatible with the pro-
visions of the CRC and that the Convention’s principles and provisions can be 
directly applied and appropriately enforced. Thus, the CRC includes mainly 
goal-oriented obligations and foresees certain results. The CRC Committee has 
also identified a wide range of measures that are relevant to the full protection 
of the CRC. It is also clear that the Committee sees the provisions of the CRC 
generally as rules. 
Reading of article 41 of the CRC reveals that the provisions of the CRC 
should be regarded as minimum standards – member states are free to adopt 
measures which are more conducive to realizing the rights of the child. These 
provisions can derive either from national legislation or from international 
obligations that grant children stronger protection. 
None of the three states has made any reservations to the treaty monitoring 
provisions of the CRC, and they have all submitted at least some of their reports 
for review by the CRC Committee in a more-or-less timely manner.283 The 
treaty-specific monitoring procedure of the CRC Committee is complemented 
by the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in the Human Rights Council. 
By ratifying the CRC as a legally binding instrument, the states parties 
assume under conditions of normalcy the full responsibility of giving effect to 
the Convention’s provisions.284 However, articles 43–45 reveal that implemen-
tation of its standards is not solely a national concern but undergoes inter-
national scrutiny.285 Reports submitted to the CRC Committee show measures 
adopted by states to give effect to the obligations under the treaty concerned and 
progress made in realizing the rights guaranteed therein. Compared to the other 
core instruments of the UN the CRC system is lacking a follow-up mechanism. 
Thus, the immediate effect of the concluding observations is not visible; in 
order to analyse this effect, the national implementation practice, as well as the 
statements of the states during the next reporting cycles, might show the effect 
of the constructive dialogue. 
 
3.2 European Convention on Human Rights 
The Council of Europe has adopted a number of treaties specifically to protect 
children’s rights and which may be invoked before the Court to challenge 
breaches of those rights: 
                                                 
282  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 5.” 
283  Estonia has been constantly late with its reports. It submitted its first report ten years 
after accession to the CRC; and submitted its II–IV report in 2015, six years after the due date. 
284  For a general analysis of the national implementation of international human rights, see 
e.g. Tomuschat, Human Rights, chap. 10. 
285  For detailed commentary see Verheyde and Goedertier, Articles 43–45. 
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• Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and 
Sexual Abuse286 
• European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights287 
• European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of 
Wedlock288 
• European Convention on the Adoption of Children289 
• European Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions con-
cerning Custody of Children and on Restoration of Custody of Children290 
• European Convention on the Repatriation of Minors291 
 
The scope of the ECHR for enforcing and protecting the rights of children is not 
immediately evident given that it contains few specific references to the rights 
of the child. However, the European Commission of Human Rights and the 
ECtHR have made a considerable contribution to European law and practice in 
the areas of private and public family law, the protection of children from abuse 
and neglect and, most recently, juvenile justice and detention.292 
The ECHR and the practice of the ECtHR are relevant for the current 
research only as far as, firstly, their implementation practice takes inspiration 
from the CRC, drawing standards from the provisions of the CRC.293 Secondly, 
in some areas the ECHR might grant children more rights or more protection. 
While it is not apparent that the ECtHR has followed a consistent strategy to 
refer to the CRC in all children’s cases, it has been making such references with 
increasing frequency and with significant effect, in order to ensure that its judg-
ments reflect current standards in children’s rights.294 The ECtHR’s approach to 
the specific rights of children is analysed, when necessary, in the second part of 
the current work and under the appropriate provisions of the CRC. 
                                                 
286  Convention on the Protection of Children against Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, 
Council of Europe, October 25, 2007, CETS No. 201. 
287  European Convention on the Exercise of Children’s Rights, Council of Europe, January 
25, 1996, CETS No. 160. 
288  European Convention on the Legal Status of Children born out of Wedlock, Council of 
Europe, October 15, 1975, CETS No. 085. 
289  European Convention on the Adoption of Children, Council of Europe, April 24, 1967, 
CETS No. 058. 
290  Recognition and Enforcement of Decisions concerning Custody of Children and on 
Restoration of Custody of Children, Council of Europe, May 20, 1980, CETS No. 105. 
291  European Convention on the Repatriation of Minors, Council of Europe, May 28, 1970, 
CETS No. 071. 
292  See Ursula Kilkelly, The Child and the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Ashgate/Dartmouth, 1999). 
293  Ursula Kilkelly, “Best of Both Worlds for Children’s Rights – Interpreting the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the Light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,” 
Hum. Rts. Q. 23 (2001): 308–26. 
294  Ursula Kilkelly, “Protecting Children’s Rights under the ECHR: The Role of Positive 
Obligations,” N. Ir. Legal Q. 61 (2010): 245. 
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The ECHR contains only a few norms that refer directly to the rights of 
children (art. 6 deals with the right to fair trial, art. 5(1)(d) refers to the 
detention of a minor, and art. 3 has been used in cases of violence against 
children). The ECtHR has dealt with the rights of the child mainly under art. 8 
of the Convention that entails respect for private and family lives;295 it includes 
a variety of different types of obligations, including negative obligations of 
respect and positive obligations to protect and fulfill. It also covers a whole 
range of rights protected by the CRC. 
 
3.3 European Social Charter 
The European revised Social Charter does not concentrate per se on the rights 
of children. However, it deals with central rights of children under several of its 
articles, and it is a major regional treaty which secures children’s rights as it 
guarantees the rights of the child in many circumstances from birth to adulthood 
in two different manners. 
Firstly, many of the rights guaranteed by the Charter have specific relevance 
to children; for example Article 16 (right of the family to social, legal and 
economic protection) which protects the rights of children as family members 
and Article 11 (right to protection of health). Secondly, the Charter contains 
specific rights relating exclusively to children; Article 7 (right of children and 
young persons to protection) and Article 17 (right of children and young 
persons to social, legal and economic protection). 
The function of the European Committee of Social Rights (EComSR) is to 
evaluate the conformity of national law and practice with the Charter. States 
have the obligation to submit periodic reports to the EComSR on the 
implementation measures of the Charter. Compared to the CRC Committee, the 
conclusions of the EComSR analyse the implementation of the Charter article 
by article and are very detailed; they also include a conclusion on whether or 
not the practice of the state is in conformity with the Charter. 
Estonia ratified the ESC (revised) in 2000, Finland in 2002; and the Russian 
Federation in 2009. Only Finland has accepted the collective complaints 
procedure of the ESC, whereby international and national NGOs can bring 
complaints before the EComSR. The specific obligations deriving from the ESC 




                                                 
295  Article 8 is the most litigated provision from a perspective of the rights of children; its 
case law has touched on many areas of family law including adoption, child abduction, 
alternative care, custody and access, guardianship, and identity issues. For a detailed analysis, 
see e.g. Ursula Kilkelly, “Protecting Children’s Rights under the ECHR: The Role of 
Positive Obligations,” Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 61 (2010): 245. 
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3.4 EU law 
Estonia and Finland are further bound by the requirements of the EU legal 
system. It has to be noted, that the EU does not disregard the rights of the 
children; to the contrary, the EU analyses the effect of its legal acts as well as 
policies to the rights of the child. Article 2 (5) of the Lisbon Treaty296 states that 
the EU will contribute to the protection of human rights and, in particular, the 
rights of the child. The minimum core of the rights of the child is stressed in art. 
24 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.297 The EU uses the CRC as a policy 
document,298  and in recent years, the protection of the procedural rights of 
children have been emphasised.299  
As the EU does not have general competence to legislate on the rights of the 
child, and as Russia is not bound by its regulation, the EU regulations do not 
have focal importance for the purposes of the dissertation. Nevertheless, the EU 
legislation has relevance is some areas of the dissertation (e.g., in the area of 
family reunification) as the EU has a joint asylum and migration policy that, in 




                                                 
296  Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union, Official Journal of the 
European Union, 30.3.2010 C 83/15. 
297  Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (OJ EU C 83/399 2010). Art. 24 
of the Charter reads:  
“1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-
being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on 
matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 
2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private 
institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration. 
3. Every child shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis a personal relationship 
and direct contact with both his or her parents, unless that is contrary to his or her interests.” 
298  See e.g. Helen Stalford and Eleanor Drywood, “Using the CRC to Inform EU Law and 
Policy-Making,” in The Human Rights of Children from Visions to Implementation, ed. 
Antonella Invernizzi and Jane Williams (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 199–218. 
299  For recent analysis, see e.g. FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 
“Press Release: Justice Needs to Be More Child-Friendly, Finds FRA,” May 5, 2015; and 
FRA – European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, “Child-Friendly Justice. Perspectives 
and Experiences of Professionals on Children’s Participation in Civil and Criminal Judicial 
Proceedings in 10 EU Member States” (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European 
Union, 2015). 
300  See e.g. Council Directive on the right to family reunification, 2003/86/EC OJ L 251, 
03/10/2003 P. 0012 – 0018 (2003); Directive on common standards and procedures in 
Member States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals, 2008/115/EC OJ L 348, 
24.12.2008, pp 98–107; Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings 
and protecting its victims, 2011/36/EU OJEU L 101/1 (2011). 
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4 Position of international human rights in national 
legal systems of Estonia, Finland and Russia 
The aim of this part is to analyse the general position of international human 
rights in the constitutional system of the states, Estonia, Finland, and Russia. 
This analysis includes insight into the constitutional values of the state, the 
position of international human rights treaties and the practice of the super-
visory bodies. When possible, examples include implementation of the rights of 
the child and the CRC. The current subsection has two hypotheses. Firstly, 
irrespective of monism or dualism, all the three states consider international 
human rights as part of their national legal system. Secondly, all three states 
deem practice of the international supervisory bodies as binding. 
International human rights, following their reception into the national legal 
system, enter the regulations of the relevant constitution. Therefore, the division 
between monism and dualism is important here. Niemi proposes that national 
implementation can be said to consist of:301 
1. translation and dissemination of the treaty and treaty body output as a 
precondition for its effective use at the national level; 
2. establishment of a national mechanism for implementation of the treaty and 
treaty body findings; follow-up of progress; 
3. use of the treaty and treaty body output in the legislative process; and 
4. use and implementation by the judiciary of the treaty and treaty body 
findings. 
 
It can be assumed that next to the provisions of the treaty itself, the views and 
general comments, being the Committees’ primary vehicles of legal analysis of 
their respective conventions, would be of greater interest to national courts and 
tribunals than concluding observations, which are of a more policy-oriented 
nature. 
The following analysis starts by looking generally at the central values 
behind the constitutions of the three states; secondly, the status of international 
treaties is analysed; thirdly, the legal relevance of international practice within 
the respective constitutional systems is analysed. This discussion is followed by 
initial conclusions and hypothesis on expected implementation of the CRC and 
the practice of the CRC Committee within these national legal systems. 
 
4.1 Human Rights in the Finnish Constitution 
The Nordic countries, in general, have the reputation of a positive or supportive 
human rights record that covers the whole diapason of human rights. At the 
                                                 
301  Heli Niemi, National Implementation of Findings by United Nations Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies: A Comparative Study, Research Reports of the Institute, December 2003, 7, 
http://www.abo.fi/media/24259/report20.pdf, (accessed May 1, 2015). 
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same time, using international human rights law in domestic legal practice is not 
a long tradition in Finland.302 However, as will be discussed below, this stance 
somewhat changed after the constitutional reform in 2000; and international 
human rights are seen as binding at the same level as the legal acts of the 
Eduskunta (Parliament).303 
 
4.1.1 Constitutional values 
Central to the Finnish legal system is the universal emphasis on legality.304 As 
Husa puts it, a common feature of the Finnish law is the commitment to a 
doctrine of sources of law; the legislative acts of the Parliament are the source 
of law par excellence.305 The Finnish legal system has had strong influences 
from the Swedish and German legal systems; the central idiosyncrasy was, 
however, shaped during the Grand Duchy era. 306  As noted by Ojanen, the 
Finnish legal system is founded on a highly formal, rule-focused legalism, that 
has to adhere “the letter of the Constitution.”307 At the same time, the Finnish 
constitution is not closed; it is open to amendments when such societal needs 
appear. 
Finnish system of government has strong presidential powers and a 
parliamentary form of government.308 One of the peculiarities of the Finnish 
legal system prior to the 2000 was the absence of a constitutional review 
mechanism. It is now expressly stipulated in section 106 of the Constitution that 
the Courts are empowered to set aside statutes on the grounds of unconsti-
tutionality, but only in the case of ‘manifest’ contrast or ‘clear contradiction’ 
with the Constitution. A pre-eminent role for ex ante constitutional control by 
the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament is emphasized.309 
                                                 
302  See e.g. Martin Scheinin, “Protection of the Right to Housing in Finland,” in National 
Perspectives on Housing Rights, ed. Scott Leckie (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), 241. 
303 Suvianna Hakalehto-Wainio, “Lapsen oikeudet ja lapsen etu lapsen oikeuksien 
sopimuksessa,” in Lapsioikeus murroksessa, ed. Suvianna Hakalehto-Wainio and Liisa 
Nieminen (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 2013), 43. 
304  Aulis Aarnio, “Introduction,” in An Introduction to Finnish Law, ed. Juha Pöyhönen, 
2nd, revised ed (Helsinki: Kauppakaari, 2002), 8. 
305  Jaakko Husa, “Panorama of World’s Legal Systems – Focusing on Finland,” in 
Introduction to Finnish Law and Legal Culture, ed. Kimmo Nuotio, Sakari Melander, and 
Merita Huomo-Kettunen (Helsinki: Faculty of Law, Univ. of Helsinki, 2012), 10. 
306  The years 1809–1917, in particular 1905–1917. For constitutional history and develop-
ment, see, e.g., Jaakko Husa, The Constitution of Finland: A Contextual Analysis, 
Constitutional systems of the world (Oxford ; Portland (Oreg.): Hart, 2011), 1–40; Ilkka 
Saraviita, Constitution of Finland. I Ed, Updated in 2008 (Kluwer Law International, 2004); 
and Aarnio, “Introduction.” 
307   See e.g., the discussion in Tuomas Ojanen, “The EU at the Finnish Constitutional 
Arena,” TvCR 2013 (2013): 245. 
308  Husa, The Constitution of Finland, 42. 
309  Husa stresses that historically the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament had 
to ensure the constitutionality of domestic legislation. Even though there is now a 
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Sovereignty has traditionally been the central value of the Finnish 
constitutional law system. Ojanen describes it as follows: 
Prior to European integration, and even in the 1990s, the sovereignty doctrine 
was markedly formal and strict: international obligations were almost auto-
matically deemed to be in conflict with the sovereignty of Finland if these 
obligations even in a minor way entailed the transfer of powers to international 
organisations or the authorities of other states. At that time, the Constitution 
assumed a notoriously minimalist approach to international affairs and, 
accordingly, lacked a constitutional provision permitting limitations of sovereignty 
or the transfer of powers to international organisations.310 
Accession to the ECHR, acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ECtHR and 
accession to the EU brought about constitutional reform with the Constitution of 
Finland being changed in 2000; changes include an extensive list of basic rights. 
 
4.1.2 Position of international human rights treaties 
Finland ratified all the UN human rights treaties relatively early, whilst it joined 
the Council of Europe only in 1989 and ratified the ECHR and its protocols on 
10 May 1990. Finland is a party to the following central UN and Council of 
Europe treaties: 
 
Treaty Signature Ratification 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
1966 1970 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 1967 1975 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the 
death penalty (OPII CCPR) 
1990 1991 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) 
1967 1975 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
1980 1986 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
1985 1989 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1990 1991 
Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of children 2000 2002 
                                                                                                                       
constitutional review procedure, this function is still exercised jointly and the authoritative 
statements of the Constitutional Law Committee still play a decisive role. Ibid., 157–64. See 
also the discussion in Tuomas Ojanen, “EU Law and the Response of the Constitutional Law 
Committee of the Finnish Parliament,” Scandinavian Studies in Law 52 (2007): 203–226. 
310  Ojanen, “The EU at the Finnish Constitutional Arena,”p. 245. 
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Treaty Signature Ratification 
in armed conflict 
Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children, child 
prostitution and child pornography 
2000 2012 
European Convention on Human Rights  1990 
European Social Charter (revised) 1996 2002 
 
Typically for a dualist state, the ratification of some treaties has included a 
lengthy internal procedure. At the same time, once Finland has acceeded to a 
treaty, it usually also accepts the respective complaints mechanism and 
international scrutiny. 
 
Finland is a party to the following international adjudication procedures: 
Complaints mechanism Date of accession 
Individual complaints procedure under the CAT 2014 
Optional Protocol to the CCPR 1975 
Optional Protocol to the CESCR 2014 
Optional Protocol to the CEDAW 2000 
Optional Protocol to the ECHR, jurisdiction of the ECtHR 1990 
 
Rosas suggests that the relatively late accession of Finland to ECHR was the 
result its policy of ‘active neutrality’ together with the need to uphold positive 
relations with both East and West during the Cold War. Finland had not joined 
the Council of Europe because it was perceived as a ‘Western European’ human 
rights system.311 
The constitution of Finland was reformed in 2000 and one of the central 
steps of the reform was adoption of the chapter including fundamental rights. 
Länsineva has described this as a paradigmatic change that “launched a new era 
in Finnish constitutional history”.312 Today the fundamental rights guaranteed 
in the constitution together with the international treaties that Finland has 
acceded to form a binding body of norms positioned at the highest place in the 
Finnish legal system – according to section 22 of the constitution, all public 
actions guarantee the observance of constitutional and human rights. 
The inviolability of human rights of all in the Finnish Constitution is stressed 
in the human dignity provision and is positioned among the fundamental 
provisions in art. 1. In the Constitution, the inviolability of human dignity is 
                                                 
311  Allan Rosas, “Nordic Countries and the International Protection of Human Rights,” 
Nordic J. Int’l L. 57 (1988): 426. 
312  Kimmo Nuotio, Sakari Melander, and Merita Huomo-Kettunen, Introduction to Finnish 
Law and Legal Culture (Helsinki: Faculty of Law, Univ. of Helsinki, 2012), 111. 
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considered to be by nature a general constitutional principle313 that assists in 
substantiating and interpreting other constitutional rights and provisions. As 
McCrudden has observed, in it’s background lies the Nordic social state: “in 
Finland the socialist influence was clear.” 314  According to the preparatory 
legislative materials for Finnish constitutional reform, human dignity refers to 
recognition of the inherent dignity and worth of all human beings. It also belongs 
to all persons irrespective of the prevailing will of the state or positive law.315 
In Finland, UN human rights treaties have been specifically incorporated 
into domestic law by an Act of Parliament, a procedure required by section 95 
of the Constitution. This means that Finland follows the traditional dualist 
approach to international law, but it has been suggested that a more appropriate 
term in the Finnish context might be ‘de facto monism’ or ‘mitigated 
dualism’.316 Scheinin argues that section 22 of the Constitution introduces a 
monistic stand into the national legal system as it refers to fundamental and 
human rights (‘perusoikeuksien ja ihmisoikeuksien’).317  
Typical for a dualist country, treaties have to be incorporated into the 
Finnish domestic legal order before they can be applied directly by the courts. 
Treaties of this type are also transformed (or incorporated) into Finnish 
legislation by legislative acts through a government proposal.318 The position of 
subsequent acts of supervisory bodies is, however, not clear. 
An extensive catalogue of bill of rights was included in the Constitution in 
1995 in order to make it consistent with international human rights treaties and 
to incorporate the ECHR into the national legal system.  Husa observes that 319
                                                 
313  See e.g. the opinion of the working group on the Constitution OLJ 8/1995, 55–6. 
314  McCrudden, “Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights,” 664. 
315  Article 1 paras 2–3 of the Finnish Constitution establishes: “The constitution shall 
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(2009): 197. 
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Finnish Law, ed. Juha Pöyhönen, 2nd, revised ed. (Helsinki: Kauppakaari, 2002), 34. 
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3/2012 or HE 341/2014. 
319  One of the aims of the reform was to enhance the domestic protection of human rights to 
a level higher than the minimal level required by the ECHR so as to diminish the need for 
individuals to go to Strasbourg. See e.g. Heyns and Viljoen, “The Impact of the United 
Nations Human Rights Treaties on the Domestic Level,” 525. 
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the Finnish Constitution regards rights as legal in nature, meaning that these 
rights exist under the rules of constitutional law. 
The constitutional reforms were completed in 2000 and introduced a system 
of ‘decentralised constitutional review’.320 As a result, courts have the capacity 
not to apply national legislation that manifestly conflicts with the constitution 
(section 106 of the Constitution). Section 22 of the Constitution includes an 
obligation for public authorities to “guarantee the observance of basic rights 
and liberties and human rights”. Similarly, the obligation of the parliamentary 
Constitutional Law Committee has been detailed as to “issue statements on the 
constitutionality of legislative proposals... as well as on their relation to inter-
national human rights treaties” (section 74 of the Constitution).321  
The Constitutional Law Committee and Finnish courts have generally tried 
to avoid open conflicts and use human rights friendly interpretation of national 
legislation.322 Husa concludes that the Finnish Constitution is considerably open 
to international human rights.323 
Children as a group needing special attention are not mentioned in the 
constitution. Van Dijk noted: 
For a young Constitution as the Finnish one is, it is somewhat surprising that Ch. 
2, dealing with basic rights and liberties, is not more closely tuned to the 
regulation of these rights and freedoms in the ECHR and its Protocols and in the 
European Social Charter, both as concerns the selection of rights and freedoms, 
their formulation and scope, and the conditions for the limitation of and 
derogation from some of them. … there is also no reference to the international 
legal obligations of Finland in this area. There is, of course, no obligation for 
Finland to implement these international obligations by incorporating them 
literally in its Constitution, but a deviating or more restrictive constitutional 
guarantee can never be used as a defence against allegations of non-fulfilment of 
these obligations.324 
Finland scrutinised its legal system prior the CRC entered into force in order to 
find out, whether any substantive change was necessary. It was concluded that 
child protection laws of Finland follow already the requirements of the CRC 
and the best interest of a child is protected.325 Hakalehto-Wainio observes that 
this analysis addressed only compatibility of the legal acts with the CRC, and it 
                                                 
320  Krommendijk, “Finnish Exceptionalism at Play?,” 21. 
321  In addition, both the Chancellor of Justice and the Parliamentary Ombudsman have an 
express constitutional task to monitor “the implementation of basic rights and liberties and 
human rights” in the performance of its duties (sections 108 and 109). 
322  Juha Lavapuro, Tuomas Ojanen, and Martin Scheinin, “Rights-Based Constitutionalism 
in Finland and the Development of Pluralist Constitutional Review,” Int J Constitutional 
Law 9, No. 2 (April 1, 2011): 524. 
323  Husa, The Constitution of Finland, 172. 
324  Pieter Van Dijk, “Comments on the Constitution of Finland” (Venice Commission, 
CDL(2007)075, September 17, 2007), para. 78. 
325  Sami Mahkonen, “Lapsen oikeuksien sopimus ja sen merkitys Suomessa,” Lakimies 
(1990): 41–58. 
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discarded possible effects on the administration or policy measures; there was 
no wider debate on the substantive implementation of the CRC. This is also the 
reason it has been claimed that implementation of the CRC in Finland is partial 
and unfinished.326 
The role and position of international human rights treaties, as well as the 
practice of the ECtHR, is high in the Finnish Constitutional system. In 1990, the 
Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament stated that the ECHR and its 
protocols would be given precedence in a case of norm conflict with the prior 
national law. Although this was not the intention at the time, the doctrine of 
allowing precedence to be given to ECHR law has since prevailed.327 
 
4.1.3 Position and role of the practice of supervisory institutions 
There are some UN treaty bodies that have had a substantive effect on the 
Finnish legal system. Views of the Human Rights Committee should be noted 
as one such positive example. After receiving the views of the HRC in the cases 
of Vuolanne,328 Torres,329 and Kivenmaa,330 the Finnish legal system was sub-
stantively updated, and a number of legislative and administrative changed were 
adopted. 331  This indicates that Finland considers the views of the HRC as 
binding. Finnish readiness to participate in the follow up procedure shows also 
the potential for including similar measures to the work of the CRC. 
Finland stressed throughout its fourth report to the CRC Committee that it 
values and analyses all the observations and recommendations of that Com-
mittee. Finland is generally following its reporting obligations, although some 
irregularities can be observed. As an example, Finland has delayed latest 
submission of its reports under both optional protocols of the CRC. 
On the effectiveness and implementation of the Concluding Observations 
Krommendjik notes: 
Most of the Concluding Observations have remained ineffective. The great 
majority of them have been ineffective because they simply coincided with 
existing or intended policy or legislative measures without having had any effect 
on them. This is primarily because Concluding Observations are generally and 
vaguely formulated without prescribing any specific course of action. A smaller 
number of Concluding Observations has been rejected or has remained 
completely unaddressed.332 
 
                                                 
326  Hakalehto-Wainio, “Lapsen oikeudet ja lapsen etu lapsen oikeuksien sopimuksessa,” 20. 
327  As referred to in Husa, The Constitution of Finland, 171. 
328  HRC, Vuolanne v. Finland, Communication No. 265/1987 (1989). 
329  HRC, Torres v. Finland, Communication No. 291/1988 (1990). 
330  HRC, Kivenmaa v. Finland, Communication No. 412/1990 (1994). 
331  See e.g. HRC, “Report of the Human Rights Committee” (A/54/40, 1999), para. 468. 
332  Krommendijk, “Finnish Exceptionalism at Play?,” 27. 
82 
One positive example from the practice of the CRC Committee is the 
establishment of the Children’s Ombudsman, whose work has proved highly 
successful in Finland.333 There is, however, no reference to the opinions or 
positions of the CRC Committee in Finnish court practice.334 
Concluding from the above, Finland is still formally a dualist country, 
although it is open both to international human rights treaties and subsequent 
supervisory practice. It has participated in the constructive dialogue and taken 
the suggestions in the concluding observations of the HRC seriously. Thus, it 
could be concluded that Finland considers these instruments to be binding; they 
were, however, more used in the legislative process of the Eduskunta. 
 
4.2 Human Rights in the Estonian Constitution 
International human rights treaties played an important role in the transition of 
Estonia to a democracy at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s.335 It is possible to take as a starting point of the transition 16 November 
1988 when the Supreme Soviet of the Estonian SSR passed three significant 
documents for the restoration of Estonia’s sovereignty336: 
1. the Declaration of Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR337; 
2. the Law amending the Constitution of the Estonian SSR338; 
3. the Resolution on the Union Treaty339. 
 
It is significant that the first two of these documents were based on international 
human rights instruments – the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR) – and that the preamble to the 1978 Constitution was 
supplemented by them.340 
                                                 
333  Ibid., 30. For an overview of the functions of Children’s Ombudsman, see e.g. Kirsti 
Kurki-Suonio, “Oikeusasiamies lapsen oikeuksien valvojana,” in Eduskunnan oikeusasia-
mies 90 vuotta. Juhlakirja. (Vammalan Kirjapaino Oy, Sastamal, 2010), 297–310. 
334  Hakalehto-Wainio, “Lapsen oikeudet ja lapsen etu lapsen oikeuksien sopimuksessa,” 46. 
335  For an analysis of the influence of international human rights and UDHR in particular 
on the transition to democracy, see e.g. Katre Luhamaa, “Estonia: Transition Through 
Human Rights.” 
336   For a collection of instruments relating to the restoration of independence as well as 
draft constitutions see Heinrich Schneider and Eesti Akadeemiline Õigusteaduse Selts, eds., 
Taasvabanenud Eesti põhiseaduse eellugu (Tartu: Juura, Õigusteabe AS, 1997). 
337  Eesti NSV suveräänsusest (Declaration of Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR) ENSV 
ÜVT 1988, 48, 685. 
338  Muudatuste ja täienduste tegemise kohta Eesti NSV konstitutsioonis (põhiseaduses) 
(Law amending the Constitution of the Estonian SSR) ENSV ÜVT 1988, 48, 684. 
339  ENSV Ülemnõukogu resolutsioon liidulepingust (Resolution on the Union Treaty) 
ESSR Gazette 1988, 48, 686. 
340  Article 1 changed the last paragraph of the preamble to the Constitution and stated that 
an inseparable part of the Estonian legal system includes “covenants that are generally 
accepted by the international community and ratified by the USSR, CESCR and CCPR and 
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A general referendum on the question of independence was held on 3 March 
1991; participation in the referendum was high and 77.83 percent of participants 
voted for the restoration of an independent Republic of Estonia.341 The Supreme 
Council adopted a Decision on the Independence of Estonia on 20 August 1991, 
whereby the statehood of the Republic of Estonia was restored de facto. It also 
established the Constitutional Assembly.342 
At the same time, Estonia was looking for support from the international 
community. The General Assembly of the UN accepted Estonia as a member of 
the United Nations on 17 September 1991343 and on 21 October 1991 Estonia 
signed the ICCPR and the ICESCR as well as numerous other UN human rights 
instruments. The Constitution was adopted on 28 June 1992.344 Estonia joined 
the Council of Europe in May 1993.345 
 
4.2.1 Constitutional values 
The Estonian legal system is part of the continental European legal system; thus, 
central to the Estonian constitution is legality and the rule of law. The preamble 
to the Constitution states that the Estonian state is founded on “liberty, justice 
and the rule of law”.346 The Constitution of Estonia strongly stresses democratic 
values as the basis of the Estonian legal system. Due to historical development, 
the constitution includes a long list of constitutional rights and, at the same time, 
is also open to additional international human rights. Ernits has mentioned the 
                                                                                                                       
to other international treaties and declarations that protect civil and human rights.” 
(translation by the author), Tunne Kelam, Tunne Kelam: eluloointervjuu: valik artikleid ja 
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kui eesmärk’, speech in the Council of Europe, Strasbourg on 26 November 1991. Published 
in Estonian in Lennart Meri, Presidendikõned, Eesti mõttelugu 9 (Tartu: Ilmamaa, 1996), 
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(Tartu: Juura, 2012), http://www.pohiseadus.ee/ (accessed January 16, 2014)., preamble. See 
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following basic principles of Estonian constitutional law: human dignity, demo-
cracy, rule of law, and social state. This list is not necessarily exhaustive.347  
Although the constitution includes the principle of the social state, there is 
strong emphasis on liberal rights and freedoms. This also seems to be the wider 
mentality of society – Estonia has had a liberal government now for more than 
20 years and the liberal party also won the latest parliamentary elections in 2015. 
There are also tendencies to give children more freedom. As an example, the 
Parliament will discuss granting children from 16 years of age the right to vote 
in local elections.348 
 
4.2.2 Position of international human rights treaties 
The Estonian legal system and the court system have been open to international 
human rights law. Article 3 of the Estonian Constitution stipulates that 
principles of international law form an inherent part of the Estonian legal system. 
Therefore, the Estonian constitutional law system can be seen as representing a 
monist approach to international law. Estonia is a party to the following central 
UN and Council of Europe treaties: 
 
Treaty Signature Ratification 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
 1991 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR)  1991 
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, aiming at the abolition of the death 
penalty (OP II CCPR) 
 2004 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) 
 1991 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
 1991 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
 1991 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)  1991 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict 
2003 2014 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the 2003 2004 
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Treaty Signature Ratification 
Child on the sale of children, child prostitution and child 
pornography 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) 
 2012 
European Convention on Human Rights 1993 1996 
European Social Charter (revised) 1998 2000 
 
As can be seen, most of the human rights treaties were quickly adopted at the 
beginning of the transition process and several of these treaties were forgotten 
for a number of years after that. The CRC is one such example. At the 
beginning of the transition, accession to the treaties was an easy way to secure 
an international standing as a state. At the same time, Estonia has been reluctant 
in accepting voluntary supervisory procedures. 
Estonia is a party to the following international human rights adjudication 
mechanisms; it has clearly favoured instruments relating to civil and political 
rights. 
Complaints mechanism Date of accession 
Individual complaints procedure under the CAT 2006 
Optional Protocol to the CCPR 1991 
Optional Protocol to the ECHR, jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
1996 
Optional Protocol to the CRPD 2012 
 
Basic rights are enumerated in the second chapter of the Constitution; this list of 
rights is not exhaustive (art. 10). Moreover, “the generally recognised principles 
and rules of international law are an inseparable part of the Estonian legal 
system”.349 
The Constitution of 1992 created a three-tier court system, at the top of 
which stands the Supreme Court with a double function: it acts as a court of 
cassation and also has the functions of a constitutional review court.350 The 
Supreme Court and its Constitutional Review Chamber in particular frequently 
uses international human rights arguments and instruments. In all major cases 
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involving the Chamber, the need for interpretation of some basic right has 
arisen.351 
The European Convention of Human Rights, the International Covenants 
and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights and practice of the relevant 
supervisory bodies are, therefore, the Court’s main instruments that help to 
substantiate and interpret basic rights. 
The Administrative Law Chamber clarified the position and use of 
international treaties among sources of law in its decision No. 3-3-1-58-02, part 
of which concerned direct application of the CESCR. The Court stated that 
international treaties usually have a supportive interpretative function. However, 
there may be cases where an international treaty is, in an individual matter, 
clearer than the Constitution. In such situations, international treaties can be 
directly applicable. Prerequisites for the direct application of a norm of 
international law are that, firstly, the norm regulates internal relations, and, 
secondly, that the norm is clear enough and does not need additional national 
regulation. International treaties with this potentiality should also have been 
ratified by the Riigikogu.352 
Although the other Chambers of the Court have not clarified their position in 
relation to the application of international treaties, the practice of the Court (and 
all its Chambers) seems to follow the same line of argumentation. There are 
numerous cases where one or several international instruments have been used 
and applied.353 
 
4.2.3 Position and role of the practice of supervisory institutions 
International human rights treaties as well as the supervisory practice of the UN 
human rights treaty bodies are often used during preparation of legislative acts. 
The same is true of the CRC and the General Comments and Concluding 
Observations of the CRC Committee. 
The practice of the Supreme Court as well as lower courts is more limited. 
The CRC has been referred to in several cases involving the Supreme Court, 
and the number of such references has risen in recent years. The court has 
referred to several provisions of the CRC. The best interests of the child (art. 3 
CRC) was central to the interpretation of the 1980 Hague Convention on the 
Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.354 In deciding the maintenance 
allowance for children living abroad, the Supreme Court referred to the 
                                                 
351  Recent cases involving application of the CRC include e.g. CCSCr No. 3-2-1-6-12, (14 
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principle of equal treatment of children and relied on art. 2 of the CRC.355 The 
Supreme Court has also taken the position that unemployment is not a sufficient 
reason to be released from the obligation to pay maintenance allowance (art. 18 
concerning the primary responsibility of parents for the upbringing and 
development of the child)356. 
While referring to the practice of the ECtHR as well as recommendations 
and other soft law instruments is a commonplace in the practice of the Supreme 
Court, there has been only one reference to a General Comment.357 There have 
been no references to the supervisory practice of the CRC Committee. Still, it can 
be concluded that Estonia views the products of the UN treaty bodies as 
authoritative interpretations that are capable of creating binding principles and 
rules. 
Concluding from the above, Estonia is clearly a monist country that uses 
international treaties and supervisory practice actively in its legal practice. Thus, 
the Estonian legal system is receptive to the universality of international human 
rights law.  
 
4.3 Human Rights in the Russian Constitution 
The current attitude of the Russian Federation towards international law and 
international human rights law in particular can be traced back to the history of 
Russian Empire and Soviet legal system in particular, and the USSR’s approach 
to international human rights law.358 As Bowring points out, Soviet international 
legal theory was full of contradictions and, he argues, these positions have 
continuing relevance.359 It could be argued that a number of current problems of 
implementation of international human rights could be traced back to difficulties 
in transitioning from Soviet doctrine to a new constitutional democracy.360 
The Soviet Union was pragmatic in its approach to international law and 
followed a strictly dualist approach concerning the relationship between 
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domestic and international law.361 The 1977 Constitution of the USSR regulated 
the relationship between domestic and international law in more modern terms 
in article 29: 
the USSR shall fulfil the obligations arising from the generally recognized 
principles and rules of international law, and from international treaties signed 
by the USSR. 
This was, at the time, however, clearly seen as a law on paper but it did not 
incorporate international law such as international human rights into the 
domestic law of the USSR. As Nußberger notes, international and domestic law 
were, under Soviet law, considered to be two completely separate systems, 
based on the concept of strict national sovereignty. There was no constitutional 
rule providing for direct incorporation of international law into Soviet law, nor 
could international treaties be invoked before national courts i.e., Soviet legal 
theory followed a “strictly dualist approach”.362 As Långström puts it, in the 
Soviet Union – until perestroika at least – implementation of human rights 
treaties belonged exclusively to the domestic jurisdiction. Voluntary reporting 
submitted by the states parties was seen as a sufficient device to monitor 
compliance.363 Feldbrugge has showed that the background to this approach 
relates to the heritage of autocracy, dictatorship and enforced orthodoxy of 
Russian society.364 
Still, the first and primary obligation is to ensure national implementation of 
international human rights treaties. Legislation is the principal way that 
international treaties and their supervisory practice should be implemented. This 
is also the approach of the Russian Federation – it sees its first and foremost 
task as to transform relevant treaty norms as well as selected recommendations 
into federal legislation.365 
 
4.3.1 Constitutional values 
Russia is one of the countries where ‘civilizational’ arguments and the 
importance of traditional values have been stressed in recent years, including in 
connection with application of international human rights treaties. Russian 
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scholarship refers to Orthodox values and the Orthodox Declaration on Human 
Rights 366  as representing central values of Russian society. 367  One of the 
initiators and strongest supporters of traditional values resolutions has been the 
Russian Federation. Russian sociologist Zakharova explains that the central 
difference between the European and Russian understandings and interpretation 
of international human rights lies in the language used: 
European language of human rights is primarily a legally oriented language…. 
Arguments justifying the importance of this concept are built on professional 
legal language and this language is closely linked to the right as a pheno-
menon368. The very idea of human rights in Europe implies the principle of the 
rule of law, and western ‘language of human rights’ defines all related legal 
categories.369 
She contrasts this view with the Russian understanding of human rights where 
“morality” language prevails along with traditions and patriotism.370 McCrudden 
observes that Russia, in particular, is strongly reasserting its national interests 
internationally, and in reinventing a narrative of national sovereignty the 
external scrutiny of human rights bodies and their ‘interference’ was perceived 
as threatening and unwelcome. 
The central difference from traditional human rights dogmatics is its 
definition of human dignity – there is a difference between worth and dignity; 
worth is given while dignity is acquired by doing “good things”.371 Furthermore: 
There are values no smaller than human rights. These are faith, morality, the 
sacred, the motherland. Whenever these values come into conflict with the 
implementation of human rights, the task of society, state and law is to bring 
both to harmony. It is unacceptable, in pursuit of human rights, to oppress faith 
and moral tradition, insult religious and national feelings, cause harm to revered 
holy objects and sites, jeopardize the motherland. Likewise we see as dangerous 
the “invention” of such “rights” as to legitimize behaviour condemned by both 
traditional morality and historical religions.372 
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At first, these traditional morality arguments were mainly used in political 
discussion. In more recent years, this language has also found international 
legitimization with the help of strong support from Russia – the UN Human 
Rights Council adopted the “traditional values resolution” in 2012.373 During 
constructive dialogue on the fourth and fifth report on the implementation of the 
CRC, Russia was asked to explain the influence of the Russian Orthodox 
Church on state policy and the state’s attitude towards the “anti-juvenile” 
campaign of the Church.374 Russia stressed in its reply that Russia is a secular 
state, it did not make its position on the campaign of the Church clear; rather, it 
explained the aim of the campaign from the perspective of the Orthodox 
Church.375 
The Constitutional Court of Russia has used the concept of traditional values 
in its jurisprudence when deciding on the constitutionality of the prohibition of 
gay propaganda. The Supreme Court found that the law prohibiting gay 
propaganda with the aim of protecting the value of family and the rights of 
minors was in accordance with the Constitution.376 The Court stated that the 
Russian legal system has “constitutionally significant moral values, predefined 
historical, cultural and other traditions of the multinational people of the 
Russian Federation”. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court found that these 
values correspond to the international obligations of Russia as international 
human rights treaties are general in nature. The Russian legal system is based 
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on a traditional notion of humanism in the context of the national and religious 
peculiarities of Russian society. These include social, cultural and historical 
characteristics that are generally accepted in Russian society (and shared by all 
traditional religious denominations) such as ideas about marriage, family, 
maternity, paternity and the child; according to the state, these values are 
formally embodied in the Constitution.377 
It can also be observed that the understanding of the separation of powers in 
Russia differs from the traditional view. According to Zorkin, it is first and 
foremost the obligation of the legislator to decide what solution is most suitable 
for society and the administrative as well as the judicial powers should as far as 
possible follow the position of the legislator i.e., “the constitution lives in 
laws”.378 
 
4.3.2 Position of international human rights treaties 
The Constitution of the Russian Federation of 12 December 1993379 radically 
changed the legal relationship between national and international law; and the 
Russian Federation adopted a monist attitude towards international law 380 . 
Article 15 (4) of the Constitution regulates the correlation between national and 
international law, and from the outset this provision seems to be relatively 
clear381: 
The universally recognized 382  norms of international law and international 
treaties and agreements of the Russian Federation shall be a component part of 
its legal system. If an international treaty or agreement of the Russian 
Federation fixes other rules than those envisaged by law, the rules of the 
international agreement shall be applied. 
Burkov stresses the importance of the position of this provision – as it is 
situated in the first chapter of the Constitution entitled “The Fundamentals of 
the Constitutional System”, this provision has priority over all subsequent 
norms of the Constitution and, as an example, it cannot be trumped by lower 
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International Law, 194. 
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implementation of art 15(4) in William E. Butler, “Russia,” in The Role of Domestic Courts 
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legislation.383 The wording of art. 15 (4) makes an interesting distinction and 
limitation. Firstly, the sources of international law include both norms and 
principles of international law; secondly, superiority is granted only to treaty 
norms.384 
Art. 15 (4) as a general principle of the Russian Constitution, has to be read 
in conjunction with other provisions of the Constitution granting competences 
to different institutions and regulating the relationship between federal and local 
law. International relations and international treaties of the Russian Federation 
are under federal authority (art. 71) and article 106 requires that federal laws on 
the ratification and denunciation of international treaties must be considered by 
the Council of the Federation. Fulfilment and application of international 
treaties fall under the joint jurisdiction of the Federation and its subjects 
(art. 72) (1). Specific competences are also conferred on the President of the 
Russian Federation – under art. 86 (b) of the Constitution, the President has the 
competence to sign international treaties and agreements. Finally, in accordance 
with art. 125 (6) of the Constitution of the Russian Federation, international 
treaties inconsistent with the Constitution of the Russian Federation cannot be 
enforced or applied.385 
Sovereignty is a key concept in the Russian understanding of the relationship 
between international and national law. This means that international criticism 
should not in principle influence Russian national law – it is up to the 
Parliament to decide what effect the international law norm has domestically. 
Antonov notes that the discourses of political and legal practitioners in Russia 
show proneness for the dualist concept of international order, where the binding 
force of the norms of international law depends on recognition by the 
authorities of the state concerned.386 
It has to be noted that in the years following adoption of the ECHR in 1998, 
Russian openness to accept and apply international human rights was high 
among the legal elite. As an example, resolution No. 5 of the Plenum of the  
 
  
                                                 
383  Burkov, Konventsiia o zashchite prav cheloveka v sudakh Rossii, 61–62. 
384  Mikhail Antonov, “The Philosophy of Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Democracy in 
Russia,” Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP 24/LAW/2013 (August 
13, 2013): 6. For an earlier discussion on this topic, see e.g., G. M. Danilenko, “Imple-
mentation of International Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice,” Eur J Int Law 10, No. 1 
(January 1, 1999): 51–69. 
385  For an analysis of the application of international human rights in Russian courts, see 
e.g., Sergei Yurievich Marochkin, “International Law in the Courts of the Russian 
Federation: Practice of Application,” Chinese Journal of International Law 6, No. 2 (2007): 
329–44; Burkov, Konventsiia o zashchite prav cheloveka v sudakh Rossii, pt. 2; or Butler, 
“Russia.” 
386  Antonov, “The Philosophy of Sovereignty, Human Rights, and Democracy in Russia,” 6. 
93 
Supreme Court 387  explained that judges have to apply both sources of 
international law. After an international treaty is ratified and enters into force, it 
becomes a part of the Russian legal system. Issuance of additional normative 
documents is not required.388 
As Tikhomirov explains, Russian courts apply the doctrine of self-executing 
and non-self-executing treaties. Only the officially published provisions of 
international treaties that do not require the issue of additional domestic legal 
acts are directly applicable.389 This approach is not fully in conformity with the 
monist approach to international law as it potentially limits application of e.g. 
social rights and would support the argumentation that not all international 
human rights create individual and justiciable rights. 
Article 15 (4) does not limit the application of international treaties only to 
the level of legislation; instead, it recognizes the importance of international law 
for the whole Russian legal system, thus including, besides legislation, legal 
practice (both judicial and administrative), and legal doctrine.390 The Plenum of 
the Supreme Court defined applicable instruments as follows: 
The universally recognized norms of international law should be understood as 
rules of conduct, accepted and recognized as legally binding by the international 
community of states as a whole. The contents of the said principles and norms of 
international law may be construed, in particular, in the documents of the United 
Nations and its specialized agencies.391 
International human rights are connected to basic rights protected through the 
constitution. As such, they have a special role within the constitutional system. 
Article 2 of the Constitution stresses the priority of basic rights; article 17 (1) of 
the constitution recognises that these basic rights include rights protected 
through international human rights treaties: 
In the Russian Federation recognition and guarantees shall be provided for the 
rights and freedoms of man and the citizen according to universally recognized 
principles and norms of international law and according to the present 
Constitution. 
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Russia is a party to the following core human rights instruments of the UN and 
Council of Europe: 
Treaty Signature Ratification 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) 
1985 1987 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) 1968 1973 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
1980 1981 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
1966 1969 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (CESCR) 
1968 1973 
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) 1990 1990 
Optional Protocol to the CRC on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict (CRC-OP-AC) 
2001 2008 
Optional Protocol to the CRC on the sale of children child 
prostitution and child pornography (CRC-OP-SC) 
2012 2013 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
(CRPD) 
2008 2012 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the protocols 
1996 1998 
European Social Charter (revised) 2000 2009 
 
Russia has also accepted number of individual complaints mechanisms of the 
UN; it has refrained from accessing the more recent mechanisms. 
Complaints mechanism Date of accession 
Individual complaints procedure under the CAT 01 Oct 1991 
Optional Protocol to the CCPR 01 Oct 1991 
Optional Protocol to the CEDAW 28 Jul 2004 
Individual complaints procedure under the CEDR 01 Oct 1991 
Optional Protocol to the ECHR, jurisdiction of the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)392 
5 May 1998 
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Russia has observed its reporting obligations relatively well; the CRC Com-
mittee noted that while all formal legislative changes in Russia were reported in 
their latest report, it lacked information about implementation of the CRC as 
well as relevant statistics.393 
As will be discussed below, Russia selectively applies the views of the CRC 
Committee and takes them into account mainly during the development of 
policy measures. Creation of the post of the Children’s Rights Commissioner 
for the President of the Russian Federation is a prime example of it.394 
 
4.3.3 Position and role of the practice of supervisory institutions 
The legal status of subsidiary instruments (including decisions and other 
documents of supervisory bodies) under ratified international treaties is not 
clear. The Plenum of the Supreme Court has stressed the obligation to apply 
directly international treaties, and their priority over national law. At the same 
time, Valery Zorkin stated in 2010: 
Every decision of the ECtHR is not only a legal but a political act. When such 
decisions are made for the benefit of protecting the rights and freedoms of 
citizens and the development of our country, Russia will always strictly comply 
with them. But when certain decisions of the Strasbourg Court are controversial 
in terms of the spirit of the European Convention on Human Rights and affect 
national sovereignty directly, and our fundamental constitutional principles, 
Russia has the right to defend itself against such decisions. The correlation 
between the decisions of the Russian Constitutional Court and the European 
Court of Human Rights must be addressed through the prism of the Russian 
Constitution.395 
As every legal norm requires interpretation, any subsequent practice of the 
treaty body should be taken into account.396 Even if Tikhomirov states in strong 
terms that recommendations by international treaty bodies are not considered to 
be legally binding397, these instruments are relevant for interpretation of treaty 
norms. Moreover, there are a few cases where the Russian Supreme Court has 
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taken into account the full diapason of UN treaty bodies’ instruments. 
Marochkin and Khalafyan observe: 
There is an extension of usage of international soft law by all subjects of 
domestic law. The constitutional principle in art. 15 (4) is not only considered in 
a formally juridical way. On the contrary, courts have developed its content and 
rely practically on all the elements of the international normative system, such as 
resolutions and recommendations of international organisations, decisions of 
international bodies, model acts, legal positions and rulings of judicial bodies. 
/.../ Strictly speaking, courts do not apply but use them to specify the terms they 
employ, to formulate and give proof of their position, to affirm or emphasize 
their legal argumentation.398 
As an example, when the Russian Supreme Court was considering the legality 
of expelling Mr. Abdullayev, it used the General Comment and jurisprudence of 
the CAT Committee to establish the criteria to be applied. Furthermore, it used 
Concluding Observations to determine the de facto situation relating to 
extradition and an alleged threat of torture in Kyrgyzstan.399 
There is even more clarity regarding the jurisprudence of international courts 
and the European Court of Human Rights in particular. The Plenary of the 
Supreme Court analysed the effect of the ECHT and the practice of the ECtHR 
in its opinion No. 21. The principal position of the Supreme Court is that: 
the legal positions of the European Court of Human Rights /.../ contained in the 
final judgments of the Court delivered in respect of the Russian Federation are 
obligatory for the courts. In order to effectively protect human rights the courts 
take into consideration the legal positions of the European Court expressed in its 
final judgments taken in respect of other States which are parties to the 
Convention. However this legal position is to be taken into consideration by the 
court if the circumstances of the case under examination are similar to those 
which have been the subject of analysis and findings made by the European 
Court.400 
More recently, in its judgment of 6 December 2013, the Constitutional Court 
stated that final judgments of the ECtHR are binding on Russia. The state has an 
obligation to pay compensation to the victim and ensure that rights violated are 
restored. On the other hand, the ECtHR is not a body that stands over national 
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courts. If the judgment of the ECtHR clashes with the Constitution, the state 
must act accordingly, bearing its national interests in mind.401 
Thus, the jurisprudence of the international courts is a source of principles of 
international law and as such give guidance to the Russian courts. At the same 
time, as was shown by Burkov, this ideal does not always materialise in practice 
and international human rights law has remained rather as a secondary source of 
interpretation.402  Butler even concludes that it is unknown whether Russian 
courts consult foreign decisions for treaty interpretation (with the exception of 
ECtHR) as it would not be part of the style of judicial decision drafting to so 
indicate.403 
If international or foreign powers (including organisations of the inter-
national community) try to introduce any legal rules (or undermine the validity 
of Russian laws), they limit or even violate the sovereign rights of the people.404 
This was clear from the statement of (former) Justice of the Constitutional 
Court Tatyana Morschtshakova, who in 2007 stated that “Unfortunately, our 
country is coming into collision with a politicization of judicial decisions… 
undermining trust in the international judicial system.”405 
For at least the last five years, the discussion over whether the Russian 
constitutional system needs reform has been on the agenda.406 The vast number 
of cases against the Russian Federation and decisions of the ECtHR that have 
not taken into account Russian arguments of culture and tradition have raised 
the need to return to the dualist legal system. 407  Recent discussions have 
stressed the need to adhere to the legal obligations of the Russian Federation but 
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at the same time to only apply international law that does not violate the spirit 
of the Constitution.408 
At the political level, President Vladimir Putin has constructed the territorial 
integrity and historical greatness of Russia as the highest value to which other 
values, such as tacitly human rights and liberty, must subordinate themselves. In 
his recent speeches, one of the values standing before individual rights is the 
stability and importance of the family.409 At the same time, in the UN Human 
Rights Council Russia has tried to combine its support for cultural relativism 
and traditional values with the universality and interdependence of international 
human rights.410 
The Russian Foreign Policy Concept 411  stresses the need to increase 
participation in international human rights institutions as well as the need to 
increase protection of human rights. It is interesting to note that in relation to 
children, the Foreign Policy Concept emphasizes the importance of “extending 
the legal framework of international cooperation in order to improve the level 
of protection of rights and legitimate interests of Russian children living 
abroad”. 412  There is no specific mention of the need to increase domestic 
protection of the rights of the child in Russia. 
The sovereignty argument has been strongly present in the recent practice of 
Russia. In relation to the rights of the child this argument has recently been 
made in the Markin case in which the Russian government insisted that “By 
assessing Russia’s legislation, the Court would encroach upon the sovereign 
powers of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court”.413 Interestingly, as 
Vaypan notes, despite the earlier call by the President of the Constitutional 
Court to set the “limits to [Russia’s] acquiescence,”414 the Constitutional Court 
refrained in 2013, when dealing with the national implementation of the Markin 
judgment,415 from laying down any general principles or proclaiming its own 
                                                 
408  See e.g., Lyuba Lulko, “Should International Law Prevail over Russian Constitution?,” 
English Pravda.ru (December 12, 2013); or Vladimir V. Putin, “Vstrecha S Zaveduyu-
shchimi Kafedrami Konstitutsionno-Pravovykh Distsiplin (Meeting with Heads of 
Departments of Constitutional and Legal Disciplines)” (Moskva, November 7, 2013), 
http://www.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19579 (accessed May 16, 2015). 
409  Vladimir V. Putin, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club,” October 19, 
2013, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6007 (accessed July 16, 2014). 
410  Human Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through 
a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind: Best Practices.” 
411  MFA of Russia, Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, December 2, 
2013, para. 39, http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76389FEC168189ED44257B2E0039B16D 
(accessed June 12, 2014). 
412  Ibid. 
413  Konstantin Markin v. Russia, App. No. 30078/06 (Eur. Ct. H.R., March 22, 2012) [85]. 
414   Zorkin, “Predel ustupchivosti.” 
415   Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti polozheniy stat’i 11 i punktov 3 i 4 chasti 
chetvertoy stat’i 392 Grazhdanskogo protsessual’nogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
svyazi s zaprosom prezidiuma Leningradskogo okruzhnogo voyennogo suda [2013] Case no 
27-П/2013 (June 12, 2013). 
99 
superiority vis-à-vis the ECtHR. Rather, the Court’s reasoning is open-ended 
and “leaves the Court free to embrace the international human rights law and 
the ECHR in particular just as much as to deviate from it, depending on the 
circumstances of future cases.” 416 
The sovereignty argument was also used as the prima facie reason in the 
arguments of the Russian authorities against the Magnitsky Act whereby 
adoption of the Russian children by US citizens was banned to protect national 
sovereignty, in the so-called Dima Yakovlev Act.417 
Thus, even when formally Russia is following the international human rights 
standards it has recognized, application of these standards often faces a shortfall. 
Frei and MacLaren noted already in 2004 that, while formally Russia follows its 
international obligations and treaties, it nevertheless gives a different meaning 
to the concepts used in treaties and instruments: 
It appears to many observers, however, as if this desire to integrate fully into the 
international order has given way to disillusionment with the West and even a 
willingness to reject its standards.418 
At the same time, Russia has signed up to most of the international human 
rights instruments. The sovereignty argument would here support the view that 
Russia has accepted the wording of the CRC; but does not see the practice of 
the CRC Committee as binding. Therefore, even if the CRC Committee gives 
authoritative interpretations, they are not of the same legal force as the 
provisions of the treaty itself. Therefore, it can be concluded that Russia views 
the instruments deriving from the political dialogue as soft law or as law that 
does not have any effect. 
As practice shows, international human rights treaties are used in Russia in 
order to support conclusions based on national law and practice. This means 
that the real substance of the international obligations is not analysed, or at least, 
this analysis is not obvious from the practice. Furthermore, human rights 
arguments are not used to introduce change in the legal system – this is not seen 
as the role of judiciary. All legislative initiatives have to come from the 
President or the State Duma and the practice of the courts should uphold the 
legislation as far as possible.  
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5 Concluding remarks 
A primary analysis of the constitutional systems of the three states shows that 
despite the monist-dualist divide between them, fundamentally, their attitude 
towards the position of international law and the supervisory practice of the 
treaty bodies does not differ. Thus, I have to agree with Paulus, who states: 
The relationship between international and local law – and even less so between 
international and domestic courts – cannot be described by a simplistic monist 
or dualist framework. Rather, in the contemporary world, every legal regime 
must relate, by one way or another, to other legal systems and their judicial 
‘products.’419 
All the three states value their international treaty obligations. Thus, the first 
hypothesis of this chapter is confirmed – all the three states consider inter-
national human rights as part of their national legal system. There are no 
differences in this attitude based on the observance of monist-dualist 
approaches, and the high regard to international human rights does not depend 
on the chosen approach to international law.  
In their domestic practice, all three states apply or at least refer to both 
international treaties and their supervisory practice. This, at least partially, 
confirms the second hypothesis of the first chapter – all three states deem the 
practice of the international supervisory bodies at least somewhat binding. 
UN human rights instruments are not at the centre of this practice; rather, the 
ECHR and the practice of the ECtHR is referred to. Only in limited cases have 
UN instruments and the CRC in particular been applied. However, references 
have been made to the CRC at all levels of power – in legislative procedure, as 
well as in the courts. The research does not clearly show whether any of these 
references really indicate the supremacy of international human rights over 
national law. 420  It is still proposed that Estonia and Finland consider the 
instruments of the UN treaty bodies as binding, whereas Russia considers these 
tools to represent the voluntary soft law. 
It is possible that reference style and substance might be dependent on the 
central values of the national legal system as considerably larger differences 
exist in the central values of the legal systems analysed. The Finnish legal 
system has a strong belief in legality and the power of the legislator together 
with separation of powers. The Russian legal system has similar support or 
                                                 
419  Andreas Paulus, “A Comparative Look at Domestic Enforcement of International 
Decisions,” Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 103 (2009): 47. These ideas were further developed in 
Andreas Paulus, “From Dualism to Pluralism: The Relationship between International Law, 
European Law and Domestic Law,” in Making Transnational Law Work in the Global 
Economy: Essays in Honour of Detlev Vagts, ed. Pieter H. F. Bekker et al. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 2010), 132–53. 
420  For an analyses of “the last word” problem, see e.g., Gertrude Luebbe-Wolff, “Who Has 
the Last Word? National and Transnational Courts – Conflict and Cooperation,” Yearbook of 
European Law 30, No. 1 (2011): 86–99. 
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belief in the legislator, but the separation of powers seems to be less relevant. 
There is also a strong emphasis on national pride and, in recent years, a new 
emphasis on traditional values. The Estonian legal system stresses liberal values. 
This is also reflected in a strong emphasis on the separation of powers. The 
legal culture expresses itself also in the practice – references to international 
supervisory practice are much more general in Finland and Russia than in 
Estonia. 
Thus, it could be suggested that instead of the monist-dualist distinction, 
application of rights might rather reflect these value systems, so that the 
universalism-relativity discussion might prove to be a more relevant framework 




Application of selected rights of the child  
in Estonia, Finland, and Russia 
Before embarking on a substantive analysis of the national application of the 
rights of the child in the countries of Estonia, Finland, and Russia, the basic 
principles that guide analysis of the implementation of the Convention has to be 
sketched. Current chapter concentrates on the implementation practice and its 
central hypothesis is that the three states do not fulfil the minimum require-
ments set forth, and, at least some of them use culture or traditional values 
arguments as justification. Finding precise causes of change in de lege lata is 
often a gruesome task; thus, the current chapter concentrates on the existing law 
in force and uses other sources such as the court cases, opinions and statements 
of the CRC Committee as complementary proof of the de lege lata. 
The current analysis is systematized according to the substantive themes of 
the CRC. The topics researched follow to some extent the way the CRC 
Committee has systematized the obligations of the state; 421  the obligations 
analysed fall under the general obligations of states that govern application of 
all other substantive rights in the CRC. The general principles analysed in the 
current study are: 
1. Definition of child (art. 1 CRC), and 
2. Best interests of the child (art. 3 CRC). 
 
Both of these norms are formulated in general terms in the CRC and have thus 
required further explanation and interpretation through the practice of the CRC 
Committee. It is proposed that a harmonization vision is behind the work of 
supervisory committees when the Committee and other supervisory institutions 
scrutinize national legislation and implementation practice by states against the 
standards of international law. The practice of the ECtHR and ComER of the 
Council of Europe also has relevance here – besides the standard of the CRC, 
the states have to apply these norms taking into account the practice of the 
European framework. This is especially important when regional instruments 
provide stronger protection. 
In order to systematize material rights for the purposes of the current disser-
tation these general principles are reviewed separately. Within the analysis of 
application of this right when necessary, the application of other general 
principles as well as substantive provisions are looked at. In every substantive 
issue, a minimum core standard is found and the practice of the state is 
evaluated against this standard in order to conclude whether the practice of the 
respective state complies with the standard or whether the state has used some 
                                                 
421  CRC Committee, “Treaty-Specific Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of 
Periodic Reports.” 
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cultural or legal arguments in order to apply the right differently. This is 
followed by a short insight into the evaluation and argumentation or lack of it 
by the CRC Committee, whereby the clarity and application of the standard 
used could be evaluated – it is interesting in the context of the current research 
to see whether the standards listed are the minimum standards that, in the 
opinion of the CRC Committee, the member states should implement or whether 
there also exists an element of progressive realization in their implementation. 
The following analysis first looks at different definitions of a child (art. 1 
CRC), with examples brought from the following areas – marriage, sexual 
consent, employment and conscription. Secondly, the central principle of the 
rights of the child i.e., the principle of best interests is looked at. Here the 
examples of placement into care and family reunification are analysed. 
In order to analyse the application of international soft law in national legal 
systems, Keller and Grover have listed several factors that are relevant for 
determining compliance.422 For the purposes of the current research, the following 
factors are deemed relevant.423 
(1) The linkage between the norm and hard law established by the inter-
national legal system or by domestic legal systems. Here, complementary 
international law norms (deriving from ILO Conventions, the ECHR, the 
ESC (revised) and the practice of the ECtHR are relevant. Additionally, 
national constitutional provisions and, in particular, domestic legislation 
inspired by international law are analysed. The link between these instru-
ments need not be explicit; it could be deemed sufficient when the linkage 
is made by the CRC Committee itself in soft law instruments. 
(2) The linkage of the norm to other ‘soft’ norms. Other UN treaty bodies 
often analyse application of the relevant treaty in relation to children. Thus, 
the existence of complementary soft law from e.g. other treaty bodies 
shows a wider consensus on the substance of the soft law norm. 
(3) The relationship of the norm to past practices. Consistency in time as well 
as consistency in applying these norms vis-à-vis all the member states is 
thus relevant. 
(4) The clarity of the obligation and the ability of others to determine whether 
the target of the norm is in compliance or not. As is shown below, the 
minimum requirements of some obligations are clearer than others. The 
current analysis does not aim to expand the minimum obligations protected 
by the CRC; rather, it remains conservative in its definitions. 
(5) The legitimacy of the process by which the norm was created. The mini-
mum obligations analysed in the current thesis have been mostly defined 
through the General Comments of the CRC Committee. Although they 
                                                 
422  Keller and Grover, “General Comments of the Human Rights Committee and Their 
Legitimacy,” 138–39. 
423  See also generally on compliance Jonathan L Charney, “Commentary Compliance With 
International Soft Law,” in Commitment and Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms 
in the International Legal System, ed. Dinah Shelton (Oxford University Press, 2003). 
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represent the view of the CRC Committee, the drafting process includes 
analysis of past practice; consultation with the states parties through days 
of general discussion and possible acceptance of written communications. 
All the General Comments are also presented for potential discussion in the 
UN Human Rights Council as well as the General Assembly. Thus, the 
legitimacy of the process is not a question for the current analysis. 
 
 
1 Definition of a ‘child’ 
Before the application of the rights of the child is possible, it has to be 
ascertained who is a child i.e., whose rights are protected by the CRC. The 
definition of child stipulates who in international law as well as in the national 
legal systems is defined as a child and has through this status the right to the 
protection provided by the CRC. At the same time, even within the same state 
the upper age limit of the status of child is set at various ages depending on the 
domain concerned. Hence, the age for marriage may be younger or older, for 
instance, than the age of criminal culpability or the legal age of recruitment into 
the armed forces, all within the same state. Further, married children are, in 
practice, excluded from the protections afforded to unmarried children under the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child.424 
Compliance with a numerical definition or requirement is comparatively 
easy to analyse as well as for a member state to legislate. This is an area where 
the precision of legislation has a central role. A number of age limits might be 
of interest. For the current research, the following general areas have been 
selected for analysis – child marriage, minimum age of employment, enlistment 
in armed forces, sexual consent. The selected topics are all also culturally 
sensitive and are often mentioned in relation to relativist arguments but they 
have also been mentioned by the CRC Committee as having particular 
importance for protection of the rights of the child.425 The list of the CRC 
Committee also includes other issues such as the minimum age for criminal 
responsibility, juvenile justice as well as the rights of the child in different court 
procedures. However, analysing these elements of the definition of a child in 
the three states would require going into too much detail in the particular area of 
material law, which would shift the focus from the general picture to details of 




                                                 
424  See also discussion in Sonja Grover, “Children’s Rights as Ground Zero in the Debate 
on the Universality of Human Rights: The Child Marriage Issue as a Case Example,” 
Original L. Rev. 2 (2006): 72. 
425  CRC Committee, “Treaty-Specific Guidelines Regarding the Form and Content of 
Periodic Reports,” para. 24. 
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1.1 Definition of a ‘child’ in international human rights 
Article 1 of the CRC defines a child as “every human being below the age of 
eighteen years unless under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained 
earlier.” This definition applies as a general principle to all substantive 
provisions of the convention and defines the subjects of the convention. In 
doing so, Article 1 defines the subject of the CRC itself, but it does not address 
the issue of when the life of a child begins and is inherently neutral on the pro-
choice/pro-life debate.426 Art. 1 is worded vaguely; it, in principle, gives the 
states a right to grant a majority to children earlier. Thus, the CRC Committee 
has defined areas where attaining majority earlier is against the aim of the CRC 
and where specific age limits should be followed. 
Such definitions are clearly rules that entail obligations to conduct and 
result – these requirements should be included in respective laws, and they have 
to be applied in practice without derogations. It would be against the aim and 
purpose of the CRC to consider the age limits as soft law, even if these 
definitions do not derive directly from the wording of the CRC and are, in 
substance, defined by the CRC Committee. 
Age limits are often also connected to cultural considerations such as the 
child and planned marriages, early sexual consent; different age limits for boys 
and girls are examples of such traditional cultural practices. Thus, the attitude of 
the CRC Committee in defining the minimum requirements and also supervising 
adherence to these requirements would reveal its attitude towards relativity 
arguments. Similar attention to age limits in developed countries and European 
countries would send a strong signal to all countries suggesting that there are no 
double standards applied among the states. At the same time, the age limits have 
been defined through the practice of the CRC Committee, so that and, therefore, 
the attitude of the member states towards these requirements would show 
whether they regard these limits as obligatory. 
The age limit in article 1 is not fully fixed as it does allow for derogations 
from the designated age of majority in instances where the legal age of majority 
in a given country is less than eighteen years old. At the same time, article 1 
does not allow for the age of majority used by a state to be more than eighteen 
years old. 
In general, minimum ages that are protective should be set as high as 
possible (for example protecting children from hazardous labour, criminalization, 
custodial sentences or involvement in armed conflict). Minimum ages that relate 
to the child gaining autonomy and to the need for the state to respect the child’s 
civil rights and evolving capacities, demand a more flexible system, sensitive to 
the needs of the individual child. Some minimum age issues relate both to 
increased autonomy and to protection. For example, the child’s right to seek 
legal and medical counselling and to lodge complaints without parental consent, 
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and to give testimony in court, may be crucial to protection from violence 
within the family. It is not in the child’s interests that any minimum age should 
be defined for such purposes.427 
Porterfield and Stanton have argued that when international agreement 
permits each state to decide at what age childhood ends and when adulthood 
begins, this could destroy the international uniformity of the CRC and thus might 
lead to unequal treatment of children based solely on their national domicile.428 
As the CRC Committee also looks for inspiration from other sources or central 
international treaties, the definition in art. 1 is complemented with a number of 
specific provisions of the ICCPR and ICESCR that apply to ‘a child’, 429 
‘children’, 430  ‘young persons’ 431  or ‘juvenile persons’. 432  All of these terms 
encompass the definition provided in the CRC. According to Alston, the aim of 
the definition of a child in the CRC was to maximize the protection given to 
children and ensure that the rights protected would apply uniformly to as large 
an age group as possible.433 
Therefore, the definition of a child is wide and indefinite; allowing states to 
limit application of the convention in case majority is achieved earlier. Majority 
as a general term in art. 1 of the CRC refers to full legal capacity. 
Setting an age for the attainment of certain rights or for the loss of certain 
protection is complex. It requires balancing the rights of a child as a subject and 
whose evolving capacities must be respected (acknowledged in arts 5 and 14 of 
the CRC) with the concept of the state’s obligation to provide special protection. 
On some issues, the Convention and its interpretation practice sets a clear line – 
no capital punishment or life imprisonment without the possibility of release for 
those under the age of 18 (art. 37); no recruitment into the armed forces or 
direct participation in hostilities for those under the age of 15, preferably not 
before 18 (art. 38 and the Optional Protocol on the involvement of children in 
armed conflict). On other issues the CRC is less concrete and gives states a 
margin, and usually setting a minimum age for different acts, such as 
                                                 
427  See further analysis of art. 1 in Rachel Hodgkin, Peter Newell, and UNICEF, Implemen-
tation Handbook for the Convention on the Rights of the Child (New York: UNICEF, 2007). 
428  “The Age of Majority: Article 1,” N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 7 (1990 1989): 31. 
429  Arts 10 and 14 of the ICCPR. 
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employment (art. 32 CRC), criminal responsibility (art. 40 CRC), and 
regulation of compulsory education.434 
When states legislate these minimum ages, all the general principles of the 
CRC have to be taken into account including the principle of non-discrimination 
(art. 2), the best interests of the child (art. 3), the evolving capacities of the child 
(art. 5) and the right to life and maximum survival (art. 6). As the CRC 
Committee has underlined: 
young children are holders of all the rights enshrined in the Convention. They 
are entitled to special protection measures and, in accordance with their 
evolving capacities, the progressive exercise of their rights.435 
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) confirmed in its General Comment No. 
17 the need to protect all children under the age of 18: 
The right to special measures of protection belongs to every child because of his 
status as a minor. Nevertheless, the Covenant does not indicate the age at which 
he attains his majority. This is to be determined by each State party in the light of 
the relevant social and cultural conditions. In this respect, States should 
indicate ... the age at which the child attains his majority in civil matters and 
assumes criminal responsibility. States should also indicate the age at which a 
child is legally entitled to work and the age at which he is treated as an adult 
under labour law. States should further indicate the age at which a child is 
considered adult …. However, the Committee notes that the age for the above 
purposes should not be set unreasonably low and that in any case a State party 
cannot absolve itself from its obligations under the Covenant regarding persons 
under the age of 18, notwithstanding that they have reached the age of majority 
under domestic law.436 
European human rights treaties do not specify further the age of maturity; 
however, some CoE recommendations define children as anyone younger than 
18437 and this approach is also followed by the ECtHR. 
                                                 
434 See analysis of the obligations under art. 1 Hodgkin, Newell, and UNICEF, Imple-
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1.1.1 Child marriage 
At the time when the Human Rights Council adopted resolutions supporting 
wider recognition of traditional values, it was passing other resolutions in 
efforts to prevent child marriages and forced marriages438. In these resolutions 
‘traditional values’ and practices were seen as a threat to human rights standards. 
Child marriage is thus an example of a practice where the justification of culture 
and tradition is a commonplace, albeit it is a cultural practice related to the 
“south”. 
The CRC does not regulate the right nor does it prohibit child marriage as 
such: this has rather been an issue under the CEDAW. 439  Askari has even 
proposed that this is why the CRC does not adequately protect and promote the 
rights of female children. The absence of a provision against child marriage is 
such an example. While the CRC was designed to be gender blind, violations 
that primarily affect boys (i.e., child soldiers) are covered under CRC article 38. 
The same consideration is not given to violations predominantly affecting girls, 
that is, specifically child marriage.440 
In its General Comment No. 4 on “Adolescent health and development in the 
context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child”, the Committee expresses 
concern: 
early marriage and pregnancy are significant factors in health problems related 
to sexual and reproductive health. Both the legal minimum age and the actual 
age of marriage, particularly for girls, are still very low in several states parties. 
There are also non-health-related concerns: children who marry, especially girls, 
are often obliged to leave the education system and are marginalized from social 
activities. Further, in some states parties married children are legally considered 
adults, even if they are under 18, depriving them of all the special protection 
measures they are entitled to under the Convention. The Committee strongly 
recommends that states parties review, and where necessary, reform their 
legislation and practice to increase the minimum age for marriage with and 
without parental consent to 18 years, for both girls and boys.441 
                                                 
438  Human Rights Council, “Strengthening Efforts to Prevent and Eliminate Child, Early 
and Forced Marriage: Challenges, Achievements, Best Practices and Implementation Gaps” 
(A/HRC/RES/24/23, September 27, 2013). 
439  Elimination of child marriage (in global practice often connected with some form of 
violence against girls e.g., with forced or planned marriage) has long been an issue for the 
CEDAW Committee, which in this connection has always also referred to the CRC. See also 
CEDAW Committee, “General Recommendation No. 21. Equality in Marriage and Family 
Relations,” 1994. 
440  Ladan Askari, “Convention on the Rights of the Child: The Necessity of Adding a 
Provision to Ban Child Marriages, The,” ILSA J. Int’l & Comp. L. 5 (1999 1998): 123–24. 
441  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 4: Adolescent Health and Development in the 
Context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child” (CRC/GC/2003/4, July 1, 2003), para. 20. 
109 
This view was stressed even more strongly at the end of 2014 when the CRC 
Committee adopted its formal position on child marriage through its GC 18.442 
Thus, although the CRC does not per se include prohibition of child marriage, 
this prohibition has been derived from art. 18 of the CEDAW and CRC 
Committees, child marriage is defined as a marriage where at least one of the 
parties is fewer than 18 years old. The committees continue: 
A child marriage is considered as a form of forced marriage given that one or 
both parties have not expressed their full, free and informed consent. As a matter 
of respecting the child’s evolving capacities and autonomy in making decisions 
that affect her or his life, in exceptional circumstances a marriage of a mature, 
capable child below the age of 18 may be allowed provided that the child is at 
least 16 years old and that such decisions are made by a judge based on 
legitimate exceptional grounds defined by law and on the evidence of maturity 
without deference to cultures and traditions.443 
Thus, even if some derogations are allowed, the minimum core criteria should 
be that marriage of children can be allowed only to children of 16 and older; 
this should be the child’s own decision uninfluenced by other parties (including 
parents); and that allowing the marriage should follow a strict procedure 
supervised by a judge without taking into account culture and tradition. This 
view was supported by the UN General Assembly which in December 2014 
adopted a resolution calling upon the member states to eliminate child 
marriages.444 
None of the sample states has a distinct culture or tradition that has required 
or accepted child marriage or forced or planned marriages. Thus, it could be 
presumed that all the sample states follow the minimum criteria or even fully 
prohibit child marriage. 
 
1.1.2 Sexual consent 
The CRC requires that a minimum age is set below which children are judged 
incapable of consenting to any form of sexual activity with others. The 
definition of sexual abuse and exploitation includes not only conduct involving 
violence or other forms of coercion, but also all sexual conduct with a child 
below a certain age, even when it was or appeared to be consensual. 445 
Consequently sexual intercourse with a child below the age of consent involves 
criminal responsibility and renders the perpetrator automatically liable to a 
charge of rape.446 
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The CRC Committee has emphasized the importance of setting a minimum 
age below which a child’s consent is not to be considered valid. The Committee 
has proposed to various countries that the age set for sexual consent should be 
raised, but has not proposed that it should be raised to 18. In this context, the 
CRC Committee refers to the need to set a minimum age for sexual consent and 
marriage (see below) and has stated: 
These minimum ages should be the same for boys and girls (article 2 of the 
Convention) and closely reflect the recognition of the status of human beings 
under 18 years of age as rights holders, in accordance with their evolving 
capacity, age and maturity (arts. 5 and 12–17).447 
It may be assumed that the status of marriage implies an ability to consent to 
sex with one’s partner. The age of sexual consent is closely connected with the 
right to non-discrimination. First and foremost, the age for the sexual consent of 
boys and girls should be the same; furthermore, there should be no 
differentiation relating to sexual orientation. The guidelines for periodic reports 
asked whether the non-discrimination requirements of the Convention’s article 
2 have been given ample consideration “in cases where there is a difference in 
the legislation between girls and boys, including in relation to marriage and 
sexual consent...”448 
The Committee has expressed concern at disparities between ages of consent 
to heterosexual and to homosexual activities, which amount to discrimination 
on the grounds of sexual orientation: 
concern is expressed at the insufficient efforts made to provide against 
discrimination based on sexual orientation. While the Committee notes the Isle 
of Man’s intention to reduce the legal age for consent to homosexual relations 
from 21 to 18 years, it remains concerned about the disparity that continues to 
exist between the ages for consent to heterosexual (16 years) and homosexual 
relations. It is recommended that the Isle of Man take all appropriate measures, 
including of a legislative nature, to prevent discrimination based on the grounds 
of sexual orientation and to fully comply with article 2 of the Convention.449 
At the same time, this time-limit should not relate to the right of a child to 
sexual education as well as reproductive information and services.450 Thus, the 
minimum requirements of the CRC concerning sexual consent are: 
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1. the age of sexual consent is set and sexual intercourse with a child below 
that age is criminalized; 
2. the age of sexual consent does not have a discriminatory effect either 
between boys and girls or relating to sexual orientation; 
3. the age of sexual consent corresponds with the age of marriage. 
 
1.1.3 Minimum age of employment 
Article 32 of the CRC requires states to protect children from “any work that is 
likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education”, to “provide 
for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to employment” and to 
“provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment.” 
The CRC Committee has, in several cases, recommended that the minimum age 
for employment should be raised; and has frequently recommended that states 
should ratify the relevant ILO Conventions on the minimum age for 
employment.451 
Article 32 requires states to protect the child from any work that is likely to 
interfere with the child’s education. The CRC Committee has indicated the need 
to coordinate the age at which compulsory education ends with the age for 
access to full-time employment.452 In several cases, the Committee has expressed 
concern at “discrepancies” between these ages and proposed “an equal age.”453 
The Revised ESC454 and the practice of the EComSR differentiate between 
children of different ages and grant some groups of children more protection than 
others. This differentiation depends on the rights in question. Article 7 of the 
Charter deals with balancing the work related rights of children. For example it 
defines the minimum age of admission to employment – at 15 years in general 
(para. 1), 18 years in the case of dangerous or unhealthy work (para. 2) while 
prohibiting work by children who are subject to compulsory education (para. 3). 
The minimum age for work is also established at 15 in ILO Convention No 138 
on Minimum Age.455 
In addition, these requirements should be implemented taking into account 
that the right to the highest attainable standard of health of the child is protected 
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(art. 24)456 and the right of the child to child to rest, leisure, play, recreational 
activities, cultural life and the arts (art. 31).457 
Thus, the minimum standard derived from the practice of the CRC Committee 
can be defined as follows: 
1. the minimum age of employment is set at 15 years; if possible, 
corresponding with the end of compulsory education or taking account the 
educational needs of the child; 
2. adoption of the relevant ILO Conventions, Convention No. 138 in 
particular.458 
 
Limiting the right of the child to work is a protective and paternalistic measure. 
Nevertheless, in a modern society, children younger than 15 do work. This 
might be due to family needs where a child has to bring food to the table in 
order for the family to survive. It might also be the wish of the child or the 
parents to earn some additional money (such as child models, children in the 
cinema, newspaper boys, work related to IT). 
It can be concluded that the CRC does not sufficiently regulate labour issues. 
Thus, without appropriate legislation together with an official ban on work, the 
protection granted to children is insufficient and is not in the best interests of 
the child. The CRC has recognised this problem and asks states for information 
about the hidden economy and, in particular, information about street children. 
At the same time, this could also be a case where the division of work between 
different institutions (the CRC Committee, the ILO Committee and on the 
regional level the EComSR) works well and there is no need for the CRC 
Committee to look at the minimum age of employment more thoroughly.459 
It would be interesting to see whether the states have understood the 
limitations of the CRC and whether they have adopted more elaborate standards 
that would suit today’s world. In addition, it would be interesting to see whether 
the CRC Committee accepts such arguments. 
 
1.1.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces 
Article 38 of the CRC requires states to refrain from recruiting into their armed 
forces anyone who has not attained the age of 15, and, in recruiting children 
between the ages of 15 and 18, “to give priority to those who are oldest”. It 
prohibits both voluntary enlistment as well as conscription of children into 
armed forces. In addition states parties must “take all feasible measures to 
                                                 
456  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 15.” 
457  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 17 on the Right of the Child to Rest, Leisure, 
Play, Recreational Activities, Cultural Life and the Arts (art. 31)” (CRC/C/GC/17, April 17, 
2013). 
458  This requirement is particularly interesting as it requires taking additional obligations on 
the state and subjecting the state under additional supervision by the ILO Committee. 
459  This is unfortunately an issue that would fall outside the scope of the current research. 
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ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a 
direct part in hostilities”.  
In May 2000 the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Optional 
Protocol to the Convention on the involvement of children in armed conflict460 
to increase protection. This requires states parties to it to ensure that nobody 
under the age of 18 is compulsorily recruited into their armed forces and to 
“take all feasible measures” to ensure that under-18-year-old members of their 
armed forces do not take a direct part in hostilities (art. 2 of the Protocol). 
The obligation under the Optional Protocol should also be followed by the 
armed groups in the territory of states as states must take all feasible measures 
to prevent recruitment and use by armed groups in hostilities of children under 
18 years by armed groups. States have to define their minimum voluntary 
conscription age when ratifying the OP on Children in Armed Conflicts. States 
parties to the Optional Protocol must rise “in years” the minimum age for 
voluntary recruitment, set at 15 in the Convention.461 The CRC Committee has 
commended States that have set a higher age limit on recruitment than 15 and that 
have ratified the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions.462 It has further 
recommended that states adopt the relevant Optional Protocol to the CRC. 
All these requirements are complemented by international criminal law, 
which has criminalized as a war crime conscripting or enlisting children under 
the age of 15.463 Further, on 14 March 2012, the International Criminal Court 
found Thomas Lubanga Dyallo guilty as a co-perpetrator in the use of child 
soldiers. This was the first case completed by the ICC.464 Thus, one of the 
requirements stressed by the CRC Committee also includes national crimi-
nalization of involving children in armed forces.465 
Thus, the minimum requirements for enlistment in armed forces under the 
CRC are: 
1) The minimum age for voluntary recruitment and conscription is set at 15 
years; this age limit should be gradually raised to 18; no child should take 
part in direct hostilities. 
                                                 
460  UN GA, “Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the 
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.” 
461  For full discussion see Hodgkin, Newell, and UNICEF, Implementation Handbook for 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 659–65. 
462 See e.g., CRC Committee, “OPAC Concluding Observatons: New Zealand” 
(CRC/C/OPAC/CO/2003/NZL, 2003), chap. C. 
463  As an example, art. 8 (2) b (xxvi) of the ICC statute prohibits as a war crime: Conscripting 
or enlisting children under the age of fifteen years into the national armed forces or using 
them to participate actively in hostilities. Rome Statute, UN GA, A/CONF.183/9; the Statute 
entered into force on 1 July 2002. 
464  The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, [1 December 2014] ICC-01/04-01/06 
(Appeals Chamber). 
465  See e.g., CRC Committee, “OPAC Concluding Observations: Finland” 
(CRC/C/OPAC/FIN/CO/1, October 21, 2005), para. 3. 
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2) The minimum age for voluntary conscription is 15; this limit should be 
raised to 18. 
3) Criminalization of earlier enlistment in armed conflict. 
 
Conscription in armed forces is an important issue for all three states due to 
their historical background. As will be shown, they all have obligatory military 
service. Estonia has, besides regular defence forces, a strong voluntary Defence 
League together with its youth organisations. Finnish history has required 
enactment of a strong obligation to participate in national defence. 
  
 
1.2 Definition of a ‘child’ in Finland 
There were 1,212,105 children (i.e., persons under 18 years of age) living in 
Finland in 2013.466 They all have the protection provided to children. Article 6 § 3 
of the Finnish Constitution467 emphasises the special position of children as well 
as their need for specific protection: 
“Children shall be treated equally and as individuals and they shall be allowed 
to influence matters pertaining to themselves to a degree corresponding to their 
level of development.” 
In Finnish legislation, a person who has not attained 18 years of age is a minor. 
In accordance with art. 6 of the Child Welfare Act468 a person under 18 years of 
age is considered a child and a person 18 to 20 years of age is regarded as a 
young person. The legislation, however, contains numerous provisions granting 
a minor, by means of derogation, the right to decide matters concerning him or 
her or the right to participate in the decision making. As an example, according 
to art. 89 (5)469 of the Child Welfare Act, a child who is at least 12 years old has 
the right the right to appeal in child welfare matters concerning themselves. The 
High Administrative Court has found that this right includes the right to receive 
information on decisions concerning them; this age limit, however, is to be 
interpreted strictly.470 
In general, the Ombudsman for Children in Finland has noted two in-
consistencies with the definition of the child in her supplementary report to the 
CRC Committee471 and stated that there exist two areas where the age limit has 
been set too low in laws, in effect hindering full protection of the rights of 
                                                 
466  Population, http://tilastokeskus.fi/tup/suoluk/suoluk_vaesto_en.html. 
467  Art. 6 of the Suomen perustuslaki (The Constitution of Finland), 11.6.1999/731, 
AMENDED 1112/2011 (1999). 
468  Child Welfare Act, 417/2007 English. 
469  Latest change 12.2.2010/88. 
470  5.11.2010/3137 Case no 1543/2/09 (KHO).  
471  Office of the Ombudsman for Children, “Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child – Supplementary report to Finland’s 4th Periodic Report January 2011”. 
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children. According to the Child Allowances Act472, a child is entitled to a child 
allowance until their 17th birthday. It is the view of the ombudsman that this 
entitlement should be extended to the 18th birthday.473 
Disability benefits for disabled or chronically ill persons are determined 
differently depending on whether they are under or over 16 years of age (Act on 
Disability Benefits474). Art. 2 of the Act entitles a child under the age of 16 to 
disability benefit if the treatment, care and rehabilitation required by their 
illness, disability or injury causes unusually great stress and commitment for a 
period of at least six months compared to a healthy child of the same age. This 
benefit ceases when the child turns 16, after which the individual/she is covered 
by the same provisions as disabled and chronically ill adults. The size of the 
benefit does not change, but the eligibility requirements are stricter after the age 
of 16. According to the view of the ombudsman, all disabled persons under the 
age of 18 should be treated the same way.475 
Child protection in Finland is strongly decentralised and all the obligations 
relating to the organisation as well as administration of child protection services 
fall on the shoulders of local government. Central regulation of child protection 
was revised in 2007 when the new Child Welfare Act was adopted; this law 
detailed the methodology of child protection, gave directions concerning work 




The right to marry in Finland is generally given to persons older than 18477. The 
Ministry of Justice may, however, for special reasons grant a person under 18 
years of age a dispensation to marry. Before the matter is decided, the custodian 
of the minor is offered an opportunity to be heard (art. 4 (2) Marriage Act). It 
has to be noted that the law sets forth no minimum age limit for the application 
of art. 4 (2). Furthermore, no judicial process is required for establishing the 
will of a minor; instead, the law gives an opportunity for the legal guardians of 
the minor to express their opinion. The law does not clearly state that judicial 
control is available or that the opinion of the child is heard. 
Nevertheless, legal practice shows that the right to marry at an earlier age is 
granted only for “special reasons” and this has not included e.g. arguments 
                                                 
472  Art. 1 of the Lapsilisälaki (Child Allowances Act), 21.8.1992/796. 
473  Office of the Ombudsman for Children, “Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child – Supplementary report to Finland’s 4th Periodic Report January 2011,” 13. 
474  Art. 1 of the Laki vammaisetuuksista (Act on Social Assistance), 11.5.2007/570. 
475  Office of the Ombudsman for Children, “Report to the UN Committee on the Rights of 
the Child – Supplementary report to Finland’s 4th Periodic Report January 2011,” 13. 
476  See further: Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriö, “Toimiva lastensuojelu. Selvitysryhmän 
loppuraportti.” (Sosiaali- ja terveysministeriön raportteja ja muistioita 2013:19, 2013). 
477  Art. 4 of the Avioliittolaki (Marriage Act), 234/1929. 
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where the domestic law of the spouse allows for an earlier marriage. The High 
Administrative Court has stated that “16 years can be considered as the 
minimum age below which when entering marriage is held to be contrary to the 
Finnish legal system.”478 
Thus, regulation is not formally in conformity with the standards set forth in 
GC No. 18 or the CEDAW Committee, in that it does not follow the age limit of 
16 proposed by the committees, nor does it include supervision by the court. 
The practice of the state seems, however, to follow the appropriate age limit. 
Interestingly, the CRC Committee has not commented on this discrepancy 
either during constructive dialogue or in the Concluding Observations, nor has 
it been noted by the CEDAW Committee. At the same time, Finland has 
supported adoption of the UN GA Resolution “Child, early and forced 
marriage”.479 Adoption of the resolution also raised the issue in the Finnish 
media, calling for the abolition of child marriage.480 
 
1.2.2 Sexual consent 
The Criminal Code481 criminalizes sexual offences against children. A person 
who has sexual intercourse with a child younger than 16 years of age or 
otherwise performs a sexual act with a child younger than 16 years of age can 
be sentenced for sexual abuse of a child to imprisonment for a maximum of four 
years. Attempted abuse is also punishable.482 
If the victim of sexual abuse is a child whose age or stage of development is 
such that the offence is conducive to causing special injury to him/her, is 
committed in an especially humiliating manner, or conducive to causing special 
injury to the child owing to the special trust he/she has put in the offender or the 
special dependence of the child on the offender, the offender can be sentenced 
for aggravated sexual abuse of a child to imprisonment for at least 1 year, with a 
maximum of 10 years. An attempt is also punishable.483 
The purchase of sexual services from a young person, that is, a person who 
is younger than 18 years of age is a punishable act.484 Procurement or soliciting 
is also punishable if it involves a person under the age of 18.485 
                                                 
478  5.12.2005/3219, KHO:2005:87 (KHO). 
479  UN GA, “Child, Early and Forced Marriage.” 
480  Kristiina Markkanen and Aleksi Teivainen, “UN Urges Finland to Prohibit Child 
Marriage,” The Helsinki Times, December 9, 2014, Finland section,  
http://www.helsinkitimes.fi/finland/finland-news/domestic/12986-un-urges-finland-to-
prohibit-child-marriage.html (accessed March 27, 2015). 
481  Rikoslaki (The Criminal Code), 39/1889. 
482  See ch. 20 sec. 5 (amended by 563/1998) and ch. 20 sec. 6 (amended by 540/2011). 
483  Ch. 20 sec 7 (amended by 540/2011). 
484  Ch. 20 sec 8a amended by 743/2006 and 540/2011. 
485  Ch. 20 sec 8b. 
117 
Production, possession and dissemination of obscene pictures of a child, that 
is, child pornographic material, are punishable acts since the beginning of 1999. 
These provisions are included in the Offences against Public Order, crimi-
nalized in the Criminal Code.486 
Furthermore, persons working for the social, youth, education or health 
services now have a duty to report to the police any suspected cases of violence 
against children. All sexual offences committed against children are subject to 
public prosecution and are punishable even when committed in a country where 
they are not criminalized. 
Finnish legislation clearly follows the requirements of the CRC Committee – 
the age of consent is generally 16, in some sexual offences also 18. The law 
does not make a distinction between boys or girls nor does it differentiate 
between sexual orientation; sexual relationships with those younger than 16 
years are criminalized by law. 
 
1.2.3 Employment 
As required by ILO Convention No. 138 and art. 7 of the European Social 
Charter (revised), Finland has established a general minimum age for work at 
15 years but this is allowed only to those who have completed their basic 
education.487 Finland ratified ILO Convention No. 138 on 13 January 1976 and 
ILO Convention No. 182 on 17 January 2000. 
Regarding the implementation practice of Finland, the EComSR found that: 
The report states that occupational safety and health inspectors obtain 
information about young workers from the records that employers are legally 
obliged to keep and that there have been no statistics available on illegal work 
carried out by children under 15. The Committee notes also from another source 
that there were no reports of children engaged in work outside the parameters 
established by law.488 
Thus, the legal requirements of employment are in conformity with CRC 
requirements, even the recommendation to co-ordinate between the age of 
compulsory education and employment. There is, however, a suggestion from 
practice that a segment of children exists that do not fall under the allowed 
category but who nonetheless work. However, this was not brought up by the 
CRC Committee itself during the last constructive dialogue. 
Rather, the dialogue and Concluding Observations of Finland brought up an 
issue that was previously not identified as part of the minimum core but that in 
in a way represents double standards or, more neutrally, progressive protection. 
                                                 
486  Ch. 17 sec. 19, amended by 540/2011. 
487  Laki nuorista työntekijöistä (Young Workers’ Act), 19.11.1993/998. 
488  EComSR, “Conclusions 2011: Finland” (EComSR, January 2012), 5. 
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According to this, Finland should make an effort to see that businesses in 
Finland also apply the same age limit in their businesses abroad.489 
 
1.2.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces 
The Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of 
Children in Armed Conflict entered into force in Finland in May 2002490. The 
Constitution of Finland obliges the participation in national defence (art. 127). 
Thus, when the ratification instrument of the Protocol was deposited, Finland 
submitted a declaration based on article 3 (2) of the Protocol according to which 
all persons recruited to serve in the national armed forces are at least 18 years of 
age and that the minimum age requirement applies to both men’s compulsory 
military service and women’s voluntary military service.491 
The new Conscription Act492 entered into force as from the beginning of 
2008. The purpose of the reform was to amend the Act to comply with the 
requirements of the Constitution, updating it and making it more functional in 
all of its aspects. According to the Act, all Finnish men are liable for military 
service as from the beginning of the year in which they attain the age of 18 
(art. 2 (1)). In comparison to what was already brought up in the Third Periodic 
Report and the First Periodic Report on the Implementation of the Protocol,493 
the only significant change brought about by the revision is that the legislation 
on conscription no longer contains provisions on entering military service 
voluntarily. 
Thus, Finnish regulation fulfils the minimum age limit of the CRC and the 
OPAC. Curiously and uncharacteristically, Finland has delayed submission of 
its second report under the CRC OPAC for 10 years now, which and this hints 
at specific substantial problems in implementing the CRC OPAC. 
 
 
                                                 
489  See CRC Committee, “Summary Records of the 1628th Meeting: Finland” 
(CRC/C/SR/1628, January 17, 2011), para. 31 and CRC Committee, “Concluding 
Observations: Finland (fourth Report)” (CRC/C/FIN/CO/4, August 3, 2011), para. 23. 
490  Tasavallan presidentin asetus lapsen oikeuksien yleissopimuksen lasten osallistumisesta 
aseellisiin selkkauksiin tehdyn valinnaisen pöytäkirjan voimaansaattamisesta ja valinnaisen 
pöytäkirjan lainsäädännön alaan kuuluvien määräysten voimaansaattamisesta annetun lain 
voimaantulosta, 31/2002 (2002). 
491  Finland declared: “The Government of Finland declares in accordance with Article 3, 
paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol that the minimum age for any recruitment of persons 
into its national armed forces is 18 years. The minimum age applies equally to the military 
service of men and to the voluntary service of women.” 
492  Asevelvollisuuslaki (Conscription Act), 1438/2007. 
493  CRC Committee, “OPAC Concluding Observations: Finland.” See also CRC Committee, 
“Concluding Observations: Finland (third Report)” (CRC/C/15/Add.272, October 20, 2005), 
sec. VIII A 2. 
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1.3 Definition of a ‘child’ in Estonia 
The number of children in Estonia has decreased within the last four years and 
as of 2012, there is a total of 237,622 children in Estonia.494 At the same time, 
the number of children without parental care and in need of state support has 
been constantly increasing within the last seven years.495 These trends as well as 
the fact that the Estonian child protection system has remained basically the 
same since 1992 mean that the Estonian child protection system in 2014/5 has 
been undergoing substantive reform. The need for such reform was recognised 
already in 2003 when the CRC Committee gave its opinion on the Estonian 
initial report and recommended the overall process of harmonization of the 
child protection system including necessary regulations being made for the 
effective implementation of those legislative measures, including adequate 
budgetary allocation together with children’s rights impact assessments.496 
The Estonian Constitution gives special protection to children and families 
in its art. 27, but it does not give a definition of a child; moreover, basic rights 
provided in the constitution are in principle applicable to everyone.497  Full 
enjoyment of rights might, however, depend on the age of the person as some 
rights are dependent on legal capacity.498 The Constitutional Review Chamber 
of the Supreme Court has stated: 
Due to the psychological and social immaturity of a minor he may, in certain 
circumstances, cause harm to himself and others more easily than an adult. Due 
to immaturity a minor, unlike the majority of adults, has limited legal liability. 
This justifies the need to impose on minors such legal restrictions that are 
usually not imposed on adults.499 
According to art. 2 of the Child Protection Act500 (hereinafter CPA), a child is a 
person below 18 years of age. Passive legal capacity begins with the birth of the 
person and ends with his or her death. An adult person, i.e., a person of 18 years 
of age, has full active legal capacity according to the General Part of the Civil 
Code Act (hereinafter GPCCA).501 According to art. 9 of the GPCCA a court 
                                                 
494   Statistikaamet, “Loendatud püsielanikud emakeele ja soo järgi” (RLE02, December 31, 
2011). 
495   Heidi Ojamaa, “Eelmisel aastal võeti Eestis arvele 2808 vanemliku hoolitsuseta last,” 
Postimees, May 16, 2013, Eesti uudised section,  
http://www.postimees.ee/1237474/eelmisel-aastal-voeti-eestis-arvele-2808-vanemliku-
hoolitsuseta-last (accessed May 19, 2015). For full statistics see also Statistikaamet, “Aasta 
jooksul arvele võetud vanemliku hoolitsuseta ja abivajavad lapsed soo järgi” (SK30). 
496  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Estonia (initial Report)” (CRC/C/15/ 
Add.196, March 17, 2003), para. 6. 
497  Madise et al., Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus. Kommenteeritud väljaanne., 131. 
498  See also Ibid., 130–32. 
499  CRCSCd No. 3-4-1-3-97, (6 October 1997), para. I. 
500   Lastekaitse seadus (Child Protection Act), RT I, 13.12.2013, 12. 
501  Art. 8 (2) of the Tsiviilseadustiku üldosa seadus (General Part of the Civil Code Act.), 
RT I, 13.03.2014, 103. 
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has the right to extend the restricted active legal capacity of a minor who is at 
least 15 years old if this is in the interests of the minor and the level of 
development of the minor so permits. In that case, the court decides what 
transactions a minor is independently permitted to enter into. Here the consent 
of the parent is generally required; it is, however, in the discretion of the court 
to look after the best interests of a child in the case of their refusal (art. 9 (2) of 
the GPCCA). 
Further regulation concerns children under seven years of age, whose 
unilateral transactions are void (art. 12 (1) of the GPCCA). On their behalf, 
transactions are entered into by a legal representative who is a parent, or 
exceptionally also a guardian appointed by the court. A minor under the age of 
seven may independently enter into a transaction by means have been granted to 
them for the purpose or for free use (art. 12 (2)). 
The definition of child has been amended in the Child Protection Act in 
order to implement Directive 2011/36/EU. 502  The central principle of this 
directive is that if the age of a person subject to trafficking in human beings is 
uncertain and there are reasons to believe that the person is a child, that person 
is presumed to be a child in order to receive immediate access to assistance, 
support and protection granted to children (art. 2(2)503 of the CPA). National 
law includes the same principle in the art. 17(10) of the Act on Granting 
International Protection to Aliens.504 
The Estonian child protection system was scrutinized and analysed in 2013 
in order to work out the new Child Protection Act. As result of this study, it was 
concluded that the Estonian child protection system has structural problems as it 
does not have one central coordinating and implementing organisation 
responsible for ensuring that different stakeholders co-operate effectively and 
efficiently and that protection of children’s rights is assured in all domains of 
government intervention that have a direct or indirect impact on children. The 
research concluded: 
Currently, the Ministry of Social Affairs co-ordinates the child protection system 
through the subordinate units of the Ministry of the Interior and county 
governments; however, the Ministry of Social Affairs does not have effective 
levers to manage county governments nor does it have a say in their budgetary 
or staff choices. Furthermore, it can only allocate tasks to county governments 
through negotiations with the Ministry of the Interior. 
The main burden of financing and performing child protection work thus lies 
with local governments. The budgets allocated to child protection are decided by 
                                                 
502  Directive on preventing and combating trafficking in human beings and protecting its 
victims, 2011/36/EU OJEU L 101/1 (2011). 
503  Amended by art. 2 (1) of the Karistusseadustiku muutmise ja sellega seonduvalt teiste 
seaduste muutmise seadus (Law Amending the Penal Code and Related Legal Acts), RT I, 
13.12.2013, 5, entered into force 23 October 2013. 
504  Välismaalasele rahvusvahelise kaitse andmise seadus (Act on Granting International 
Protection to Aliens), RT I, 23.03.2015, 25. 
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local government councils, and have tended to decrease in recent years. The 
administrative capacity of local governments is uneven throughout the country, 
and local governments with a smaller revenue base often do not have enough 
resources to develop or deliver child protection services to the extent that would 
be necessary in their jurisdiction. Developing child protection activities and 
capacities mainly remains project-based, and so far the government has not 
allocated specific funds for continuous and sustainable development in this 
domain. Furthermore, the government does not have a detailed view of how the 
funds allocated to child protection are used and whether this use is efficient and 
achieves the desired impact.505 
As is shown below, Estonia is moving very slowly towards substantive 
implementation of the rights of the child. Analysis shows that formal legislative 
requirements of international human rights treaties are usually clearly 
established; their implementation is, however, often problematic. 
 
1.3.1 Marriage 
Marriage is regulated by the Family Law Act506 (hereinafter FLA), whereby 
generally only adults may marry (art. 1(2)). According to art. 1(3), a court may 
extend the active legal capacity of a person who has attained at least 15 years of 
age pursuant to the provisions concerning the extension of active legal capacity 
of minors for the performance of acts required to contract marriage and to 
exercise the rights and perform the obligations related to marriage.507 
During supervision of the Estonian report under the CEDAW in 2007, the 
CEDAW Committee urged Estonia to raise the legal age of marriage for women 
and men to 18 years, in line with article 16, paragraph 2, of the CEDAW, the 
Committee’s general recommendation 21508 and the Convention on the Rights 
                                                 
505  AS PricewaterhouseCoopers, “Lastekaitse korralduse uuendamise alusanalüüs. Lõpp-
aruanne.” (Sotsiaalministeerium, November 27, 2013), 10. 
506  Perekonnaseadus (Family Law Act), RT I, 29.06.2014, 105. 
507  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Initial Report of Estonia” (CRC/C/8/Add.45, July 
11, 2002), para. 36. 
508  CEDAW Committee, “CEDAW GR: Estonia.” The Committee stated in para. 36: 
“Article 16 (2) and the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child preclude 
States parties from permitting or giving validity to a marriage between persons who have not 
attained their majority. In the context of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, "a child 
means every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable 
to the child, majority is attained earlier". Notwithstanding this definition, and bearing in 
mind the provisions of the Vienna Declaration, the Committee considers that the minimum 
age for marriage should be 18 years for both man and woman. When men and women marry, 
they assume important responsibilities. Consequently, marriage should not be permitted 
before they have attained full maturity and capacity to act. According to the World Health 
Organization, when minors, particularly girls, marry and have children, their health can be 
adversely affected and their education is impeded. As a result their economic autonomy is 
restricted.” 
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of the Child.509 Furthermore, statistics show considerable discrepancies between 
the number of girls and boys who are married before the age of 18. On average, 
2–4 boys are married each year; the number of girls getting married has 
decreased from 54 in 2003 to 17 in 2010.510 This statistics hints on the existence 
of de facto understanding that girls traditionally mature at an earlier age, and 
therefore it is normal when they are able to marry also at an earlier age. 
Concluding from the above, Estonian regulation is not in conformity with 
the minimum requirements of the CRC. The minimum age of marriage is 15; 
nevertheless, the procedure is supervised by a judge. Similarly to Finland, the 
CRC Committee has not commented on this discrepancy. 
 
1.3.2 Sexual consent 
Sexual intercourse with a child (art. 145 Penal Code511) and satisfaction of 
sexual desire with a child (art. 146 Penal Code) are punishable acts under 
criminal procedure. An adult person who engages in sexual intercourse with a 
person of less than 14 years of age faces punishment of up to five years’ 
imprisonment, and an adult person who involves a person of less than 14 years 
of age in satisfaction of sexual desire in a manner other than sexual intercourse 
faces punishment of up to five years’ imprisonment. This age limit coincides 
with the age of criminal capacity.512 In 2006 the punishments for these crimes 
were increased: instead of two-three years’ imprisonment the punishment was 
set to up to five years’ imprisonment. 
From the outset, Estonian legislation is in conformity with the requirements 
of the CRC. It is, however, comparatively low and there are no clear reasons for 
such a low limit. Here exists a discrepancy with the age of marriage – the age 
for sexual consent is 14 and the earliest age for marriage is 15. It is positive that 
the minimum age of marriage is higher than the age of sexual consent; 
furthermore, the age limit of 14 is non-discriminatory both in terms of gender 
and sexual orientation. 
The CRC Committee analysed this age limit during supervision of the first 
report by Estonia under OP SC and found that the age of sexual consent is 
relatively low. It commented on the fact that the age of sexual consent is also 
connected with a number of criminalized activities i.e., satisfaction of sexual 
desire with a child (art. 146 Criminal Code), child stealing (art. 172 Criminal 
Code), and use of minors in the manufacture of erotic works (art. 177 Criminal 
                                                 
509  CEDAW Committee, “Concluding Comments of the CEDAW Committee: Estonia” 
(CEDAW/C/EST/CO/4, October 8, 2007), para. 31. For background see Rangita de Silva-
de-Alwis, “Child Marriage and the Law.” (UNICEF working paper, 2008). 
510  Statistics provided in Annex 4 of the Estonian Report. CRC Committee, “State Party 
Report: Second, Third and Fourth Report of Estonia” (CRC/C/EST/2-4, 2014). 
511  Karistusseadustik (Penal Code), RT I, 12.03.2015, 21. 
512  See further CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Second, Third and Fourth Report of 
Estonia,” para. 146. 
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Code). The Committee recommended that for these crimes the age limit should 
be raised to 18 irrespective of the age of sexual consent.513 
Practice shows that this low age limit for sexual consent hinders also 
investigation of sexual violence or rape cases against 14-year-old children, as it 
is implied that sexual relations with them are based on consent that is similar to 
that of adults. This, however, does not take into account the vulnerability of 




Minors are allowed to work in Estonia; such work is supervised by the Labour 
Inspectorate. According to the Labour Contracts Act 515 , a person who has 
attained 18 years of age may be employed. In exceptional cases, with the 
written consent of a parent or guardian, a minor having attained 15 years of age 
may be employed if the work does not endanger the minor’s health, morals and 
acquisition of education and if the work is not prohibited for minors. A minor 
between 13 and 15 years of age may be employed with the written consent of a 
parent or guardian and the labour inspector of the employer’s location and for 
work included in the list approved by the Estonian Government if the work does 
not endanger the minor’s health, morals and acquisition of education and if the 
work is not prohibited for minors. An employer may enter into an employment 
contract with a minor of 13–14 years of age or a minor of 15–16 years of age 
subject to the obligation to attend school and allow them to work if the duties 
are simple and do not require major physical or mental effort i.e., light work 
(Labour Contracts Act, art. 7 (4)). Minors of 7–12 years of age are allowed to 
do light work in the fields of culture, art, sports or advertising. 
Minors have a reduced working time: for minors 13–14 years old 20 hours a 
week; for minors 15–16 years old 25 hours a week; for minors 17 years old 30 
hours a week. Minors may not work overtime, at night or on holidays. This 
regulation is, however, not all-inclusive as it does not regulate work of children 
outside employment contracts. As noted by the ILO in 2010: 
the Labour Contracts Act, and its provisions relating to the minimum age of 
admission to employment or work, do not apply to work performed outside the 
framework of a formal labour relationship, such as self-employment or non-
remunerated work. In this regard, the Committee reminds the Government that 
the Convention applies to all branches of economic activity and covers all kinds 
                                                 
513  CRC Committee, “OPSC Concluding Observations: Estonia” (CRC/C/OPSC/EST/CO/1, 
March 5, 2010), para. 29–30. 
514  See e.g., Kadri Ibrus, “Politsei jättis uurimata alaealise väited tema enesetapukatseni 
viinud vägistamise kohta,” Eesti Päevaleht (May 26, 2015),  
http://epl.delfi.ee/news/eesti/politsei-jattis-uurimata-alaealise-vaited-tema-enesetapukatseni-
viinud-vagistamise-kohta?id=71555635 (accessed May 27, 2015). 
515  Töölepingu seadus (Employment Contracts Act), RT I, 12.07.2014, 146. 
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of employment or work, including work performed by children and young 
persons in the absence of a contractual employment relationship or on an unpaid 
basis.516 
According to statistics presented to the ILO by the Estonian Tax and Customs 
Board, in 2013, 8,603 minors, including 112 aged between 7 and 11 years and 
1,882 aged between 12 and 14 years, worked for at least one month during the 
year. As the Committee did not make any recommendations on the information 
provided by Estonia, it has to be presumed that Estonian practice is in 
conformity with the requirements of the ILO.517 
Estonian legislation allows for different age limits even if the central age is 
15 as required by the CRC Committee. Estonia acceded to ILO Convention No. 
182 on 24 September 2001 and ILO Convention No. 138 on 15 March 2007. It 
has to be noted that Estonia has also seen current regulation as sufficient as it 
did not discuss child labour in its last report to the CRC Committee.518 
 
1.3.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces 
On 18 December 2013 Estonia ratified the Optional Protocol to the CRC on the 
involvement of children in armed conflict, which entered into force on 12 
March 2104. Estonia made the following declaration in ratification: 
According to article 3 paragraph 2 the Republic of Estonia declares that the 
minimum age for voluntary recruitment into national armed forces is 18 years. 
Male Estonian citizens have an obligation to serve in the defence forces 
according to the Military Service Act.519 An Estonian citizen`s national defence 
obligation starts from the age of 17 years (art. 2 (3)). Call-up selectees are 
called up for conscript service at the age of 18–27 years i.e., the law does not 
allow inclusion of a person younger than 18 years of age in the reserve to call 
him up into service as a reservist. Active service, i.e., professional military 
service, accepts Estonian citizens 18–60 years of age into service on a voluntary 
basis. Only servicemen in active service may be deployed on an international 
military operation.520 
In the case of mobilisation, persons at least 18 years of age may be called up 
for service. Therefore, although Estonian legislation specifies as a call-up 
selectee a male person at least 17 years of age, only a person at least 18 years of 
age may sign up for conscript service or active service and be deployed on an 
                                                 
516  ILO Committee of Experts, “Direct Request (CEACR) on Minimum Age Convention 
(No. 138): Estonia (2010)” (published 100th ILC session (2011), adopted 2010). 
517  ILO Committee of Experts, “Direct Request (CEACR) on Minimum Age Convention 
(No. 138): Estonia (2014)” (published 104th ILC session (2015), adopted 2014). 
518  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Second, Third and Fourth Report of Estonia.” 
519  Kaitseväeteenistuse seadus (Military Service Act), RT I, 10.07.2012, 1. 
520  See also CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Second, Third and Fourth Report of 
Estonia,” para. 487–88. 
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international military operation. Thus, conscription in armed forces follows all 
the requirements of the CRC Committee.  
However, several questions relate to the voluntary organisation, the National 
Defence League,521 which also has young members. According to the Estonian 
Defence League Act (DLA), an Estonian citizen of at least 18 years of age may 
be an active member of the Defence League. A junior member of the Defence 
League may be an Estonian citizen 7–18 years of age (art. 25 of the DLA). 
Pursuant to the DLA, youth organisations of the Defence League are structural 
units of the Defence League. It is unclear whether participation in this 
organisation would amount to voluntary enlistment to armed forces. In principle, 
Defence League is part of the Estonian defence system;522 as it is possible to 
join the Defence League as a young member from the age of seven years, this 
might violate the requirements of the CRC. Here, the state report by Estonia 
brings out a cultural relativism argument and states: 
In the course of the preparation of the act it was found that due to administrative 
and historical reasons it is necessary to define youth organisations as part of the 
structure of the Defence League.523 
Still, the DLA limits participation of children in military activities – children 
under 18 years of age cannot participate in hostilities as well as in other security 
activities (art. 25 (6)). It remains to be seen whether the CRC Committee 
regards participation by children in the Estonian Defence League as a violation 
of the Convention. It is also interesting to note that this is the only place in 
Estonian report where the relativist argument of tradition and history was used. 
 
1.4 Definition of a ‘child’ in the Russian Federation 
At the beginning of 2003, the population of the Russian Federation stood at 
145,0 million persons. At the beginning of 2010, it totalled 141.9 million 
persons, a decline of 3,05 million persons (2.1%) compared to 2003. As of the 
beginning of 2010, there were 26 million children in the Russian Federation 
under 18 years of age, 83.3% of the figure for 2003, or a decline of 5.2 million 
persons, due primarily to a decrease in the number of children between 10 and 
17 years of age. The number of children between 5 and 9 grew by 4,700 
                                                 
521  The Defence League is a voluntary national defence organisation operating under the 
Estonian Ministry of Defence. It is organised in accordance with military principles, 
possesses weapons and holds exercises of a military nature. Its work is regulated by the 
Kaitseliidu seadus (The Estonian Defence League Act), RT I, 20.03.2013, 1. See also for 
details CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Second, Third and Fourth Report of Estonia,” 
para. 489. 
522  Art. 2 (2) of the DLA provides: “(2) For the purposes of this Act the exercise of military 
nature is military training which is provided by the Defence League to its members for the 
performance of the duties of the Defence League. /…/” 
523  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Second, Third and Fourth Report of Estonia” 
paras 480–494. 
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(+ 0.1%), and the age group 0–4 increased by 1.5 million to 22.9% and stood at 
8.0 million persons in 2009.524The Russian constitution grants special protection 
to the family and the child within the family (art. 38 of the Constitution) and 
includes a right to education (art. 43 of the Constitution). The importance of 
protecting children and in particular the obligation of the state to provide this 
protection has also been one of the recent talking-agendas of President Putin, 
who as an example stressed on 17 February 2014 that “bearing in mind that, 
apart from the state, it is primarily the family that should be responsible for 
children’s lives”. 525 
From the outset, Russian law “in the books” generally follows the pattern of 
the CRC and other international human rights instruments regarding the 
definition of a child as under current Russian Civil Code art. 21 the age of 
majority is 18 years526. Children between the ages of 14–18 years have limited 
legal capacity to enter into transactions527; minors over 16 can be declared as 
emancipated528. 
At the same time, there is little if any analysis done on the implementation of 
the rights of the child in the administrative decisions and judgments.529 Tarusina 




The minimum age for marriage in the Russian Federation is 18 years; with valid 
reasons, the local authorities may permit the marriage of individuals who have 
reached the age of 16531. In such a case, a person who has not attained the age of 
eighteen acquires full legal capacity from the time of marriage532. Curiously, 
art. 13 (3) allows for an even lower age limit: “the procedure and conditions 
                                                 
524  See further statistics in CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Consolidated Fourth and 
Fifth Report of the Russian Federation” paras 6–17; World Population Review. Available 
online: http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/russia-population/ (accessed June 1, 
2015). 
525  Putin, “State Council Presidium Meeting on Family, Motherhood and Childhood Policy.” 
526 Federal’nyy zakon “Osnovy zakonodatel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob okhrane 
zdorov’ya grazhdan” (Fundamentals of the legislation of the Russian Federation on health 
care) (N 5487-1 1993), art. 24 (5). 
527 Semeynyy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Family Code), N 223-ФЗ (N 223-ФЗ 1995). 
art. 26. 
528 Ibid. art. 27. 
529  See e.g., Natal’ya Novikova, “Zashchita Prav Detey Sredstvami Grazhdanskogo 
Protsessa,” Nauchnyy dialog, Rossiya, Yekaterinburg, Obshchestvo s ogranichennoy 
otvetstvennost’yu “Tsentr nauchnykh i obrazovatel” nykh proyektov’ (2014). 
530  Nadezhda Tarusina, “European Experience and National Traditions in Russian Family 
Law,” Russ. Law J. 3, no. 2 (May 20, 2015): 83. 97 
531  Semeynyy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Family Code). art. 13. 
532  Ibid. art. 21 (2). 
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under which the marriage as an exception, taking into account special 
circumstances may be allowed up to the age of sixteen, may be established...”. 
Thus, there is no lowest limit for marriage, nor does it require judicial control. 
Such a law has been adopted e.g. in the Moscow region.533  
Thus, Russian legislation does not follow the minimum standards 
recommended by the CRC – it is possible to adopt a law that sets the minimum 
age limit too low. There is at least one such law in the Moscow region, where no 
age limit is set. The decision to allow children to marry is given to the executive 
power and there is also no independent judicial control over the matter. 
There are, however, recent alarming developments regarding child marriage, 
as Russian Ombudsman for Children’s Rights has openly stated that in some 
regions of Russia “emancipation and sexual maturity happens earlier”, thus 
supporting child marriage as culturally appropriate.534 It remains to be seen 
whether he presented the official position of the Russian government. Such 
usage of traditional values argument is violating the ideals of number of 
international human rights treaties; furthermore, as it was accompanied with 
support to non-intervention into domestic and private affairs, this is clearly a 
recession from the post-modern values. 
 
1.4.2 Sexual consent 
Sexual relations by an adult with a child below the age of 16 years is a criminal 
offence535. The age limit is the same irrespective of the sex of the child or 
sexual orientation. Other crimes against minors are considered aggravating 
circumstances and involve more severe punishment.536 Following criticism from 
the CRC, the punishment for these crimes has been increased. This age limit 
coincides with the federal age limit for marriage. These increased punishments 
were tested before the Constitutional Court in 2014; with reference among other 
instruments to the CRC, the Court found it justified and constitutional to have 
increased sanctions for sexual crimes committed against children younger than 
12 years old.537 
                                                 
533  Zakon Moskovskoy oblasti “O poryadke i usloviyakh vstupleniya v brak na territorii 
Moskovskoy oblasti lits, ne dostigshikh vozrasta shestnadtsati let” (On procedure and 
conditions of marriage in the Moscow region), N 61/2008-ОЗ (2008). 
534  See reports by Carl Schreck, “Russian Official Stirs Scandal With Underage Marriage 
And ‘Shriveled’ Women Remarks,” RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty, May 14, 2015, Trans-
mission section; and William Echols, “Traditional Values and Teenage Brides: Russia’s 
Ombudsman for Children Goes off the Rails,” Russian Avos, May 15, 2015,  
https://russianavos.wordpress.com/2015/05/15/. 
535  Ugolovnyy Kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Criminal Code of the Russian Federation), 
UK RF, N 63-FZ (1996), art. 134 (as amended by 28.12.2013 N380-FZ). 
536  E.g., rape of a minor is punishable by imprisonment of 8–15 years (art. 131 (3) of UK RF ), 
sexual assault against a minor is punishable by 8–15 years (art. 132 (3) of UK RF). 
537  Opredeleniye Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF “Ob otkaze v prinyatii k rassmotreniyu zhaloby 
grazhdanina Bulygina Mikhaila Anatol’yevicha na narusheniye yego konstitutsionnykh prav 
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Legal regulation as such is in conformity with the CRC minimum 
requirements. Interestingly, Russia referred to the previous recommendations of 
the CRC Committee as a reason for reforms made to the age of sexual consent. 
Thus, Russia sees the recommendations in the Concluding Observations as 
binding, at least as soft law.538 
There is a discrepancy between the age of sexual consent and the right to 
receive information relating to sexuality. Art. 14 of the Federal law “On Basic 
Guarantees of Child” protects the child from “...information, propaganda and 
agitation injurious to his health, moral and spiritual development”.539 It has to 
be noted that a child in relation to that law is defined as a person who is under 
18 years of age (art. 1). This law among other things prohibits children “from 
information that promotes unconventional sexual relationships”. This prohibition 
has effectively prohibited the dissemination of sexual education information to 
LGBT persons and thus makes a distinction on the grounds of sexuality. 
Dissemination of such information is an administrative offence and as such is 
punishable by a fine of up to 1 million rubbles.540 
This amendment was adopted with the support of traditional values 
argumentation. These arguments were also used by the Constitutional Court 
when analysing the constitutionality of the regulation.541 
                                                                                                                       
primechaniyem k stat’ye 131 Ugolovnogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii i polozheniyami 
Federal’nogo zakona ot 29 fevralya 2012 goda N 14-FZ ”O vnesenii izmeneniy v Ugolovnyy 
kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii i otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
tselyakh usileniya otvetstvennosti za prestupleniya seksual’nogo kharaktera, sovershennyye v 
otnoshenii nesovershennoletnikh” [2014] Case no N 2214-O (September 25, 2014). 
538  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Report of the 
Russian Federation”, paras 2, 20 
539  This amendment was adopted in 2013 by the law Federal’nyy zakon o vnesenii izme-
neniy v stat’yu 5 federal’nogo zakona “o zashchite detey ot informatsii, prichinyayushchey 
vred ikh zdorov’yu i razvitiyu” i otdel’nyye zakonodatel’nyye akty rossiyskoy federatsii v 
tselyakh zashchity detey ot informatsii, propagandiruyushchey otritsaniye traditsionnykh 
semeynykh tsennostey (Federal Law on Amending Article 5 of the federal law “on the 
protection of children from information harmful to their health and development,” and some 
legislative acts of the Russian Federation in order to protect children from information that 
promotes denial of traditional family values), N135-FZ (2013). This amendment has 
received strong criticism both from international bodies as well as from domestic NGO-s. 
540  Ibid. According to art. 3 under the promotion of non-traditional sexual relations among 
minors is understood the “dissemination of information aimed at developing unconventional 
juvenile sexual attitudes, the attractiveness of non-traditional sexual relations, distorted ideas 
about the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional sexual relations, or the 
imposition of information on non-traditional sexual relations, causing interest in such 
relationships.” 
541  The Constitutional Court found that this regulation is in conformity with the Russian 
Constitution and its international obligations. Po delu o proverke konstitutsionnosti chasti 1 
stat’i 6.21 Kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniyakh v 
svyazi s zhaloboy grazhdan N.A. Alekseyeva, YA.N.Yevtushenko i D.A.Isakova [2014] 
Case no 24-П (September 23, 2014). 
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Russia did not provide any comments on this law during constructive 
dialogue with the CRC Committee although the question was posed in the list of 
issues also questioning among other things discrimination based on sexual 
orientation.542 
The CRC Committee was, therefore, concerned at recent developments in 
the legislation of the state party prohibiting “propaganda of unconventional 
sexual relationships”. The Committee recognized the need to protect children 
from harmful information as a legitimate aim. However, it saw as problematic 
the fact that this law encourages stigmatization of and discrimination against 
LGBTI persons, including children, and children of LGBTI families. The 
Committee was particularly concerned that vague definitions of propaganda 
leads to the targeting and ongoing persecution of the country’s LGBTI 
community, including abuse and violence, in particular against underage 
LGBTI rights activists.543 
The Committee did not link its comment to reports of coercive treatment of 
transsexual and homosexual persons, in particular children, and an attempt to 
diagnose transsexuality as a psychiatric disease, as well as lack of sexual health 
information for LGBTI children with the law, although a clear connection is 
observed by a number of international NGOs. 
 
1.4.3 Employment 
The minimum age at which children may be hired for work coincides with their 
age of completion of compulsory schooling and is 15 years. The Labour Code544 
sets the minimum age for work at 16 years545 . However, a pupil who has 
reached 14 years of age may be hired for light work in their free time, with 
parental consent, provided that there is no risk of damage to the child’s health 
and no disruption of education; the amount of time that may be worked is 
reduced for workers less than 18 years old; employment of workers less than 18 
years old on heavy work, on work under harmful or hazardous conditions, work 
underground or work the performance of which may damage moral 
development is prohibited.546 
                                                 
542  CRC Committee, “List of Issues – Russian Federation CRC.” 
543  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Russian Federation (combined Fourth and 
Fifth Report),” sec. III. B. 
544  Trudovoy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Labor Code of the Russian Federation) 
(N 197-ФЗ 2001); latest amendments Federal’nyy zakon “O vnesenii izmeneniy v otdel’nyye 
zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii v svyazi s prinyatiyem Federal’nogo zakona” 
O spetsial’noy otsenke usloviy truda, N 421-FZ (2013). 
545  Amended by Federal’nyy zakon “O vnesenii izmeneniy v Federal’nyy zakon” O 
pravovom polozhenii inostrannykh grazhdan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii “i Trudovoy kodeks 
Rossiyskoy Federatsii,” N 204-FZ (2013). 
546  Trudovoy kodeks Rossiyskoy Federatsii (Labor Code of the Russian Federation), art. 63. 
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Russia joined ILO Convention No. 138 on 3 May 1979 and ILO Convention 
No. 182 on 25 March 2003. The ILO Committee observed in 2013 that: 
(It) noted the Government’s statement that the illegal employment of minors and 
the violation of their labour rights were frequent occurrences in the informal 
economy. This involved minors who washed cars, engaged in trading and 
performed auxiliary work. The Committee also noted ..., that children, some as 
young as 8 and 9 years old, were engaged in economic activities such as 
collecting empty bottles and recycling paper, transporting goods, cleaning 
workplaces, looking after property, street trading and cleaning cars. /.../ 
Recalling that the Convention applies to all branches of economic activity and 
covers all types of employment or work, the Committee urged the Government to 
take the necessary measures to strengthen the capacity and expand the reach of 
the labour inspectorate to better monitor children working in the informal 
economy.547 
Thus, the ILO Committee requested the government to take the necessary 
measures to strengthen the capacity and expand the reach of the labour 
inspectorate to better monitor children carrying out economic activities without 
an employment relationship or in the informal economy.548 
The CRC Committee noted in its last Concluding Observation that large 
numbers of children live and work on the streets, where they are vulnerable to 
abuse, including sexual abuse, and to other forms of exploitation to such an 
extent that regular school attendance is severely restricted.549 This deficiency 
was not identified as a flaw of law; instead, it required other effective measures, 
in the opinion of the Committee.550 Thus, minimum age requirements relating to 
labour seem to be in conformity with the requirements of the CRC, whereas 
implementation is not sufficient. 
 
1.4.4 Voluntary enlistment and conscription into armed forces 
Pursuant to article 34, paragraph 2, of the Federal Military Conscription and 
Military Service Act 551 , citizens may enter into their first military service 
contract between the ages of 18 and 40. This rules out the possibility of 
voluntary recruitment into military service in the Russian Federation by citizens 
who have not attained the age of 18 years. 
                                                 
547  ILO Committee of Experts, “Observation (CEACR) on Minimum Age Convention (No. 
138): Russian Federation (2013)” (published 103rd ILC session (2014), adopted 2013). 
548  Ibid. 
549  Similar concerns were raised by the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in its 2011 Concluding Observations on the fifth periodic report of the Russian 
Federation submitted to it. CESCR Committee, “Concluding Observations: Russian 
Federation (fifth Report)” (E/C.12/RUS/CO/5, June 1, 2011). 
550  See the chapter on Economic exploitation, including child labour, CRC Committee, 
“Concluding Observations: Russian Federation (combined Fourth and Fifth Report).” 
551  Federal’nyy zakon “o voinskoy obyazannosti i voyennoy sluzhbe” (On Military Duty 
and Military Service), N 53-FZ (1998). 
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Russia ratified the OP on Children in Armed Conflict in 2008. When ratifying it, 
Russia made the following declaration: 
The Russian Federation, pursuant to article 3, paragraph 2, of the Optional 
Protocol, declares that, in accordance with the legislation of the Russian 
Federation, citizens under the age of 18 may not be recruited for military service 
in the armed forces of the Russian Federation and a military service contract 
may not be concluded with them; 
In accordance with the legislation of the Russian Federation, citizens who have 
reached the age of 16 are entitled to admission to professional military 
educational institutions. Upon enrolment in these institutions they shall acquire 
the status of members of the military performing compulsory military service. 
The legislation of the Russian Federation guarantees that such citizens shall 
conclude military service contracts on reaching the age of 18, but not before they 
have completed the first year of education in these educational institutions.552 
The CRC Committee did not find anything to comment on in relation to 
conscription in armed forces. Thus, it can be concluded that the normative 
framework of the Russian Federation is in conformity with the CRC in relation 
to conscription in armed forces. 
 
1.5 Conclusions 
As shown above, all three countries have generally followed the recom-
mendations of the CRC and have set the age of majority at 18 years. Similarly, 
all three countries grant older minors specific rights that take into account their 
level of development, such as the right to deal with minor transactions and the 
right to be heard in the cases relating to them. It can also be seen that states 
have applied these age limits as rules, and have established the required limits 
through legal acts. 
There were notable differences relating to marriage. Furthermore, it was also 
an area where cultural values arguments were used. Marriage is generally 
reserved for adults, i.e., the marriageable age is 18, in all three countries. 
However, in all countries there are exceptions to the general rules and for a 
special reason and with permission from the authority (and/or the parents), it is 
possible to grant a person under 18 years of age a dispensation to marry. 
Statistics shows that these exceptions are used in all of the three countries and it 
affects more girls than boys; albeit there are no clear reasons for the existence 
and use of these exceptions. 
The right to marry is strongly connected with the age of sexual consent. 
Finland and Russia have set the age of sexual consent at 16 years; the practice 
of Estonia deviates from that and the age of sexual consent is set at 14 years. 
There is no argumentation behind such a low age limit, although it could be 
                                                 
552  See status of the OP in the UN Treaty collection: https://treaties.un.org (accessed June 1, 
2015). 
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connected with a less paternalist approach from Estonian legislation, where 
liberal rights have gained central importance and protective measures are, thus, 
as limited as possible. Russia is on the other end of the liberal → paternalist 
scale and has through prohibition of dissemination of information on 
‘unconventional relationships’ also limited sexual health information to children, 
especially children with LGBTI orientation. Russia has strongly used traditional 
values arguments in defending this prohibition. 
Similar observation can be made regarding the age of work – set at 15 years 
in the cases of Finland and Estonia as provided by the CRC and ILO 
Convention No. 138, while in the Russian Federation it is set at 16 years. All 
three countries limit work-time for children attending school but there are 
discrepancies in the application of this requirement. In the case of the Russian 
Federation, the ILO supervisory committee noted that the government was not 
sufficiently efficient in guaranteeing that this provision is adhered to. In the case 
of Estonia, the ILO Committee requested further information on measures taken 
or envisaged to ensure that children who are not bound by an employment 
relationship, such as children performing work on a self-employed basis, unpaid 
work or work in the informal sector, benefit from the protection provided by the 
Convention.553  Finnish practice was found to be in conformity by both the 
ComESCR as well as the ILO Committee. Estonian and Russian practices 
remain unclear as no adequate statistics is available on the number of children 
working in other than official labour relations. 
There were two topics where the practice of Estonia stood out as possibly 
problematic. These were the early age of sexual consent (14 years) in Estonia 
and the traditional values argument used by Estonia in relation to the National 
Defence League. Neither Finland nor Russia used this kind of argumentation in 
their reports or oral discussions. Instead, Russia was the only one to connect its 
activities in implementing the CRC with the previous recommendations of the 
CRC Committee, although it can be observed that Russia failed to answer a 
number of questions both in replies to the ‘List of Issues’554 as well as during 
the oral proceedings555 where domestically it uses traditional values and cultural 
differences arguments. 
The definition of a child is an area where the passiveness of the CRC Com-
mittee can be observed. The minimum core of this definition usually requires a 
particular result i.e., the adoption of appropriate legislation that includes said 
age limits. Thus, it is theoretically at least easy to analyse, whether national 
legal systems correspond to these requirements. In a way, adopting recom-
mended age limits could be a good test-case. The CRC Committee has remained 
                                                 
553  ILO Committee of Experts, “Direct Request (CEACR) on Minimum Age Convention 
(No. 138): Estonia (2010).” 
554  CRC Committee, “Replies of the Russian Federation to the list of issues.” 
555  See both CRC Committee, “Summary Records of the 1863 Meeting: Russian Federation 
CRC”, and CRC Committee, “Summary Records of the 1864 Meeting: Russian Federation 
CRC” (CRC/C/SR.1864, January 30, 2014). 
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passive in the constructive dialogue with the three states. Despite discrepancies 
with the proposed minimum requirements, it still did not analyse in relation to 
these states whether the age limits are met and this section of the Concluding 
Observations was perfunctory.  
There might be several explanations for this kind of passiveness; the 
approach of the CRC Committee might indicate that there is no obligatory 
minimum core in art. 1 or it is unclear. Alternatively, the CRC Committee 
might consider the discrepancies of these three states to be insignificant as there 
is no widespread practice of child marriage, for example. If the latter is true, 
then the CRC Committee is promoting double standards as it always brings out 
its concerns in relation to states that have a high number of child marriages or 
where some of these age limits are unreasonably high or low.556 
 
 
2 Best interests of the child 
The concept of the ‘child’s best interests’ is a long-standing normative concept 
in international law.557 It pre-dates the CRC and was already enshrined in the 
Declaration of the Rights of the Child (para. 2), 558  the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women559 as well as being 
present in the ECHR (mainly art. 8). It is also visible in the practice of the 
international courts such as the Human Rights Committee as well as the 
European Court of Human Rights.560 
Due to its general and relative nature, the best interests of the child has been 
seen as a prime example for the theoretical debates on the nature of human 
rights.561 Surprisingly, this question it did not receive much attention in the 
                                                 
556   See e.g., CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Indonesia (third and fourth 
report)” (CRC/C/IDN/CO/3-4, July 10, 2014). 
557  For recent analysis of the right see John Eekelaar, “The Role of the Best Interests 
Principle in Decisions Affecting Children and Decisions about Children,” The International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 23, No. 1 (March 28, 2015): 3–26. 
558  Declaration of the Rights of the Child, UN GA, Resolution 1386 (XIV). 
559  CEDAW, UN GA, 1249 UN Treaty Series 13 arts. 5 (b) and 16 1 (d). 
560  Kilkelly, “Best of Both Worlds for Children’s Rights – Interpreting the European 
Convention on Human Rights in the Light of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.” 
For recent practice, see e.g., Berisha v. Switzerland, App. No. 948/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 30, 
2013) pt. 51. and Neulinger and Shuruk v. Switzerland, App. No. 41615/07 (ECHR, June 7, 
2010) pt. 135. 
561  Neil MacCormick has used the best interests of a child as a test-right. See Neil 
MacCormick, Legal Right and Social Democracy. Essays in Legal and Political Philosophy 
(Oxford University Press, 1984) and Leif Wenar, “The Nature of Claim-Rights,” Ethics 123, 
No. 2 (jaanuar 2013): 202–29. 
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drafting of the CRC.562 However, it is a right where implementation could be 
and often is affected by cultural differences or traditions.563 
As analysis shows, the national understanding of the best interests of the 
child has cultural connotations. Part of this problem could be the result of the 
unclear requirements of the CRC. 
 
2.1 Minimum core of the best interests of the child 
The CRC Committee has identified the “best interests of the child” 
encompassed in article 3 as one of the general principles of the Convention564 
and which is central for interpreting and implementing all the other rights of the 
child. 565  It is a dynamic and relatively indeterminate concept that in every 
instance of application requires an assessment of what is appropriate to the 
specific context. It also gives the child the right to have their best interests 
assessed and taken into account as “a primary consideration” in all actions or 
decisions that concern them in both public and private spheres.566  
As will be shown, this is an example of a norm that should be substantively 
applied as a principle. Depending on the substance of the issue at hand, it 
generally has to be implemented in a more or less nature. At the same time, it 
also has to be applied as a rule that includes an obligation of result (e.g. 
inclusion of the principle in national legislation) and obligation of conduct (e.g. 
application of the principle in all the cases relating to children). As Eekelaar 
points out, best interests principle requires clear guidelines and legislation for 
the individual cases concerning a specific child; at the same time, it has to be 
applies as a principle in matters relating to children as a group.567 
Inherent dangers are also connected to this concept – indeterminacy renders 
possible its erroneous application.568 This manifests strongly in the context of 
                                                 
562  Freeman, Article 3, 25–27; and OHCHR, Legislative History of the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, Vol. I, 335–48. 
563  See also the arguments of Freeman in connection to circumcision. Freeman, Article 3, 2. 
564  This has been reflected for example in the general instructions on submitting reports to 
the CRC Committee. CRC Committee, “Treaty-Specific Guidelines Regarding the Form and 
Content of Periodic Reports.” 
565  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 5,” para. 12; and CRC Committee, “General 
Comment No. 12: The Right of the Child to Be Heard” (CRC/C/GC/12, July 20, 2009), para. 
2. It has also been affirmed in recent practice of the General Assembly of the UN. UN GA, 
“Rights of the Child” (A/RES/65/197, March 30, 2011), para. 16. 
566  For extended analysis, see e.g., Freeman, Article 3. 
567  John Eekelaar, “The Role of the Best Interests Principle in Decisions Affecting Children 
and Decisions about Children.” 
568  As Freeman points out: “in upholding the standard, other principles and policies can 
exert an influence from behind the ‘smokescreen’ of the best interests principle. It can cloak 
prejudices, for example anti-gay sentiments. It can also be merely a selection of ‘dominant 
meanings’”, Freeman, Article 3, 2. 
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different traditions and cultures – different societies at different historical 
periods do not agree on what is in the best interests of a child.569 
Article 3 (1) CRC reads as follows: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private 
social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative 
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 
The Convention explicitly refers to the child’s best interests in other provisions 
as well: separation from parents (art. 9); family reunification (art. 10); parental 
responsibilities (art. 18); deprivation of family environment and alternative care 
(art. 20); adoption (art. 21); separation from adults in detention (art. 37 (c)) and 
procedural guarantees, including presence of parents at court hearings for penal 
matters involving children in conflict with the law (art. 40 2 (b) 9). Reference to 
the child’s best interests is also made in the Optional Protocol on the sale of 
children, child prostitution and child pornography and in the Optional Protocol 
on a communications procedure. 
According to the CRC Committee, the concept of the child’s best interests is 
aimed at ensuring, firstly, the full and effective enjoyment of all the rights 
recognized in the Convention, and, secondly, the holistic development of the 
child. The best interests of the child has potential to conflict with the interests of 
other members of the family; furthermore, it is unclear, who should have the 
right and/or obligation to determine the best interests of the child, and how 
much it has to take into account the view of the child. As an example, the CRC 
Committee has pointed out that “an adult’s judgment of a child’s best interests 
cannot override the obligation to respect all the child’s rights under the Con-
vention.”570 
Full application of the concept of the child’s best interests requires 
development of a rights-based approach, engaging all actors, to secure the 
holistic physical, psychological, moral and spiritual integrity of the child and 
promote their human dignity. Hence, according to the CRC Committee, the best 
interests of the child comprises three intertwined components:571 
1. A substantive right – this is a primary consideration when different interests 
are being considered; it is guaranteed that this right will be implemented 
whenever a decision is to be made concerning a child, a group of children or 
children in general. Article 3 (1) creates an intrinsic obligation for states, is 
directly applicable (self-executing) and can be invoked before a court.572 
                                                 
569  Ibid., 27. 
570  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14,” para. 4. 
571  Ibid., para. 6. 
572  Besides national practice, this view is supported also by the practice of both of the HRC 
and the ECtHR. See e.g., HRC, “General Comment No. 32: Right to Equality Before Courts 
and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial” (CCPR/C/GC/32, 2007), para. 42; and Kilkelly, 
“Protecting Children’s Rights under the ECHR.” 
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2. A fundamental and interpretative legal principle – if a legal provision is open 
to more than one interpretation, the interpretation which most effectively 
serves the child’s best interests should be chosen. 
3. A rule of procedure – when a decision affects a child or children, the 
decision-making process must include an evaluation of the possible impact 
(positive or negative) of the decision on the child or children concerned. This 
also requires procedural guarantees such as justification of a decision or 
participation in proceedings.573 
 
These requirements can also be taken as minimum core requirements. The CRC 
Committee has used the traditional tripartite division574 of respect, protect and 
ensure to further open the meaning of these obligations:575 
1. A child’s best interests are appropriately integrated and consistently applied 
in every action taken by a public institution, especially in legislation, all 
implementation measures, administrative and judicial proceedings which 
directly or indirectly impact on children. 
2. All judicial and administrative decisions as well as policies and legislation 
concerning children demonstrate that the child’s best interests have been a 
primary consideration. This includes describing how the best interests have 
been examined and assessed, and what weight has been ascribed to them in 
the decision. 
3. The interests of the child have been assessed and taken as a primary 
consideration in decisions and actions taken by the private sector, including 
those providing services, or any other private entity or institution making 
decisions that concern or impact on a child. 
 
The dividing line between what is best for children as a group and what is in the 
primary interest of an individual child is not clear from the CRC itself. The 
principle enshrined in article 3 relates to both contexts.576  Nonetheless, the 
interests of an individual child cannot (necessarily) be understood “as being the 
same as those of children in general”; art. 3 (1) requires that “the best interests 
of a child must be assessed individually”. 
The CRC Committee emphasised in General Comment No. 14 that a range 
of issues has relevance when deciding what is in the best interests of the child in 
any concrete case. These considerations include but are not limited to (de-
pending on the particular decision involved) the views of the child, preservation 
of the family environment and maintaining relations; the care, protection and 
safety of the child; a situation of vulnerability; the child’s right to health; the 
child’s right to education. Additionally, a number of procedural guarantees 
                                                 
573  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14.” 
574  On tripartite division of obligations, see e.g., Olivier De Schutter, International Human 
Rights Law: Cases, Materials, Commentary (Cambridge University Press, 2014), 279–95. 
575  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14” paras 14–16. 
576  Ibid. 
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should be followed including the right of the child to express their own views; 
establishing the facts; decisions should be taken by qualified personnel 
including, when necessary, legal representation; and mechanisms to review 
decisions. 
As an example, as to custody decisions the CRC Committee has stressed the 
importance of the best interests of the particular (individual) child, stating 
explicitly that it is contrary to these interests “if the law automatically gives 
parental responsibilities to either or both parents”. 577  Consequently, the 
dividing line between an understanding of the best interests principle in relation 
to children as a group and the individual child is unclear. 
The best interests of the child is strongly reflected in the practice of the 
ECtHR in article 8 of the Convention (the right to family life). It has had para-
mount importance in extreme cases such as international child abduction578 and 
application of the Hague Convention;579 national and international adoption;580 
placement into care581 and the like. As art. 8 relates to the private sphere, thus 
the ECtHR respects the margin of appreciation as much as possible and 
intervenes only in exceptional cases.582 The court has consistently stressed in 
these cases that a broad consensus – including in international law – supports 
the idea that in all decisions concerning children, their best interests must be 
paramount.583 
                                                 
577  Ibid., para. 67. 
578  The ECtHR has stressed the need for a fair balance between the competing interests at 
stake – those of the child, of the parents, and of public order. The best interests of the child 
are the primary consideration and the objectives of prevention and immediate return 
correspond to a specific conception of “the best interests of the child”. X v. Latvia, App. No. 
27853/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R., November 26, 2013) [95–96]. 
579  Hague Convention, UN GA. 
580  X and Others v. Austria, App. No. 19010/07 (Eur. Ct. H.R., February 19, 2013). 
581  K. and T. v. Finland, App. No. 25702/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 12, 2001). 
582  The EctHR stated in Dmitriy Ryabov v. Russia, App. No. 33774/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R., 
August 1, 2013) [46]: “Undoubtedly, consideration of what is in the best interests of the 
child is of crucial importance in every case of this kind. Moreover, it must be borne in mind 
that the national authorities have the benefit of direct contact with all the persons concerned. 
It follows from these considerations that the Court’s task is not to substitute itself for the 
domestic authorities in the exercise of their responsibilities regarding custody and contact 
issues, but rather to review, in the light of the Convention, the decisions taken by those 
authorities in the exercise of their discretionary powers.” 
583  Kilkelly points out that the impact of the margin of appreciation is most pronounced in 
care cases where it is particularly apparent that the Court is unwilling to second guess the 
merits of a care order. The Court’s task is to consider whether the reasons used to justify the 
measure in question were proportionate i.e., ‘relevant and sufficient’. In practice, therefore, 
the margin of appreciation enjoyed by state authorities means that only in exceptional 
circumstances will the Court find that a care order does not meet these criteria. Ursula 
Kilkelly, “Children’s Rights: A European Perspective,” Judicial Studies Institute Journal 4, 
No. 2 (2004): 73. 
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Thus, the general minimum requirements in the application of the best 
interests of a child are: 
1) The best interests principle is reflected in legislation as a primary 
consideration in all matters relating to a child or children. 
2) The best interests of the child is included and analysed in all proceedings 
concerning a child as a guiding procedural principle. Every decision must 
include an evaluation of the possible impact (positive or negative) of the 
decision on the child or children concerned. In all decisions and proceedings 
connected to a child or children, the best interests of the child is analysed 
and is clearly visible in deliberations. 
 
There are further specific requirements relating to the issue involved. The 
current research looks at implementation of the best interests of a child in two 
areas: placement into care and family reunification. 
 
2.1.1 Placement into care 
The CRC emphasises the importance of the family as a living-environment584. 
Thus, the presumption of the CRC is that living together with one’s family is in 
the best interests of the child and there should be weighty reasons (such as harm 
to the child’s health or development) for removal of the child from the family. 
The ECtHR has treated art. 8 of the convention as one of the provisions 
where the margin of appreciation of states is wide. In the case of Ryabov vs 
Russia, however, the Court noted that taking into account the best interests of 
the child is one of the reasons that might require restriction on such a margin585. 
This is especially true when a child is placed into foster care or in the case of 
adoption586. 
                                                 
584  The preamble to the CRC reads: “Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group 
of society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all its members and 
particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and assistance so that it 
can fully assume its responsibilities within the community, Recognizing that the child, for 
the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a family 
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding, ...” 
585  The ECtHR stated in Dmitriy Ryabov v. Russia [48]: “Article 8 requires that the 
domestic authorities should strike a fair balance between the interests of the child and those 
of the parents and that, in the balancing process, particular importance should be attached to 
the best interests of the child, which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may 
override those of the parents. In particular, a parent cannot be entitled under Article 8 to 
have such measures taken as would harm the child’s health and development.” Similar 
argumentation has been used in a number of other cases concerning adoption of a child, 
paternity, foster case and other rights of a child. See, inter alia A.L. v. Poland, App. No. 
28609/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R., February 18, 2014) [65–69]; Sommerfeld v. Germany, App. No. 
31871/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R., August 7, 2003) [62]; Görgülü v. Germany, App. No. 74969/01 
(Eur. Ct. H.R., February 26, 2004) [43]. 
586  See also Ageyevy v Russia App no 7075/10 (18 April 2013) [124, 144–146] 
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As a general principle, when deciding upon the best interests of a child, the 
ECtHR takes into account, besides the reasoning of the parties, the fairness of 
the decision-making process587 including the right to participate in the process. 
The European Social Charter (revised) uses the concept of the best interests 
of the child in a number of its provisions including, for example, art. 17. The 
practice of the EComSR shows that any restriction or limitation of parents’ 
custodial rights should be based on clear criteria laid down in legislation, and 
should not go beyond what is necessary for the protection and best interests of 
the child and the rehabilitation of the family.588 This means, among other things, 
that the long term care of children outside their home should take place 
primarily in foster families suitable for their upbringing and only if necessary in 
institutions589. 
Children placed in institutions are entitled to the highest degree of 
satisfaction of their emotional needs and physical well-being as well as to 
special protection and assistance. Such institutions must provide conditions 
promoting all aspects of children’s growth.590 
Fundamental rights and freedoms such as the right to integrity, privacy, 
property and to meet with persons close to the child must be adequately 
guaranteed for children living in institutions and national law must provide a 
possibility to lodge an appeal against a decision to restrict parental rights, to 
take a child into public care or to restrict the right of access of the child’s 
closest family. Furthermore, a procedure must exist for complaining about the 
care and treatment in institutions. Supervision of the child welfare system must 
be adequate, in particular the institutions involved.591 
 
2.1.2 Family reunification 
Family reunification has importance in several contexts: domestic separation of 
a child from the family; keeping the families of foreign nationals together in the 
cases of legal as well as illegal immigration; or expulsion of a family of foreign 
nationals or some family members from the country. In all of these cases, a 
child is especially vulnerable. The current research looks at general measures 
                                                 
587  Sahin v. Germany, App. No. 30943/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 8, 2003). 
588  EComSR, “Conclusions XV-2, Statement of Interpretation: General Observation 
Regarding Article 17” (XV-2_Ob_V1-2/Ob/EN, December 31, 2001). The EComSR has 
emphasised that placement is an exceptional measure. In all circumstances, appropriate 
alternatives to placement should first be explored, taking into account the views and wishes 
expressed by the child, his or her parents and other members of the family. EComSR, 
“Conclusions 2011: General Introduction,” January 2012, para. 9. 
589  EComSR, “Conclusions XV-2, Statement of Interpretation: General Observation 
Regarding Article 17.” 
590  EComSR, “Conclusions 2005: Moldova,” January 2006, 474. 
591  EComSR, “Conclusions XV-2, Statement of Interpretation: General Observation 
Regarding Article 17”; and EComSR, “Conclusions 2005: Lithuania,” January 2006, 370. 
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taken by the state to reunify the child with the family after some forced 
separation and the rights of non-citizens to protection of family life. 
Haugli and Schinkareva point out that the most important task in relation to 
this principle is balancing it against other rights. Even if the best interests of a 
child is recognised and implemented in national legislation, it is acknowledged 
that other considerations may override the interests of the child. Hence, 
balancing individual interests and those of society becomes a challenge.592 
It is questionable from the outset whether states also have to apply the 
principle of the best interests of the child in the context of refugees or persons to 
be deported. As Haugli and Schinkareva note, there was a discussion whether 
separation of children and parents, on the one hand, and deportation of the 
parent(s), on the other, could have been considered together, even before the CRC 
was adopted.593 The view of the UN Working Group drafting the CRC, though 
not unanimously supported, was that art. 9594 of the CRC is intended to apply in 
domestic situations, while art. 10595  CRC is intended to apply to separations 
involving different countries.596 Strictly speaking, there is reference to the best 
interests of the child only in connection with maintaining contact with parents. 
Nevertheless, when analysing international practice and national implementation 
of these provisions, it is important to pay attention to both arts 9 and 10 in 
conjunction with art. 3 as a general principle. The CRC Committee has noted: 
When the child’s relations with his or her parents are interrupted by migration 
(of the parents without the child, or of the child without his or her parents), 
preservation of the family unit should be taken into account when assessing the 
best interests of the child in decisions on family reunification.597 
                                                 
592  Trude Haugli and Elena Shinkareva, “The Best Interests of the Child Versus Public 
Safety Interests: State Interference into Family Life And Separation of Parents and Children 
in Connection with Expulsion/Deportation in Norwegian and Russian Law,” International 
Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 26, No. 3 (December 1, 2012): 351. 
593  Ibid., 354. 
594  Art 9 (1) reads: “States parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his 
or her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial 
review determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation 
is necessary for the best interests of the child. Such determination may be necessary in a 
particular case such as one involving abuse or neglect of the child by the parents, or one 
where the parents are living separately and a decision must be made as to the child’s place 
of residence.” 
595  Art 10 (1) reads: “In accordance with the obligation of states parties under article 9, 
paragraph 1, applications by a child or his or her parents to enter or leave a State Party for 
the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by states parties in a positive, humane 
and expeditious manner. states parties shall further ensure that the submission of such a 
request shall entail no adverse consequences for the applicants and for the members of their 
family.” 
596  Hodgkin, Newell, and UNICEF, Implementation Handbook for the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child, 125–26. 
597  CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14,” para. 66. 
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Regionally, art. 8 of the ECHR regulates the right to family life; ECtHR has 
developed the right and duty of the states to take all possible stems in order to 
keep the families together. Article 8 pays special attention to the rights of the 
child and their interests in variety of cases of separation from their family; and, 
as discussed above, the best interests of the child should be the decisive 
principle.598 The ECtHR has stressed repeatedly that any decision restricting the 
family-life should be conducted with due diligence; the measures should 
pursued the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of the child and 
his parents; the child’s best interests and the family’s particular situation have to 
be taken into account. Furthermore, states enjoy wide margin of appreciation in 
these cases as they are in the best position to analyse and evaluate the facts of 
the case and find a fair balance between the legitimate aims and the best interest 
of a child.599 
As for Estonia and Finland, family reunification has been dealt with in the 
EU legislation – Council Directive 2003/86/EC600 deals with the right to family 
reunification; Directive 2008/115/EC 601  regulates common standards and 
procedures in member states for returning illegally staying third-country 
nationals and regulations relating to the grant of international protection. Thus, 
it can be expected that the practice of Estonia and Finland grants children 
similar rights and protection. 
Concluding from the above, the analysis of the minimum requirements of the 
best interests of a child is very general for the purposes of the current dis-
sertation. States fulfil their minimum core obligations relating to art. 3 (1), when 
the principle is reflected in the relevant legislation and when it is a primary 
consideration of decisions. It has to be noted that other provisions of the CRC, 
as well as ECHR, might impose further obligations on the states. These 







                                                 
598  See e.g., Wouter Vandenhole and Julie Ryngaert, “Mainstreaming Children’s Rights in 
Migration Litigation: Muskhadzhiyeva and Others v. Belgium,” in Diversity and European 
Human Rights, ed. Eva Brems (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 68–92. 
599  See e.g., Berisha v. Switzerland, App. No. 948/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 30, 2013); or 
Osman v. Denmark, App. No. 38058/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R., June 14, 2011). 
600  Council Directive on the right to family reunification, 2003/86/EC OJ L 251 , 
03/10/2003 P. 0012 – 0018 (2003). See also Julien Hardy, “The Objective of Directive 
2003/86 Is to Promote the Family Reunification of Third Country Nationals,” European 
Journal of Migration and Law 14, No. 4 (January 1, 2012): 439–52. 
601  Directive on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally 
staying third-country nationals, 2008/115/EC OJ L 348, 24.12.2008, pp 98–107. 
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2.2 Best interests in the Finnish legal system 
Finnish law as well as practice uses the concept of the best interests of the child 
(“lapsen etu”) as the core concept both in legislation as well as in court practice. 
The Child Welfare Act 602  lists the best interests of the child as a central 
principle and defines the concept of the best interests of the child at the 
legislative level. According to art. 4, when assessing a child’s need for child 
welfare measures and carrying out such measures, the best interests of the child 
should be regarded as the primary consideration. The best interests of the child 
is also prominent in the Act on Child Custody and Right of Access603 where the 
best interests of the child in art. 2 is strongly connected with the views and 
wishes of the child. 604  One of the most interesting provisions here is 
art. 34 (1) (3), according to which a child who is mature enough can veto 
execution of a return order.605 
The CRC Committee did not find the current regulation sufficient – although 
there is a relevant reference in the Child Welfare Act, there is no comprehensive 
system for taking the best interests of the child into account in all possible 
matters relating to children.606 
When assessing the best interests of the child, Finnish regulation requires the 
focus of attention on how various alternative measures and solutions would 
ensure the child balanced development and well-being, safeguarding their close 
relationships and their continuity, give the child understanding and affection as 
well as supervision and care according to their age and level of development, 
education according to their talents and wishes, a safe living environment, 
physical and psychological integrity, maturing towards independence and 
responsibility, a chance to participate and have a say in matters concerning 
themselves as well as taking into account the child’s background in terms of 
mother tongue, culture and religion.607 
                                                 
602  Child Welfare Act, 417/2007 English. 
603  Act on Child Custody and Right of Access, 361/1983. 
604  Supreme Court has stressed in numerous cases the need to take into account the views 
and opinions of the child. See e.g., KKO:2012:95, para. 9 in particular. Hanna Pajulammi 
has analysed the child’s participation rights and concluded that Finnish legal system needs to 
be renewed in order to apply it more comprehensibly. Hanna Pajulammi, Lapsi, oikeus ja 
osallisuus (Helsinki: Talentum, 2014). 
605  See also the argumentation in K. and T. v. Finland, App. No. 25702/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R., 
July 12, 2001). 
606  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Finland (fourth Report),” para. 27–28. 
607  Virve-Maria de Godzinsky, “Lapsen etu ja osallisuus tahdonvastaisissa huostaanotoissa,” 
in Lapsioikeus murroksessa, ed. Suvianna Hakalehto-Wainio and Liisa Nieminen (Helsinki: 
Lakimiesliiton Kustannus, 2013), 155–82. At the same time, the Ombudsman for Children 
finds that co-ordination between different stake-holders of the government still needs 
improvement. Lapsiasiavaltuutetun toimisto, Harvojen yhteiskunta vai kaikkien kansakunta? 
Hallituskausi 2011–2015 lapsen oikeuksien näkökulmasta, Lapsiasiavaltuutetun vuosikirja, 
2015, 13. 
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Different societies have different obstacles for fulfilment of these ideals – 
the Finnish report on application of the CRC stated: 
In Finland, both fathers and mothers tend to have full time jobs. Therefore, 
finding good solutions for combining work and family life is crucial for the 
fulfilment of the best interests of the child. The Government promotes combining 
work and family life in all decision making and encourages men to take 
advantage of the family leaves to which they are entitled. The development of the 
father-child relationship is often hampered for instance by the fact that fathers of 
small children tend to work overtime and do not take enough advantage of family 
leaves.608 
The best interests of the child also serves as a basis for plans on the organisation 
of child welfare services. Thus, as a principle, everyone connected with the 
upbringing of the child should support child welfare; the need for welfare and 
protection of the child should take into account the best interests of the child. 
What is in the best interests of the child depends on the particular facts of every 
case. Finnish child welfare stresses the importance of prevention – intervention 
to problems identified should happen at an early stage. Assessing the need for 
child welfare and a child protection programme must primarily take into 
account the child’s best interests and various policy options and solutions 
should be directed towards it.609 
The best interests of the child is clearly visible in the practice of different 
judicial and administrative bodies. As an example, one of the early precedents 
came from the Supreme Administrative Court when the Directorate of 
Immigration had served an expulsion order on four foreigners (mother A, father 
B and their two minor children) whereby they would be deported from Finland. 
As A suffered from a serious illness, the Supreme Administrative Court 
considered that her eviction would amount to degrading treatment. As A and B, 
with their minor children, formed a family, and these family ties had to be taken 
into account together with the relations between children and parents, the court 
applied the best interests of the child and the prohibition on separating a child 
from his or her parents against their will. Thus, the Supreme Administrative 
Court quashed the Directorate’s decision to expel.610 
Still, the Parliamentary Ombudsman has pointed out that implementation of 
the principle, for example, by the police needs further development so that it 
                                                 
608  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Fourth Report of Finland” (CRC/C/FIN/4, May 
26, 2010), para. 123. 
609  Art 4 of the Child Welfare Act proposes that the following criterion might be of 
importance: 1) balanced development and well-being, as well as a close and continuing 
relationships; 2) the ability to obtain understanding and affection, as well as the age and 
maturity of the supervision and care; 3) tendencies and wishes of education; 4) a safe 
nurturing environment and the physical and psychological integrity; 5) the independence and 
responsibility of growing up; 6) the ability to participate in and influence their own affairs, 
as well as 7) In linguistic, cultural and religious background taken into account. 
610  04.02.1997/228 (KHO). 
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would take fully into account and implement the best interests of a child.611 
Research also shows that the Parliament does not consider the best interest of a 
child in all legislative recommendations relating to the rights of the child. The 
Ombudsman of Children’s Rights often amends such recommendations with its 
own additional analysis.612 
Using the best interests of the child in rhetoric is also a commonplace among 
administrative officials after adoption of the Child Welfare Act. As an example, 
the Parliamentary Ombudsman has repeatedly emphasised in his decisions that 
the authorities must consider and give precedence to the best interests of 
children. Examples include urging the police to pay attention to the best 
interests of a child when using coercive measures on a minor suspected of a 
drug offence. 613  On another occasion, the Ombudsman considered that the 
police had not taken into account the best interests of the child when a 13-year-
old had been left at home alone for a night without giving him or his mother any 
information about the fact that his father had been taken to a mental hospital.614 
Numerous cases decided by the Parliamentary Ombudsman involve the best 
interests of the child, for example in connection to the right to property and the 
right to be heard,615 taking into public care,616 giving information about the 
address of a child to a parent who is prohibited visiting rights by the court.617 
It is evident from these examples that the concept of the best interests of the 
child is deemed important in Finnish legislation and is applied in extreme cases 
such as custody cases or placing a child into care, reunification of families, and 
asylum-seekers. The best interests of the child is present in general child 
welfare instruments; all decision makers have to take it into consideration when 
dealing with matters relating to children. Thus, this general overview suggests 
that the minimum requirements of the CRC are fulfilled and that Finland not 
only applies the principle in its domestic law but it is also a central policy-
making principle. 
                                                 
611  Ombudsman noted: “In his most recent decisions the Ombudsman has again drawn the 
attention of the police to taking the child’s best interests into consideration and choosing the 
mildest means possible”. Parliamentary Ombudsman, Communitation to the CRC Committee 
on Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under Article 44 of the Convention, 
Fourth reports of States Parties due in 2008, Finland /CRC/C/FIN/4, (January 3, 2011). 
612  For more recent analysis, see e.g., Lapsiasiavaltuutettu, lausunto LAPS/49/2013 
(February 17, 2015) or lausunto LAPS/185/2014 (February 12, 2015). 
613  Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, “Päätös esitutkinnan edellytyksistä ym” (No. 3326/4/05, 
January 22, 2007). 
614  Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, “Poliisin ja lääkärin virheellinen menettely mielenterveys-
potilaan toimittamisessa terveyskeskukseen tutkittavaksi” (No. 4745/4/11, January 9, 2014). 
615  Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, “Lapsen kuuleminen ulosottoasiassa” (No. 2393/4/05, 
August 31, 2007). 
616  Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, “Julkisuuslain mukainen menettely tiedon luovutuksessa ja 
huoltajan oikeus osallistua lasta koskevaan päätöksentekoon” (No. 1795/4/13, August 1, 2014). 
617  Eduskunnan oikeusasiamies, “Turvakiellon alaisen osoitteen luovutus yhteishuoltajalle” 
(No. 4372/4/12, December 17, 2013). 
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However, as discussed below, implementation of these requirements does 
not fully meet the standards of the CRC. These problems might be connected to 
the structure of the Finnish legal system where there are no general codes; 
instead all areas are regulated by specific acts. Thus, the principle of the best 
interests of the child should be present in all of these legal acts.618 The scope of 
the current research, however, does not allow a comprehensive test of this 
argument. 
 
2.2.1 Placement into care 
Placement into care has been an area where Finland has historically received 
criticism both from the CRC Committee as well as the ECtHR.619 Art 4 (3) of 
the Child Welfare Act requires that in child welfare all participants act 
delicately and use primarily assistance in open care, unless the child’s best 
interests require otherwise. When foster care is necessary in the interests of the 
child, it has to be arranged without delay. Foster care should be taken with the 
child in the interests of the objective of reunification of the family. Realisation 
of these goals has been problematic – in 2011 the CRC Committee found that 
the number of children in care was increasing.620 This would show that the CRC 
prerequisite that the family environment is generally in the best interests of a 
child was not being followed by Finland. 
Nevertheless, the Finnish courts have applied the best interests of the child in 
their practice – recent decisions of the High Administrative Court have taken 
into account the best interests of the child in decisions on placement of a child 
in foster care. As an example, in a number of its decisions the High 
Administrative Court has stressed the need to ensure that the child has a stable 
growing environment with close contacts to persons that are important to them. 
This is not necessarily primarily possible in public care, but rather placement in 
a foster family should be preferred.621 The courts have stressed that the best 
                                                 
618  Research shows that the legislator does not analyse rights of the child in all the cases 
relating to them. In 2012, the best interests of a child have been considered in mere 3% of 
the legislative initiatives. Outi Slant and Kati Rantala, Vaikutusten arviointi ja lain-
valmistelun perustietoja vuoden 2012 hallituksen esityksissä., Oikeuspoliittisen tutkimus-
laitoksen tutkimustiedonantoja 122 (Helsinki: Hakapaino OY, 2013), 50. Still, there are also 
positive examples. See e.g., HE 159/2012, HE 111/2012, from more recent practice e.g., HE 
358/2014. 
619  See e.g., K. and T. v. Finland, App. No. 25702/94 (Eur. Ct. H.R., July 12, 2001). For a 
theoretical overview, see e.g., Godzinsky, “Lapsen etu ja osallisuus tahdonvastaisissa 
huostaanotoissa.” 
620  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Finland (fourth Report)”, paras 33–34. 
621  See e.g., judgment of the High Administrative Court 4.7.2006/1714, KHO:2006:42; or 
19.09.2000/2302 case No. 4419/3/98 (KHO). 
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interests of the child also requires, among other things, stability in the living 
conditions of the child.622 
Application of the best interests of the child in Finland has also been 
analysed by the European Court of Human Rights. The ECtHR connected 
taking into care with the requirement of family reunification in the case of R. vs 
Finland,623 where the ECtHR stressed the need to take the best interests of the 
child into account in custodial cases and considered that on the facts of the case 
it raised the question whether the authorities actively sought to sever the ties 
between the applicant and his son, or at least failed to make genuine efforts 
towards uniting the family. Accordingly, this violated article 8 of the 
Convention. 
In its concluding observations from 2011 the CRC Committee in general saw 
adoption of the Finnish Child Welfare Act as a positive sign and welcomed the 
fact that it includes the concept of the best interests of the child in the 
assessment of a child’s need for welfare measures.624 However, the Committee 
found that the principle has not been adequately understood or taken into 
account in all decisions affecting children. At the same time, the best interests 
of the child should be consistently applied in all legislative, administrative and 
judicial proceedings as well as all policies, programmes and projects relevant to 
and with an impact on children. It noted further that the legal reasoning of all 
judicial and administrative judgments and decisions should also be based on this 
principle.625 
Thus, the CRC Committee found that Finland has no unified nationwide 
standards establishing the criteria for placement in alternative care, care 
planning and regular review of placement decisions, and that supervision and 
monitoring of alternative care facilities is insufficient. There are also problems 
with lack of support for biological families; in turn, that hinders reunification of 
these children with their biological families.626 
Similar observations were made by the EComSR, which recommended that 
the long-term care of children outside their home should take place primarily in 
foster families suitable for their upbringing and only if necessary in institutions.627 
                                                 
622  See e.g., judgment of the High Administrative Court 27.12.2011/3737, KHO:2011:113 
(KHO), or 9.12.2011/3496, KHO:2011:99 (KHO). 
623  R. v. Finland, App. No. 34141/96 (Eur. Ct. H.R., May 30, 2006). It has to be noted that 
this case took place before reform of the child welfare system and was one of the triggers for 
adoption of the 2007 law. The court had similar argumentation and also stressed the 
importance of the best interests of a child in the case of K.A. v. Finland, App. No. 27751/95 
(Eur. Ct. H.R., January 14, 2003), and the case of K. and T. v. Finland. 
624  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Finland (fourth Report),” para. 27. 
625  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Finland (fourth Report),” paras 27–28. 
626  Ibid. paras 33–34. 
627  EComSR, “Conclusions 2011: Finland,” 14. The committee asked what measures are 
taken to reduce institutionalisation of children and increase foster care in families. In the 
meantime it reserved its position on this point i.e., it did not conclude neither conformity nor 
non-conformity on the matter. 
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The EComSR further stressed that any restriction or limitation of parents’ 
custodial rights should be based on criteria laid down in legislation, and should 
not go beyond what is necessary for the protection and best interests of the child 
and the rehabilitation of the family. As a principle, it should only be possible to 
take a child into custody in order to be placed outside their home if the measure 
is based on adequate and reasonable criteria laid down in legislation.628 
It has to be noted, however, that recent practice in Finland shows a vast 
improvement – evaluation of the best interests of the child is a commonplace in 
the recent practice of the High Administrative Court629 as well as that of the 
Supreme Court.630 In recent years, there have been no cases concerning the best 
interests of the child in the ECtHR that have been initiated after the new Child 
Welfare Act came into force. Thus, it can be concluded that the principle of best 
interests is functioning in this area at least at a minimum level. 
 
2.2.2 Family reunification 
The second area where international monitoring scrutinizes the application of 
the best interests of the child concerns legal or illegal immigrants and family 
reunification. Family reunification is important both in cases of granting 
families residence permits or expulsion of foreigners as well as in cases of 
foster care. Art. 6 of the Aliens Act631 requires that the best interests of the child 
be taken into account when making any decisions based on the Aliens Act. This 
is also the general practice of the Supreme Administrative Court.632 
Thus, relating to family unification, the minimum requirements relating to 
the best interests of a child are present – the principle is sufficiently clearly and 
comprehensively present in the relevant legislation; it is also applied in the 
decision-making process. 
 
                                                 
628  Ibid. The Committee asked what the criteria is for restrictions on custody or parental 
rights and the extent of such restrictions. It also asked what the procedural safeguards are to 
ensure that children are removed from their families only in exceptional circumstances. It 
further asked whether national law provides for a possibility to lodge an appeal against a 
decision to restrict parental rights, to take a child into public care or to restrict the right of 
access of the child’s closest family. 
629  See e.g., judgments of the High Administrative Court 22.5.2013/1747, KHO:2013:97 
(KHO); 19.3.2014/803, KHO:2014:50 (KHO); 19.3.2014/804, KHO:2014:51 (KHO); or 
27.12.2011/3737, KHO:2011:113 (KHO). 
630  See e.g., judgment of the Supreme Court KKO:2012:11 [2012] in case no S2010/118 
(January 30, 2012) on the right to know one`s parents; judgments of the Supreme Court 
KKO:2009:40 [2009] in case no S2008/149 (May 22, 2009) or KKO:2011:99 [2011] in case 
no S2010/304 (November 22, 2011) on the right to know the birth parents. 
631  Ulkomaalaislaki (Aliens Act), 301/2004. 
632  See e.g., judgments of the High Administrative Court No. 22.5.2013/1747, KHO: 2013:97; 
No. 25.3.2010/613, KHO:2010:17; No. 19.3.2014/803, KHO:2014:50.; No. 7.2.2014/316, 
KHO:2014:24; No. 9.10.2009/2454, KHO:2009:85; and No. 4.2.2013/414, KHO:2013:23. 
148 
2.3 Best interests in the Estonian legal system 
According to art. 3 of the Child Protection Act,633 the best interests of the child 
is the primary consideration and guiding principle at all times and in all cases. It 
has to be noted that the Estonian language version of the act uses the term 
‘lapse huvid’ i.e., the ‘interests of the child’. The Estonian language version 
does not refer to ‘best’ interests. Estonian legislation is, thus, even vaguer than 
the CRC itself and does not reflect the requirement that every decision should 
look for a solution that is in the best interests of the child or children 
concerned.634 Thus, the law does not fully comply with the requirements of the 
CRC. Curiously, the English translation of the Act corresponds to the wording 
of the CRC. This discrepancy has not been amended even in the new version of 
the CPA that will enter into force on 1 January 2016.635 
The Family Act636 requires that, in settling a dispute between the parents 
regarding a child, the court should determine the case according to the interests 
of the child (art. 123 (1)).637 The Supreme Court has emphasised that the rights 
of a child should be under special scrutiny in all civil processes that concern 
them; 638  the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter CCP) 639  has established 
several procedural safeguards for the protection of these. They include, for 
example, the obligatory participation of the representative (art. 219 of the CCP); 
obligation of the court to take evidence on its own initiative (art. 230 (3) of the 
CCP); measures securing action (e.g. arts 378 (3) and 384 of the CCP); and 
obligation to reason rulings relating to adoption and guardianship (art. 478 (2) 
of the CCP). The practice of the Supreme Court confirms that the interests of 
the child have to be taken into account – as an example, the need to take into 
account the best interests of the child in custody cases640 and in deciding the 
powers of decision of parents641 have been emphasised.642 
                                                 
633  Lastekaitse seadus (Child Protection Act), RT I, 13.12.2013, 12. 
634  The CRC Committee noted as long ago as 2003 that the best interests of a child are not 
adequately reflected in Estonian legislation. CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: 
Estonia (initial Report),” paras 21–22. 
635  Lastekaitseseadus (Child Protection Act) (new), RT I, 06.12.2014, 1 (enters into force 
1.01.2016). Art. 5 (3) refers similarly to the primacy of the interests of the child. 
636  Perekonnaseadus (Family Law Act), RT I, 29.06.2014, 105. 
637  It has to be reminded here that the best interest of a child is closely connected with the 
child’s right to be heard in all the cases connected to them (art. 12 of the CRC). It is 
impossible to establish the best interests of an individual child in a concre case without 
hearing the position of the child. 
638  CCSCd No. 3-2-1-18-13 (26 June 2013), para 17. 
639  Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik (Code of Civil Procedure), RT I, 19.03.2015, 26. 
640  See for an example of a custody decision during divorce proceedings CCSCd No. 3-2-1-
13-07, (21 March 2007). Case No. 3-2-1-79-96 concerned the best interests of a child who 
had been living with her grandmother. CCSCd No. 3-2-1-79-96, (5 June 1996). 
641  See e.g., CCSCr No. 3-2-1-91-14 (5 November 2014). 
642  See further e.g., CCP arts 558 (1) and (3), and art. 563 (6). 
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There are several instances when it is the obligation of a specific person to 
see that the best interests of the child are protected. Estonian legislation places 
great importance on the guardianship authority, which may participate in the 
proceedings either by their own initiative or at the request of the court.643 
According to the Juvenile Sanctions Act, 644  a child has the right to a 
representative who protects their interests before the juvenile committee. The 
opinion of specialists is also required in all court cases involving minors, and a 
social worker monitors compliance with this requirement. 645  This opinion 
should be guided by the best interests of the child. As a rule, courts have to 
appoint a representative to children in a number of family matters, including 
adoption and placement into care.646  
Also the Estonian report of 2014 connected the best interests of the child 
with the obligation to hear the opinion of a child. 647  It correctly saw the 
obligation to hear the child as part of the wider goal of protecting the best 
interests of the child and found it to be reflected in Estonian legislation and 
practice as well. As an example, art. 151 of the Family Law Act requires that 
for the adoption of a child who is at least 10 years old, decisions cannot be 
made without the child’s consent. It is also a more general principle supported 
by procedural law. 
As discussed above, what precisely is in the best interests of a child depends 
on the facts of the particular case and this view develops throughout the 
procedure where the interests and needs of the child are evaluated. Courts in 
Estonia have found the following general principles to be in the best interests of 
the child:648 
• the best interests of the child limit the interests of the parents649; 
                                                 
643  A guardianship authority also represents the child’s interests in the case of settlement of 
disputes outside a court of law. A guardianship authority is the local authority of the child’s 
place of residence. Its task is to guarantee that the child’s interests are put first. 
644  Alaealise mõjutusvahendite seadus (Juvenile Sanctions Act), RT I 1998, 17, 264. 
645  Lastekaitse seadus (Child Protection Act), RT I, 13.12.2013, 12 art. 35 (2). 
646  Art. 219 of the CCP. 
647  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Second, Third and Fourth Report of Estonia,” 
42–44. 
648  See also analysis of the court-practice relating to guardianship by Maarja Lillsaar, 
“Ühise hooldusõiguse lõpetamine ja hooldusõiguse üleandmine. Kohtupraktika analüüs” 
(Riigikohus, õigusteabe osakond, May 2013). 
649  Ruling of Tartu Circuit Court in case No. 2-08-89161 (June 27, 2011). See further on 
evaluation of the best interests of the child in custody disputes Kristel Siimula-Saar and 
Maarja Lillsaar, “Vanematevahelised vaidlused hooldusõiguse ja suhtlusõiguse kindlaks-
määramisel – kes on võitja, kes kaotaja?,” RiTo 30 (2014); or Kati Valma, “Lapse parima 
huvi väljaselgitamine tsiviilkohtumenetluses vanematevahelistes hooldusõiguse vaidlustes” 
(MA thesis, Tallinn University, 2012). The Supreme Court has noted that interests of a child 
might conflict with the interests of both parents. SC en banc decision No. 3-2-1-4-13 
(December 17, 2013), para. 36. 
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• the natural environment for growing is a family and therefore, the rights of 
the child include the right to parents and the right to care from parents650; 
• stability and continuation of relations are in the best interests of the child651; 
• siblings should be raised together652. 
 
The ECtHR has touched upon application of the best interests of a child in 
Estonia and the need to take into account the interests and needs of the child 
with utmost care and diligence in the case of Kiisa vs Estonia 653 . It also 
discussed the best interests of the child in the case of Vronchenko v. Estonia654 
and found that the procedural rights of the applicant during criminal 
proceedings were violated as he did not have the possibility to question the 
child, based on whose evidence he was convicted of sexual abuse of the child. 
The court found that although the national courts acted with the aim of 
protecting the best interests of the child and, therefore, the applicant was not 
able to question her during criminal proceedings, the best interests of the child 
was not duly balanced against the procedural rights of the applicant as he was 
not given enough alternative possibilities to question the victim. Therefore, the 
ECtHR found a violation of arts 6 (1) and 6 (3) of ECHR. 
Even when legislation seems to reflect at least to some extent the best 
interests of the child, research conducted in 2012 by Praxis has shown that 
while the general opinion supports listening to the opinion of the child, actually 
taking it into account is not considered relevant. 655  Adults and children 
supported the need to listen to the interest and opinion of the child, although 
adults think that this is not necessarily something that has to be taken into 
account. 
The best interests of the child has been referred to in the practice of the 
Supreme Court;656 nevertheless, it has not been sufficiently interpreted nor has 
                                                 
650  Ruling of Harju County Court in case No. 2-12-17667 (October 9, 2012). See also Kerly 
Espenberg et al., Vanema hooldusõiguse määramise uuring lõppraport, Võrguteavik, (Tartu: 
Tartu Ülikooli sotsiaalteaduslike rakendusuuringute keskus RAKE, 2013). 
651  Ruling of Tartu County Court in Case No. 2-12-27663 (December 21, 2012). 
652  Decision of Harju County Court in case No. 2-11-14383 (March 9, 2011). 
653  Application Kiisa v. Estonia, App. No. 16587/10, 34304/11 (Eur. Ct. H.R., March 13, 
2014) para. 64. The ECtHR considered that the civil proceedings in the alimony case were too 
lengthy taking into account also the fact that the subject matter required specific diligence. 
654  Vronchenko v. Estonia, App. No. 59632/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
655  Karu et al., Lapse õiguste ja vanemluse monitooring. Laste ja täiskasvanute küsitluse 
kokkuvõte, 17–24. 
656  The Supreme Court referred to the interests of the child as a guiding procedural 
principle. CCSCr No. 3-2-1-91-14, (5 November 2014), para. 16. The court has pointed out 
that co-operation between the parents is in the interests of the child and, thus, it is the role of 
the courts to do the utmost that the parents agree in custody (guardianship) matters. CCSCr 
No. 3-2-1-113-14, (5 November 2014), para. 25. 
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its substance within the Estonian legal system been analysed by the Court.657 
The lower courts are using the concept in some of their practice as a guiding 
principle; research shows that this analysis of the court is often not clearly 
substantiated and seems to depend on the awareness of particular judges.658  
In general, the principle of the best interests of the child is present in 
Estonian legislation, both in the material and the procedural laws. It is, however, 
an undefined legal concept that is incorrectly transposed in the legislation, and 
the courts apply it formally and seldom motivate its application substantively. 
 
2.3.1 Placement into care 
Separation of a child from the family is at the legislative level clearly dependent 
on the best interests of the child – it should be that the best living environment 
for the child is the family. Art. 25 of the Social Welfare Act (hereinafter 
SWA)659 regulates the separation of a child from the family and requires that the 
separation should be “in the interest” of the child. 
Separation of a child from their family and deprivation of custody over a 
person in full is additionally governed by the Family Law Act. Article 135 of 
the FLA sets conditions for the separation of a child from the family and 
deprivation of full custody. A court may separate a child from the parents only 
if damage to the interests of the child cannot be prevented by other supporting 
measures applied in the relationship between the parents and the child.660 The 
decision to remove a child from the family has to be taken by the court – a court 
may deprive a parent of the right of custody of a person in full only if other 
measures have not yielded any results or if there is reason to presume that 
application of the measures is not sufficient to prevent danger (FLA art. 134 et 
seq); the rural municipality or city government is included in the proceedings as 
legal guardian (art. 135 (3) of the FLA). If leaving a child in their family 
endangers the health or life of the child, a rural municipal government or city 
government may separate the child from the family before a court ruling is 
made. In such cases, the rural municipal government or city government should 
                                                 
657  The Supreme Court en banc had the oportunity to discuss the best interest of a child in 
connection to enforcement of custody decisions. It mentioned the complexity of the situation, 
but failed to discuss the substance of the rights of the child. SC en banc, case No. 3-2-1-4-13. 
658  This has also been confirmed by the research on custody disputes by Espenberg et al., 
Vanema hooldusõiguse määramise uuring. Lõppraport. 87–88. There are also some positive 
examples. See e.g., decision of Tallinn Circuit Court in case No. 3-13-1412/127 (12 
September 2014). 
659  Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus (Social Welfare Act), RT I, 13.12.2014, 44. 
660  Art 134 (3) of the Perekonnaseadus (Family Law Act), RT I, 29.06.2014, 105. FLA sees 
the following measures as possible alternatives: making decisions arising from the right of 
custody in lieu of a parent, issue of warnings and precepts, imposition of prohibitions, and 
requiring the parents to observe the instructions of an agency specified by the court. See e.g., 
the argumentation of the Supreme Court in case CCSCr No. 3-2-1-132-11, (20 December 
2011). 
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promptly apply to a court to restrict parental rights with respect to the child (art. 
135 (4) of the FLA). 
Removal of a child includes procedural safeguards which ensure that 
children are removed from their families only in exceptional circumstances.661 
The best interests of the child further requires that national law provides the 
possibility to lodge an appeal against a decision to restrict parental rights, to 
take a child into public care or to restrict the right of access to the child’s closest 
family.662 The best interests of the child has also been stressed by the Supreme 
Court in a number of custody cases. As an example, the Supreme Court has 
stressed that when it receives information about a child in need, it has to start 
proceedings on its own initiative.663 
According to observations by the EComSR, despite the doubling of funding 
allocated to foster care, the numbers of children in social welfare institutions 
(substitute homes) have not improved: there are still more children in 
institutions (1,261 in 2010) than in foster families (523).664 Statistics shows that 
in the years 2010–2011 approximately 450 children were annually separated 
from their families. Out of these children approximately 1/3 were placed into a 
substitute home, 1/3 were placed into substitute care, and 1/5 were returned to 
their families; 665  in 2012 there were 309 children who were placed into 
substitutive care (410 children were separated from their families). Statistics 
also show that the number of children returning to their families from public 
care is low.666 Thus, placement into care in the Estonian context generally means 
placing a child in some institution. This practice, in general, is not in the best 
interests of a child as living in a family environment is in their best interests. 
The EComSR has stated that any restriction or limitation on parents’ 
custodial rights should be based on criteria laid down in legislation, and should 
not go beyond what is necessary for the protection and best interests of the child 
and the rehabilitation of the family. The Committee has held that it should only 
be possible to take a child into custody in order to be placed outside their home 
if such a measure is based on adequate and reasonable criteria laid down in 
                                                 
661  New CPA includes more detailed regulation concerning a child in need of assistance 
and child in danger and relevant evaluation criterion. Lastekaitseseadus (Child Protection 
Act) (new), RT I, 06.12.2014, 1 (2016), e.g., arts 30–33. 
662  See also the argumentation of the Supreme Court in case CCSCr No. 3-2-1-98-11, (23 
November 2011). 
663  See e.g., CCSCr No. 3-2-1-35-12, (4 April 2012); and CCSCr No. 3-2-1-132-11, (20 
December 2011). 
664  EComSR, “Conclusions 2011: Estonia,” January 2012, 20. 
665  See the statistics in CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Second, Third and Fourth 
Report of Estonia.” annex, table 10, p. 126. 
666  Vabariigi Valitsus, “Lastekaitseseaduse eelnõu seletuskiri,” December 27, 2013, 3. In 
2011 the percentage of children who left public care and returned to their biological families 
was 12%, while in 2012 the percentage was 16%. 
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legislation.667 These requirements are met in the case of Estonia, as there are 
both substantive limits enlisted in the FLA arts 134–135; as discussed above, 
there are also procedural safeguards available in CCP. 
As such a vast number of children are living in institutions, the best interests 
of the child also has relevance for evaluating the living conditions in these 
institutions as well as all the protective measures granted for children living in 
institutions. In its observations, the EComSR was critical of the way that public 
care institutions were supervised, including the methodology of these visits and 
child participation.668 The same problem was pointed out by the Chancellor of 
Justice in its overview of 2012: 
State supervision over the quality of the substitute home service is performed by 
county governors. However, the quality of their work is rather uneven. For 
example, county governors have interpreted differently the legally prescribed 
requirements for the substitute home service... which leads to a different 
application of the law in substitute homes in different counties. Shortcomings 
could also be observed in the preliminary and follow-up supervision performed 
by county governors.669 
In Estonia, the functions of the independent supervisory institution on the rights 
of children (i.e., Ombudsman for Children) has been performed by the 
Chancellor of Justice since 19 March 2011.670 He noted, in particular, that: 
The state has made considerable investments for creating the necessary living 
conditions for children... Children and young people are mostly satisfied with 
their life in substitute homes and the main daily needs of children are generally 
met. Nevertheless, on several occasions the Chancellor found recurring and 
systematic shortcomings in terms of the guarantee of the fundamental rights of 
children... The main problems relate to the creation of family-like conditions for 
children in substitute homes.671 
He found that as the best growing environment for the child is the family, 
substitute care should be organized, if possible, in family-like conditions in 
public care. This is even more important as more children are living in 
institutions in comparison with foster children in guardianship families.672 
Thus, Estonian legislation relating to placement into care includes the 
requirement of the best interests of the child. Similarly, court practice 
                                                 
667  EComSR, “Conclusions XV-2, Statement of Interpretation: General Observation 
Regarding Article 17”, p. 29. 
668  EComSR, “Conclusions 2011: Estonia,” 20. 
669  Chancellor of Justice as Ombudsman for Children, “2012 Overview of the Chancellor of 
Justice Activities,” 2013, 22–23. 
670  See the Õiguskantsleri seadus (Chancellor of Justice Act), RT I, 03.07.2013, 10, 
art. 1 (8). 
671  Chancellor of Justice as Ombudsman for Children, “2012 Overview of the Chancellor of 
Justice Activities,” 20. 
672  Ibid., 20–21. 
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occasionally analyses the best interests of the child; however, systematic and 
substantive implementation of the best interests principle is still problematic. 
 
2.3.2 Family reunification 
As discussed above, if a child is separated due to a limitation on a parent’s 
custodial rights, the opinions and wishes of the child will be heard and annexed 
to the documentation concerning the separation. The opinions of the child will 
be heard and documented by the social services department. A child separated 
from one or both parents has the right to maintain personal relations and contact 
with both parents and close relatives, except if such relations harm the child.673 
The Supreme Court has stressed that cases concerning custody and/or family 
unification issues are of such importance that the courts have to decide if the 
best interests of the child requires starting civil proceedings even when there is 
no such basis in civil procedure law.674 
A child whose parents reside in different states has the right to direct contact 
and personal relations with both parents. For the purpose of family reunification, 
the child or their parents have the right freely to leave the state or enter Estonia 
pursuant to the established procedure.675 
A parent living apart from a child has the right of access to the child. A 
parent with whom a child resides may not hinder the other parent’s access to the 
child. Recent changes in the Code of Civil Procedure stress the need to try, as 
early as possible and at each stage of the proceedings, to direct the participants 
towards settling the matter by agreement. The court should hear the participants 
as early as possible and draw their attention to the possibility to seek the 
assistance of a family counsellor and, above all, for forming a common position 
on taking care of and assuming responsibility for the child.676 Since July 2014, 
the FLA also emphasises that it is possible to restore a parent’s custody if the 
restoration of the parent’s right of custody corresponds to the interests of the 
child (art. 1231 of the FLA). This regulation might, in principle, violate the 
rights of the parents; however, within the framework of the current research, 
this regulation fulfils the best interests of the child criteria. 
The Social Welfare Act regulates the substitute home service provided for 
children. 677  Article 25 (3) of the Act requires that sisters and brothers 
originating from one family are kept together upon separation from their home 
                                                 
673  Lastekaitse seadus (Child Protection Act), RT I, 13.12.2013, 12, arts 27–28. The 
Supreme Court has e.g., decides that removal of a child from a foster home could violate the 
best interests of the child. CCSCr No. 3-2-1-132-11, (20 December 2011), para. 19. 
674  Ibid., paras 16–19. 
675  Lastekaitse seadus (Child Protection Act), 30. 
676  Tsiviilkohtumenetluse seadustik (Code of Civil Procedure), RT I 2005, 26, 197 (2006), 
art. 561. 
677  Chapter 3 division 10 of the Sotsiaalhoolekande seadus (Social Welfare Act), RT I, 
13.12.2014, 44. 
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and family unless this is contrary to the interests of the children. A child who is 
separated from their home and family has the right to receive information about 
their origin, the reasons for separation, and issues pertaining to their future and 
if a circumstance that initiated the separation ceases to exist, the child should be 
assisted in returning to their home and family. It is the obligation of the 
guardianship authority to provide assistance to a family from whom a child has 
been taken in order to help establish the prerequisite conditions for the child to 
return to the family. 
According to the Imprisonment Act678 the aim of communication with a 
prisoner is to promote contacts with their family, relatives and other close 
people and to avoid disruption of the social contacts of the prisoner (art. 23 of 
the VangS). A detainee has the right to meetings with family members, relatives 
and close people (art. 25 on long-term visits and art. 32 on prison leave) and the 
right of correspondence and telephone calls under the control of the 
administration. A mother detained in a female prison and a child up to three 
years of age are given the possibility to live together; it has to be ensured that 
the ties of a mother with a child over three years of age are sustained unless this 
disturbs the normal raising of the child or has a negative influence on the 
child.679  No statistics is available on to what extent these requirements are 
fulfilled in reality. The need to protect family life even in prison has also been 
stressed by the Supreme Court,680 which found that disruption of a long-term 
visit of a child is an intense violation of rights of the detainee as well as those of 
the child. 
A second area of concern is unification of families either in Estonia or 
abroad. According to art. 115 of the Aliens Act681 the following persons are not 
subject to the immigration quota: the spouse of an Estonian citizen and of an 
alien who resides in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit to whom a 
residence permit is issued to settle with the spouse; a minor and adult child, 
parent and grandparent and a ward of an Estonian citizen and of an alien who 
resides in Estonia on the basis of a residence permit to whom a residence permit 
is issued to settle with a close relative. As a general rule, according to the Aliens 
Act, a temporary residence permit may be issued to an alien for the purpose of 
settling with their spouse, if the latter is of Estonian nationality and resides in 
Estonia permanently or an alien who has resided in Estonia for at least two 
years and the spouses share close economic ties and a psychological relation-
ship, the family is stable and the marriage is not one of convenience. A number 
of additional conditions must be met in order for the reunification of spouses or 
close relatives to take place: the sponsor must have a permanent legal income or 
                                                 
678  Vangistusseadus (Imprisonment Act), RT I, 19.03.2015, 31. 
679  Ibid., art. 54. Current legislation stresses the importance of maintaining family ties 
between mothers and children; this approach is questionable as the CRC gives importance to 
the relations of a child with both parents (art. 9 (3) of the CRC). 
680  See e.g., ALCSCr No. 3-3-1-11-12, (16 May 2012), paras 14–17. 
681  Välismaalaste seadus (Aliens Act), RT I, 23.03.2015, 7. 
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the joint permanent legal income of the two spouses must ensure that the family 
is maintained in Estonia; the family member must have insurance coverage 
guaranteeing any costs related to medical treatment as a result of illness or 
injury during the period of validity of the residence permit; and the family must 
have a registered residence and an actual dwelling in Estonia. 
Following transposition of the EU Directive 2003/86/EC682 the Aliens Act 
requires a residence permit for at least two years for those migrant workers who 
are not citizens of member states of the European Union or citizens of the 
European Economic Area (art. 137 of the Aliens Act).683 With respect to the 
directive, it should be noted that it is more favourable than the European Social 
Charter (revised) (cf. art. 3 (4) ESC(rev)) and that it does not affect the 
possibility for the member states to adopt or maintain more favourable 
provisions (cf. art. 3 (5) of the ESC(rev)). 
With this in mind, the EComSR has stated that “States may require a certain 
length of residence of migrant workers before their family can join them. A 
period of a year is acceptable under the Charter”. 684  In this respect, the 
EComSR concluded in 2011 that Estonia’s two-year residence requirement is 
excessive, and therefore it is not in conformity with the ESC (revised). 685 
Moreover, the EComSR has noted on the sufficient income requirement that 
“[t]he level of means required by States to bring in the family or certain family 
members should not be so restrictive as to prevent any family reunion”.686 The 
EComSR has also analysed the requirement of sufficient housing and found that 
it should not be so restrictive as to prevent any family reunion.”687 
On 4 June 2012 the ECtHR made an admissibility decision in the case of 
M.R. and L.R. v. Estonia688 where the applicants were a mother and her daughter, 
whose father was seeking her return to Italy under the Hague Convention of 25 
October 1980. The applicants had not returned to Italy after a trip to Estonia. 
The ECtHR had requested the Estonian Government, under Rule 39 (interim 
measures) of its Rules of Court, not to return the child while the proceedings 
were pending before it. In view of the urgency, the Court examined the case in 
less than three months. The Court declared the application inadmissible and 
                                                 
682  Council Directive on the right to family reunification, 2003/86/EC OJ L 251, 
03/10/2003 P. 0012 – 0018 (2003). 
683  A recent study on the possibilities of misusing this right has been conducted by 
Veronika Kaska and Sisekaitseakadeemia, Perekonna taasühinemise õiguse kuritarvitamine: 
fiktiivabielud ja põlvnemise kohta valeandmete esitamine Euroopa Liidus ja Eestis – misuse 
of the right to family reunification: marriages of convenience and false declarations of 
parenthood in the European Union, Euroopa rändevõrgustik (The European migration 
network) 2012, 7 (Tallinn: Sisekaitseakadeemia, 2012). 
684  EComSR, “Conclusions 2011: General Introduction”, interpretation of art. 19 (6), para. 9. 
685  EComSR, “Conclusions 2011: Estonia,” 26. 
686  European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions XIII-1, Netherlands 
687  European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions IV, Norway 
688  M.R. and L.R. v. Estonia (admissibility), App. No. 13420/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R.). Appli-
cation No. 13420/12. 
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found that the Estonian authorities, in rejecting the mother’s arguments to the 
effect that she was unable to return to Italy, had not overstepped their margin of 
appreciation. Nor was there anything to suggest that their decision to order the 
child’s return had been arbitrary or that the authorities had failed in their 
obligation to strike a fair balance between the competing interests at stake. 
Concluding from the above, Estonia has the necessary legislation more or 
less in place. There is still a lack of substantive and clear practice where the 
meaning and requirements of the best interests of the child are analysed. It has 
been recommended even more generally that the Estonian Family Law Act, as 
well as procedural guarantees relating to family law matters, need updating.689 
Current research confirms this need. It would be very interesting to see whether 
the CRC Committee would also bring out the discrepancy of the Estonian 
wording. 
 
2.4 Best interests in the Russian legal system 
The principle of the best interests of the child and the obligation to take into 
consideration the interests of the child in all issues involving children has been, to 
certain extent, legislated in central Russian legal acts such as the Fundamentals of 
Health-Care Legislation,690 the Education Act,691 the Federal Act on Guardianship 
and Custody692 and the Federal Act on Basic Guarantees of Children’s Rights.693 
These acts, however, do not refer to the “best interests of the child” but to the 
“legitimate interest of a child” (“законных интересов ребенка”).  Limiting the 
best interests of the child to ‘legitimate interests’ reveals the unwillingness of 
Russia to allow a full scale of interests to be considered. 
In its Concluding Observations from 2014, the CRC Committee noted with 
concern that the legislation implements the principle of the best interests of the 
child incorrectly and refers to the “legitimate interests of the child” which is not 
equivalent to “the best interests of the child” in scope.694 Similar concerns were 
raised by the alternative report from the NGOs, in which they agreed that the 
legal acts of Russia included necessary protective measures; on the other hand, 
                                                 
689  Triin Göttig and Triin Uusen-Nacke, “Vanema õigused ja kohustused lapse suhtes,” in 
Kohtute aastaraamat 2013 (Eesti Vabariigi Riigikohus, 2014), 55–61. 
690  Federal’nyy zakon “Ob osnovakh okhrany zdorov’ya grazhdan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii” 
(Fundamentals of Health-Care), N 323-FZ (2011). This law does not protect the best 
interests of the child in particular but requires the parties to take into consideration the best 
interest of the patient. 
691  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii “Ob obrazovanii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii” 
(Education Act), N 273-FZ (2012). 
692  Federal’nyy zakon “Ob opeke i popechitel’stve” (Federal Act on Guardianship), N 48-
FZ (2014). 
693  Federal’nyy zakon ob osnovnykh garantiyakh prav rebenka, N124-FZ, (Federal Act on 
Basic Guarantees of Children’s Rights), N124-FZ (1998). 
694  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Russian Federation (combined Fourth and 
Fifth Report),” para. 26. 
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it was observed that implementation practice was lacking, nor were there any 
legal mechanisms to enforce this principle: 
The terminology such as the “best interests of the child” or “child develop-
mental needs” are not legally defined in Russian laws. The Child protection state 
entities (tutorship and guardianship bodies) assess primary children’s needs as 
general physical safety, and do not assess emotional and psychological needs 
such as attachments or contact and do not take these into account in making 
their decisions.695 
Implementation of the principle is merely formal and concentrates on the 
physical well-being of the child – the CRC Committee has noted that the State 
entities for child protection (tutorship and guardianship bodies) assess only the 
general physical safety of children and do not assess their emotional and 
psychological needs.696 Whether this issue is redressed by the Federal law on 
the Foundations of Social Services697 remains to be seen. The NGO alternative 
report was quite optimistic on the matter as the non-governmental sector had 
been involved in its drafting process: 
This Draft-Law hopefully will resolve the /.../ problems of the Russian social 
system. In particular it regulates provision of social services at the place of 
living (it is specially stated that social services to families with disabled children 
are free of charge) according to individual programs and in the form of case-
management, and it incorporates the mechanisms of competition of different 
providers (including NGOs) of social services who realize the individual 
programs. Also mechanisms are supposed for independent monitoring and 
assessment of the quality of services the result of which will be taken into 
account in decision making on the choice of provider of services – which 
hopefully will stimulate the increase of quality and better work of the whole 
social system.698 
The best interests of the child should be included in all laws, decisions and 
policies relating to children. The court practice of the highest courts shows that 
the principle is applied infrequently and randomly; however, on a positive note, 
during the last two years, the number of such references has increased 
substantially. Nevertheless, the available case-law has not fully discussed the 
                                                 
695  Coalition of Russian NGOs, “Russian NGOs’ ‘Alternative Report – 2013’, Comments 
to the ‘Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of the Russian Federation on the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,’” 9–10. 
696  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Russian Federation (combined Fourth and 
Fifth Report),” para. 26. 
697  Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii ot 28 dekabrya 2013 g. N 442-FZ, “Ob 
osnovakh sotsial’nogo obsluzhivaniya grazhdan v Rossiyskoy Federatsii” (Federal law on 
the Foundations of Social Services), No. 442-FZ (2013). 
698  Coalition of Russian NGOs, “Russian NGOs’ ‘Alternative Report – 2013’, Comments 
to the ‘Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of the Russian Federation on the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,’” 10. 
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substance of the principle.699 Cases of the Supreme Court have discussed, for 
example, parental rights and the interest of a child in having access to both 
parents;700 limiting custodial rights of the parents;701 place of residence of a 
child; and subsistence.702 
One of the issues discussed during oral sessions of the constructive dialogue 
concerned the application of the best interests of the child in the “National 
Strategy of Actions in the Interest of Children 2012–2017”.703 This strategy was 
opposed by the national traditional values movement as being dangerous for the 
preservation of the family. The CRC Committee noted with concern in its 
Concluding Observations that the ongoing “anti-juvenile” campaign reportedly 
prioritizes the interests of parents over the interests of their children.704 The same 
was noted by the alternative report.705 President Putin stated in his speech to the 
Congress of Russian Parents that he understood the need to be conservative in 
family matters and take further account of “Russian family traditions”.706 
Social services for children are provided at social services institutions for 
families and children. Statistics shows growth in institutional support for 
children’s rights – there are more people providing different services to children 
                                                 
699  As an example, the Supreme Court has referred to the best interests of the child in 
connection with the curfew for children in the Decision of the Supreme Court from 2 
November 2011. Opredeleniye Verkhovnogo Suda RF O chastichnoy otmene resheniya 
Arkhangel’skogo oblastnogo suda ot 25.08.2011 i chastichnom udovletvorenii zayavleniya o 
priznanii nedeystvuyushchimi otdel’nykh polozheniy Zakona Arkhangel’skoy oblasti ot 
15.12.2009 N 113-9-OZ “Ob otdel’nykh merakh po zashchite nravstvennosti i zdorov’ya 
detey v Arkhangel’skoy oblasti” i Zakona Arkhangel’skoy oblasti ot 03.06.2003 N 172-22-
OZ “Ob administrativnykh pravonarusheniyakh”, (2011) N 1-G11-26. 
700  Opredeleniye Verkhovnogo Suda RF ot 28.10.2014, (2014) N 57-KG14-7; Opre-
deleniye Verkhovnogo Suda RF ot 29.10.2013, (2013) N 49-KG13-7. 
701  Opredeleniye Konstitutsionnogo Suda RF “Ob otkaze v prinyatii k rassmotreniyu 
zhaloby grazhdanki Sobolevoy Niny Aleksandrovny na narusheniye konstitutsionnykh prav 
yeye nesovershennoletnego syna Zaytseva Nikity Dmitriyevicha punktami 1 i 5 stat’i 429 i 
punktom 4 stat’i 445 Grazhdanskogo kodeksa Rossiyskoy Federatsii”. [2010] Case no N 
945-O-O (July 15, 2010). 
702  Opredeleniye Verkhovnogo Suda RF ot 01.10.2013, (2013) N 2-КГ13-3; Opredeleniye 
Verkhovnogo Suda RF ot 17.09.2013, (2013) N 18-KG13-85. 
703  President Putin approved this plan on 1 June 2012 by presidential decree No. 761. Ukaz 
Prezidenta RF N 761 “O Natsional’noy strategii deystviy v interesakh detey na 2012–2017 gody” 
(2012). Meetings of the Coordinating Council on the implementation of the National Strategy for 
Action for Children, available online: http://state.kremlin.ru/council/36/, (accessed June 1, 2015). 
704  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Report of the 
Russian Federation,” para. 26 (a). 
705  Coalition of Russian NGOs, “Russian NGOs’ ‘Alternative Report – 2013’, Comments to 
the ‘Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of the Russian Federation on the Imple-
mentation of the Provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,’” 13–14, 18, 24. 
706  President of the Russian Federation speaks at the Congress held in Moscow by Russian 
parents. Prezident Rossii, “Vladimir Putin Vystupil Na Prokhodyashchem v Moskve 
S"yezde Roditeley Rossii” (September 2, 2013),  
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17469 (accessed May 24, 2015). 
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as well as supporting or protecting their rights.707 These social services should, in 
accordance with art. 6 of the Federal Act on the Foundations of Social Services, 
be provided on the basis of common state standards. However, practice 
throughout the country is still diverse. According to the state report, national 
standards fix, e.g., the main types of social services for families and children, their 
quality, terms and definitions, classification of social service facilities, types of 
social service institutions available, and monitoring the quality of such services.708 
The NGOs alternative report did not see development of the social services 
system in the context of the best interests of the child as positive and found 
three central flaws to the social services system:709 
1. Social work is not organized by way of planned and targeted case manage-
ment and is not directed to providing services at the residence of citizens and 
families (i.e., at home). As a rule, a difficult life situation of the family is 
resolved as a rule by taking a child from the home to shelters and social 
institutions for the disabled, and boarding schools, or to substitute families. 
2. Social work is monopolized by state departments and their centres.710 
3. There are no federal minimal standards of social services and their quality. 
The disparity between regions is vast, and accordingly, the Federal Act of 
                                                 
707  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Report of the 
Russian Federation,” para. 183. 
708  Ibid., para. 184 et seq. 
709  Coalition of Russian NGOs, “Russian NGOs’ ‘Alternative Report – 2013’, Comments 
to the ‘Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of the Russian Federation on the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,’” 10. Similar 
observations have been made in the critical social media. See e.g. Sandra Dillon, “Russia 
and the Child’s Best Interests,” Children’s Rights and Social Orphans, June 28, 2010, 
http://allthesocialorphans.wordpress.com/2010/06/28/russia-and-the-childs-best-interests/ 
(accessed March 17, 2014). 
710  Coalition of Russian NGOs, “Russian NGOs’ ‘Alternative Report – 2013’, Comments 
to the ‘Consolidated Fourth and Fifth Periodic Report of the Russian Federation on the 
Implementation of the Provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child,’” 7–8. 
According to the report, de-institutionalization had a big drawback in 2008 when the Federal 
Act no 48 on Tutorship and Guardianship was adopted on 24 April 2008. Use of “patronat 
family care” supported the individual needs of children and families. As a result, practically 
all inmates of institutions, including children with disabilities, HIV/AIDS infected children, 
teenagers etc. were placed with well trained and supported foster families and thus, almost 
95% of all children were brought up in new families or re-turned home. After adoption of the 
2008 law, this system was abolished and as a result all such centers have been closed down 
or become ordinary orphanages again. Furthermore, in 2012 the ‘Dima Yakovlev Act’ was 
adopted which put a ban on US adoption from Russia. Federal’nyy zakon “O merakh 
vozdeystviya na lits, prichastnykh k narusheniyam osnovopolagayushchikh prav i svobod 
cheloveka, prav i svobod grazhdan Rossiyskoy Federatsii” (Federal Law on measures 
against persons involved in violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms, rights and 
freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation), N 272-FZ (2012). 
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August 2004711 made it impossible to establish federal standards and rules in 
providing social services. 
 
A similar observation was made by the CRC Committee, which noted that the 
obligation to take into consideration the interests of the child in all initiatives 
involving children has been set out in its legislation. However, the Committee 
was concerned that “The child protection state entities (Tutorship and 
Guardianship bodies) assess only the general physical safety of children and do 
not assess their emotional and psychological needs”.712 
Concluding from the above, most legal acts dealing with the rights of the 
child do include the specific version of the best interests of the child principle 
whereby all decisions have to take into consideration the “legitimate interests of 
the child”. As noted by the CRC Committee, this is not in full conformity with 
the wording of the CRC. There are further substantive deficiencies in the 
implementation of the best interests of the child principle – the CRC Committee 
recommended further that Russia should strengthen its efforts to ensure that the 
best interests of the child is appropriately integrated and consistently applied in 
all legislative, administrative and judicial proceedings and in all policies, 
programmes and projects relevant to and with an impact on children; to develop 
procedures and criteria to provide guidance to all relevant persons in authority 
for determining the best interests of the child in every area and for giving them 
due weight as a primary consideration. Such procedures and criteria should be 
disseminated to the public, including religious leaders, courts of law, 
administrative authorities and legislative bodies.713 
 
2.4.1 Placement into care 
As discussed above, under Russian legislation, parents have the primary 
responsibility for the upbringing and development of their children. They have 
equal rights and obligations vis-à-vis their children, and they must provide for 
their under-aged children and look after their health and physical, intellectual, 
psychological, spiritual and moral development. These obligations are enforced 
through administrative sanctions, and it is unclear whether the best interest of a 
child is a primary consideration in these decisions. 
                                                 
711  Federal’nyy zakon “O vnesenii izmeneniy v zakonodatel’nyye akty Rossiyskoy Federatsii 
i priznanii utrativshimi silu nekotorykh zakonodatel’nykh aktov Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
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122-FZ (2004). 
712  CRC Committee, “Concluding Observations: Russian Federation (combined Fourth and 
Fifth Report),” para. 26. 
713  Ibid., 27. 
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In accordance with art. 535 of the Code of Administrative Offences,714 a 
warning may be issued or an administrative fine imposed on parents or other 
legal representatives of minors for non-fulfilment or improper fulfilment of 
their responsibility for providing for, bringing up, educating and protecting the 
rights and interests of minors. Furthermore, pursuant to art. 69 of the Family 
Code,715 a parent or parents may be deprived of parental rights for evasion of 
parental responsibilities. These grounds include e.g. wilful refusal to make 
maintenance payments, refusal to remove a child from a maternity clinic or 
ward or other medical centre, educational establishment, social protection 
institution or other similar facility, abuse of parental rights, cruel treatment 
(including physical or psychological violence) and offences against a child’s 
sexual inviolability. A parent or parents may also be deprived of their parental 
rights if they are chronic alcoholics or drug addicts or if they have made a 
premeditated attack on the life or health of their children or spouse. These 
provisions were tested in the Constitutional Court in a case where the parental 
rights of a mother were limited due to non-attendance at school.716 
Article 69 of the Family Code allows a court, in the interests of the child, order 
a child’s removal from the parent or parents without depriving them of or 
restricting their parental authority. Such a measure is usually taken in cases which 
it is dangerous for a child to remain with the parents for reasons beyond their 
control (such as a psychological disorder or chronic illness, a concurrence of 
difficult circumstances) and also if there are insufficient grounds for deprivation 
of parental rights. If the parent or parents do not alter their behaviour, the 
tutorship and guardianship authorities are required, on the expiry of a six-month 
period from the day of issuance of a court order restricting the parents’ rights, to 
initiate proceedings for deprivation of these rights. In the interests of the child, 
they may initiate proceedings for deprivation of parental rights on the expiry of 
that period. Thus, parental rights can be limited as a kind of punishment. 
The state report on the application of the CRC shows that limitation of 
parental rights is large scale. According to the report, “compared to 2003, the 
number of petitions approved for deprivation of parental rights rose by 19.5 
percent and totalled 63,100 cases (50,800 cases in 2003). The number of such 
cases has been declining since 2007.”717 From 2007 to 2009 the number of 
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foster families rose from 22,200 to 40,500, and the number of children deprived 
of parental care who have been placed in such families grew from 38,600 to 
68,000.718 The alternative report of the NGOs to the CRC Committee paints 
another picture and states: 
From the total huge numbers of institutionalized children only 25% are children 
officially acknowledged as orphans (80% from this 25% are social orphans with 
their parents alive but deprived of their parental rights by the Courts). 75% of 
inmates of Russian children’s institutions are so called “parental inmates” given 
by their parents under care of the State “temporarily”, as is permitted by article 
155-1 of the Family Code of the Russian Federation. Most of this 75% are so 
called “children with limited possibilities of health” (or children with special 
needs and disabilities); however plenty of children are voluntarily given by their 
parents to State institutions because of poverty, impossible living conditions, or 
by socially vulnerable parents (alcoholics etc.) who were ‘advised’ by the 
authorities to write their Request on temporary placement of a child under care 
of the State and who are asked to revise this Request annually.719 
Questions concerning periodic review of placement and all other aspects of 
guardianship have been regulated since 2008 by the Federal Act on Tutorship 
and Guardianship720 . This law underwent significant changes in 2013. Ms. 
Winter noted during oral session No. 1863 of the CRC Committee that, “A new 
law on tutorship and guardianship make it harder to move children from 
institutions to alternative forms of care.”721 This view was also emphasised by 
the alternative report, “background of popularity of this [“Anti-juvenile”] 
campaign lies in the wider population’s fear of losing their children since they 
see the everyday destruction of families under pretext of protection of children’s 
rights by the tutorship and guardianship bodies and by subsequent deprivation 
of parental rights by Court Decisions.”722 
The CRC Committee noted in relation to that issue: “the State entities for 
child protection (tutorship and guardianship bodies) assess only the general 
physical safety of children and do not assess their emotional and psychological 
needs”. 723  This assessment was not as strong as reform proposal by the 
Coalition of NGOs, in whose estimation development of social orphanhood 
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prevents work directed at the preservation of the biological family. Preservation 
of families requires a priority radical reform of the tutorship and guardianship 
bodies which currently work as mere executors of the decisions without their 
own discretionary powers. 724  Instead, the CRC Committee opted to give a 
general recommendation for improvement of administrative bodies. 
The alternative report drew attention to the fact that child protection bodies do 
not have a duty to fulfil ‘periodic reviews of placements’ which means that they 
are responsible only for formal control over these placements. In fact, such 
control is indeed quite formal and covers assessments only of some general things 
such as actual accommodation, food and sanitary conditions. The most dramatic 
is the absence of any reviews of placement of children with institutions.725 
The best interests of a child would need regular review and family unification 
should also be considered due to the fact that the conditions in the institutions are 
questionable at best. According to the alternative report, existing tools for 
supervision of observation of rights of inmates of children’s institutions are 
insufficient. As an example, in February 2013 the Investigation Committee of the 
Russian Federation revealed that in one orphanage in Siberia the older inmates 
raped the younger ones regardless of gender, and this system of active hetero- and 
homosexual abuse existed over 10 years.726 Similar problems were observed by 
the CRC Committee, though in more diplomatic terms: 
The placement of children in institutions is not reviewed regularly. The child 
protection (guardianship) bodies are responsible only for formal monitoring of 
such placements, merely assessing accommodation, food and sanitary conditions; 
/…/ Children in care institutions are subjected to abuse, including sexual abuse, 
and no assistance is given to the child victims of that abuse; Children in care 
institutions who misbehave are often punished with psychiatric hospitalization 
and treatment.727 
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The reunification of families is also lacking; rather, the trend is towards the 
separation of families. Some groups have been especially targeted, such as 
Roma. The CRC Committee noted: 
The Committee is seriously concerned about the widespread practice of children 
being forcibly separated from their parents in the application of articles 69 and 
73 of the Family Code, and the lack of support and assistance to reunite families. 
The Committee is also concerned that Roma mothers are often separated from 
their children immediately upon discharge from the hospital after birth because 
they lack the necessary documentation and that the children are returned only 
for a large sum of money that most Roma cannot afford. Furthermore, the 
Committee is concerned that children who are forcibly separated from their 
parents are then placed in care institutions and/or put up for adoption.728 
Adoption would be a measure that would remedy some of the above-mentioned 
problems. Recent developments in Russia seem also to hinder this process. 
Under the Family Code, adoption is considered a priority form of placement for 
children who have remained without parental care (art. 123 et seq). According 
to the state report, a considerable number of children with disabilities have been 
adopted by Russian families. However, the number of children with disabilities 
adopted is nevertheless insufficient, owing to the persistent stigmatization of 
these children in society. Furthermore, the requirement that a child should be 
refused by at least five Russian families before an intercountry adoption can be 
considered reduces the possibility of such an adoption for children with 
disabilities. The Dima Yakovlev Federal Act729 of 28 December 2012, which 
bans adoptions from the Russian Federation to the United States of America, 
has eliminated the prospect of adoption for a considerable number of children, 
in particular children with disabilities in care institutions. 
Concluding from the above, Russian legislation and practice do not guarantee 
the best interests of the child in placement into care. This is an area where 
cultural arguments, though not explicitly stated, seem to have a great influence 
on the matter. During the Soviet era, there was no trust in the capabilities of the 
family. The same can be observed now – placement in institutions is seen as a 
suitable move for orphaned or misbehaving children. There is no attempt to 
substantially decrease the number of children in institutions even if a number of 




                                                 
728  Ibid., para. 41. 
729 Federal’nyy zakon “O merakh vozdeystviya na lits, prichastnykh k narusheniyam 
osnovopolagayushchikh prav i svobod cheloveka, prav i svobod grazhdan Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii” (Federal Law on measures against persons involved in violations of fundamental 
human rights and freedoms, rights and freedoms of citizens of the Russian Federation), 
N 272-FZ (2012). 
166 
2.4.2 Family reunification 
Departure from and entry to the Russian Federation by Russian citizens, 
including minors, is regulated by Federal Act No. 114 of 15 August 1996 
(amended 12.12.2013) on the Procedure for Departure from and Entry to the 
Russian Federation730. There is also more detailed co-operation between the 
Russian Federation and CIS countries concerning the return of minors to their 
country of permanent residence, signed in Chisinau on 7 October 2002731 . 
According to the report, in 2009 the social protection authorities of the 
constituent entities returned 125 minors to their permanent place of residence 
after establishing their identity. Sufficient information is unavailable as to the 
true statistics on this issue.732 
The Constitutional Court has pointed to the need to take account of 
arts 9 and 10 of the CRC, according to which statements by children or their 
parents to request entry to a state party to the Convention for the purpose of 
family reunification are to be considered as positive, humane and expeditious;733 
as well as addressing the need for deportation of a foreign citizen or their 
temporary residence in the Russian Federation in case of HIV infection.734 
Concluding from the above, serious limitations are connected to imple-
mentation of the best interests of the child in cases of family reunification after 
a child has been in an institution; this is especially problematic as the number of 
“social orphans” is vast. Mistrust towards the family means that leaving 
children to institutions is seen as a sufficiently good solution for the child. 
Russia has limited the definition of the best interest of a child and reserves 
itself a right to decide, what interests of the child are legitimate. Furthermore, 
practice of Russia is inconsistent – on the one hand, it refers to the traditional 
value of the family, on the other, the legislation allows easy limitation of 
parental rights; a vast number of children in the orphanages are ‘social orphans.’ 
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2.5 Conclusion 
Formal requirements of the best interests of the child are more or less present in 
all three states, although the definition of the legal interest of a child as provided 
in Estonian and Russian legislation does not comply with the minimum 
requirements of art. 3 (1).  
As was shown, implementation of the principle varies considerably among 
the three states. While Finnish practice shows that the best interests of the child 
is and can be analysed in every case concerning decisions by the child, still 
there are specific areas where this right is not protected to the fullest extent 
possible (e.g. taking into public care), the fact that the best interests of the child 
is an issue before the domestic courts show that at least potentially parties are 
aware of the principle, and there is the possibility of true application of it. 
Estonian legislation is currently going through the developments whereby 
the best interests of the child will be incorporated more strongly to the decision-
making process. The practice of the courts shows that understanding the 
substance and meaning of the best interests of the child is an issue that has 
gained more attention in court proceedings. The meaning and scope of the 
principle, as well as its relation to the rights of the parents, is, however, not 
clarified sufficiently in Estonian court practice nor is there substantive analysis 
on the way this principle is used in administrative proceedings. There is also the 
insufficient practice of reviewing removal decisions; the decisions taken are 
often viewed as final. This is not in compliance with the evolving capacities of 
the child; both the family circumstances as well as the best interests might 
change in time. 
Russian legislation includes the principle of the interests of the child in its 
relevant legal acts. The wording of this principle is not in accordance with the 
requirements of the CRC. Using the concept of ‘legitimate interests’ gives the 
state a possibility to define, what interests of a child are legitimate. This does 
not follow the position of the CRC that is open to the full amplitude of different 
interests.  
Furthermore, practical application of the principle is formal and limited; and 
therefore, the principle has practical meaning mainly in family disputes over 
custody. Even when the highest courts support the application of this principle 
in the domestic legal system, regulating the traditionally private sphere has 
received strong opposition. There is also more emphasis in current Russian 
rhetoric on the need to protect the family so that the relationship of rights and 
protection of the family vis-à-vis the best interests of the child remain unclear. 
In hard cases, however, concerning taking into care and removal of parental 
rights, practice shows no substantive consideration of the best interests of a 
particular child and the authorities routinely take children into public care 
without substantive analysis of other possible measures. 
Both of the test cases – placement into care and family reunification – show 
that both Estonia and Russia have difficulties in taking into account the time 
factor and support the family reunification. Supporting the reunification of the 
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family requires by the sides of legislative measures also policy instruments (e.g. 
education, dissemination of information, etc.) Removal of a child or separation 
of a child from the family seems to be a one-way motion that does not take the 
reunification as a substantive and positive alternative. As the best interest of a 
child is not re-evaluated, Estonia and Russia violate the minimum core of this 
principle.  
CRC Committee was strong in its criticism of the Russian report and 
indicated that practical application of the legislative requirements is the real test 
case and shows whether the legislation is in compliance with the CRC. It 
remains to be seen whether the similarly strong criticism is also taken in relation 
to Estonia. 
The best interest of a child was also a right where Russia domestically uses 
traditional values argument. As it was not used during the constructive dialogue, 
the CRC Committee did not have to evaluate the general admissibility of these 
arguments. However, it noted that the Russian definition of the best interests of 
a child is not in compliance with the CRC. 
It has to be noted that the General Comment No. 14 on the best interests 
principle gives states sufficient guidance on the practical implementation 
requirements. Moreover, the concluding observations of the CRC Committee 
were also detailed enough to point out the national enforcement deficiencies. 
This is, at the same time, an area where some type of follow-up mechanism 
would help to clarify both the requirements and criticism of the Committee and 




National implementation of international human rights treaties depends on the 
substance these norms are seen to have as well as the national relevance of 
those norms. The central research question of the dissertation asks whether 
significant differences occur in the national implementation of the minimum 
core of these – purportedly universal – rights and what factors might cause 
differences. The main hypothesis of the work was that even in such a 
universally recognized document as the CRC the universality claim does not 
hold true for the understanding and, furthermore, that the interpretation and 
practical application of the minimum core of rights in Estonia, Finland, and 
Russia differs considerably. Research shows that there are considerable 
differences in the implementation practice of both the definition of a child and 
the best interests of the child of these states; the primary factors in these 
differences vary. 
The current dissertation started with the proposal that a difference exists in 
the way states implement international human rights, and these differences are 
dependent on a number of theoretical approaches to international law. First, it 
was proposed that this difference might come from the monist-dualist dis-
tinction, whereby monist countries would be more inclined to apply inter-
national law directly while dualist states would refrain from doing so. Analysis 
showed no real difference in national attitudes or the application of international 
human rights treaties connected to these underlying theories. In hard cases, the 
selection of the monist approach did not mean that direct implementation of 
international treaties was seen as a suitable solution. Nor did it mean that the 
legislator or national courts were in fact applying human rights treaties. Thus, 
the central hypothesis of the first chapter was confirmed – the three states all 
consider international human rights as part of their national legal system; and, 
they all deem practice of the international supervisory bodies as binding. 
Finland, as a dualist country, applies international human rights norms very 
similarly to monist countries. The reason behind this could be that Finland is no 
longer a true dualist country, or, alternatively, that it is not a dualist country in 
relation to international human rights treaties, or even more strictly, it is not a 
dualist country in relation to the CRC. At the same time, both Russia and 
Estonia have so many structural and societal problems that even if the legislator 
and the courts were willing to apply international human rights standards, the 
practical possibilities of the state would not allow for that. Thus, it rather seems 
that every legal system will also attempt to maintain its distinct character and 
the main source of its legitimacy, in particular, popular sovereignty, as well as 
the protection of human and citizens’ rights. 
All three countries have used the CRC in their legislative practice as a reason 
for changing the national law; the CRC has been applied directly in the national 
courts of all three states. Finnish practice is comparatively more limited. The 
reasons for this are rather dependent on legal culture and tradition whereby the 
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courts are not deemed to be an appropriate place for resolving policy issues. It is 
first and foremost the obligation of the legislator to adopt national legal norms 
that correspond to their international obligations and implement them in 
national law. 
The monist states of Estonia and Russia have been quite open to both inter-
national legal norms as well as international practice. The Estonian courts when 
applying basic rights, have often sought support from international legal obli-
gations and refer to both international treaty norms as well as to international 
practice. A similar approach was observed in relation to the Russian legal 
system. Even in controversial cases, the Constitutional Court has at least 
mentioned the international obligations of Russia as also justifying the findings 
of the Court. However, these references were quite vague in character while, in 
a number of cases, there was even no reference to concrete norms or treaties. 
To use the language of Simmons, different costs influence the behaviour of 
these states735 – the differences observed might be a result of the difference in 
the level of development of these states. Russia has not finished its transition to 
democracy (it is even unclear whether it is still on this path); the costs of full 
implementation of international human rights obligations are, therefore, still 
very high for Russia. This is also apparent from the practice of the CRC 
Committee, which showed serious structural problems in the application of the 
CRC.  
Although limited resources are available also in Estonia, Estonia never-
theless has completed its transition to democracy and has for more than 20 years 
followed liberalism as a political concept. This means that there is a lack of full 
implementation of social rights; at the same time, the analysis shows that some 
practices or beliefs have remained from Soviet baggage. 
The second hypothesis of the research was that states apply international 
human rights differently because of their specific value system and/or cultural 
traditions. This hypothesis proved to be true – national implementation of 
international obligations was dependent on the constitutional or societal values 
of the countries. Both Estonia and Russia used the “tradition” argument in their 
implementation of international human rights; Finland did not use similar 
arguments in relation to the rights central to the current research. However, it 
still mentions ‘traditions’ to justify certain legislative policy decisions or the 
absence of certain legal acts – e.g. “self-regulation has long traditions in the 
Finnish mass media, and it has been considered to be suitable for monitoring 
the contents of the Internet and mobile phones as well.”736 Russia did not use 
the traditional values argument openly; nevertheless, its national legislation, as 
well as the domestic rhetoric of its leaders, uses the traditional values argument.  
Research also showed deficiencies in the supervisory practice of the CRC 
Committee. As an example, the definition of the child was not analysed closely 
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and, thus, questionable regulations of the states e.g. in child marriage were not 
analysed. This gives the impression of double standards and hints that child 
marriage could not be a problem for a Western state. 
Based on the aforementioned analysis, it might be assumed that the question 
of the general supremacy of international human rights is moot; rather, we 
might have to take a new and pragmatic approach toward the relationship 
between international law and domestic law that focuses on specific solutions 
instead of general and formal hierarchies. This is a point where constructive 
dialogue with the CRC Committee could be of utmost importance. Clarification 
of the margins given to states and of minimum standards would help both states 
as well as the Committee itself to see whether the practice of the state has gone 
too far and is effectively hindering the protections granted to children. 
Much of the debate presented in chapter 1.2 on the universality and relativity 
of international human rights law and pluralist legal orders is characterised by 
polarised presumptions that disregard the complexity and variety of local 
situations. One has to recognise that cultural differences are significant and real 
to people; there exists the complexity of the relationship between law and 
culture and the fact that culture is a dynamic process, which is socially and 
politically contested.737 The current research shows that even though these dif-
ferences might be quite fundamental (e.g. the attitude toward LGBTI children), 
they do not necessarily hinder protection of all the rights in the CRC. 
People are bearers of both culture and rights, and the recognition of rights 
should not imply the rejection of culture. On this basis, the current thesis rejects 
the view that universalism and cultural relativism are alternatives between 
which one must choose once and for all. Instead, it suggests that much can be 
learned from how a local understanding of justice sees universal general 
principles of human rights in their own contexts. The protective and even 
discriminatory stance of Russia toward certain rights has stressed paternalist 
and protective measures and, thus, it could be presumed that it effectively 
combats some of the true problems of child rights such as sexual violence 
against children. Too paternalist an approach could mean that the rights of the 
family and the best interests of the child are unnecessarily limited, but too 
liberal an approach also poses threats. When the sexual consent limit is set too 
low, as is the case in Estonia, the need to protect children from sexual violence 
could be disregarded. 
These three states are all from Europe. They have long accepted their 
international human rights obligations and the rights of children, particularly 
since the creation of the CRC in 1991. Thus, the CRC Committee has already 
had the chance to analyse the practice of these states in over four to five cycles 
and, as was shown, the practice of the Committee were generally accepted by 
the states, at least as soft law. 
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One of the most important outcomes relates to the standards and conclusions 
of the CRC Committee itself. Analysis of the practices of the CRC Committee 
in relation to these states reveals that the Committee has, by way of its 
supervisory practice and drawing upon it in its General Comments, formulated 
certain issues as norms or at least strong suggestions. It does not treat all of 
these requirements as minimum standards; at least, it does not draw member 
states’ attention to these requirements. This was especially obvious in relation 
to the definition of a child and the age limits. 
Adopting a new law would be the easiest measure available to the state. This 
is especially so in cases such as child marriage where the potential number of 
children influenced is small, and the issue could be resolved simply by adopting 
a law. At the same time, it would be an easy task for the Committee to analyse 
conformity with this requirement and, when necessary, conclude whether 
national legislation needs improvement or not. It is curious because child 
marriage is connected with cultural practices that are possibly very harmful. 
Thus, in order to guarantee that this requirement is taken seriously, there should 
not be differential treatment of states by the Committee, and such practices 
should also be prohibited in states where child marriage is not connected so 
clearly with harmful cultural practices such as planned marriages or polygamy. 
These issues should be a priority even if the capacity and resources of the 
Committee are limited, and the Committee must decide where to invest its time. 
On the basis of the current research, it can be concluded that the CRC 
Committee generally follows the core minimum standards approach, even if it 
does not clearly define these standards in its General Comments or Concluding 
Observations. Through its recommendations and issues of concern, the 
Committee hints at the required minimum; in the best-case scenarion, it defines 
minimums in its General Comments. At the same time, it is not formally the 
obligation of the Committee to find out whether a state is in violation of the 
CRC (i.e., to ‘name and shame’). Its main obligation is to assist states with 
constructive dialogue and guarantee gradual improvement in the protection of 
the rights of the children. 
Coming back to the main question of the dissertation, it has to be concluded 
that the universality ideal of international human rights is not realised. Estonia, 
Finland, and Russia substantiate and apply the minimum requirements of the 
CRC differently. The CRC Committee has not been strong enough in pointing 
out these discrepancies; thus, it has to be questioned whether the CRC Com-
mittee itself sees analysed rights as the minimum core requirements. All the 
three sates used some cultural or traditional values arguments; accepting them 
in matters that do not interfere with the minimum core of rights could help to 
advance the implementation of international human rights norms. Here, I concur 
with Lenzerinis’ observation: 
when human rights are rationalized according to the terms of reference proper to 
a given culture – i.e. are attributed a meaning which is culturally intelligible in 
the light of the intellectual patterns of the community (of course, without altering 
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their purpose) — their goal, content, and role are better understood by the 
members of society. As a result of this process, human rights are empathized by 
the society and incorporated within its cultural substrate, in the sense that they 
are assimilated by the community and felt as natural components of their 
everyday life.738 
Integrating culture and national values into human rights ‘talk’ could help to 
strengthen protection of international human rights; it is paramount for the 
substantive implementation of human rights to internalise them for the 
receptor,739 and the minimum core approach seems to be the most appropriate 
tool for it. At the same time, this internalisation should not distort the meaning 
of international human rights grounded in positive law. It is still unrealistic or 
utopian to expect that the internalisation of human rights would circumvent 
national values and constitutional requirements. Thus, through reporting as well 
as judicial control, international cooperation should, therefore, be balanced with 
constitutional values; rather, international supervision should aim at accom-
modating different legal systems while accepting and preserving their distinct-
ness as much as possible. This kind of dialogue, however, would pre-suppose 
open engagement between international human rights and national legal systems. 
Other UN human rights bodies have opted for using follow-up mechanisms to 
support the work of the treaty bodies. This is definitely an instrument that 
could complement the existing reporting system. 
The selection of states in the research was limited and, thus, the current 
observations might prove wrong in relation to other states and other rights. The 
states of the current study have formally accepted the universality of the 
international rights of the child. However, certain topics opened the door for 
relativist or subsidiarity arguments. It is still hard to conclude whether these 
interpretations were fully outside the margins of the CRC. It would be 
interesting to see whether the function of the CRC Committee in the individual 
complaints procedure would bring more clarity to this debate and whether the 
minimum standards deriving from the CRC would be substantiated un-
ambiguously. 
I am of opinion that if minimum core universal harmonization is the ideal of 
the CRC, it is the task of the CRC Committee to use uniform minimum 
standards and, when necessary, to complement them with progressive 
realisation goals. Without a clear indication from the CRC Committee, the 
states have no reason to step out from the comfort zone and apply these 
minimum requirements. 
 
                                                 
738 Federico Lenzerini, The Culturalization of Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 
2014), 217–18. 
739 The receptor approach has been developed in Tom Zwart, “Using Local Culture to 
Further the Implementation of International Human Rights: The Receptor Approach,” Hum. 
Rts. Q. 34 (2012): 546. 
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SUMMARY IN ESTONIAN 
Universaalsed inimõigused siseriiklikus kontekstis:  
lapse õiguste rakendamine Eestis, Soomes ja Venemaal 
Iga õiguskorra aluspõhja või ka taustsüsteemi moodustavad väärtused. Sise-
riiklikes õiguskordades tulenevad need väärtused tihti traditsioonist, kultuurist 
ja tavadest ning neid väljendatakse näiteks põhiseaduste preambulites. Rahvus-
vahelise õiguse puhul on olukord keerulisem – rahvusvaheline õigus põhineb 
riikide vabatahtlikel kokkulepetel ning üldiselt on selle alusväärtuseks olnud 
vastastikkus. Pärast II maailmasõda on rahvusvahelise õiguse paradigma muutu-
nud ning nüüdisaegse rahvusvahelise õiguse alusväärtuseks peetakse tihti just 
rahvusvahelisi inimõiguseid.  
Rahvusvahelises inimõiguste teoorias leitakse niisiis, et suveräänsus ei ole 
enam üksinda rahvusvahelise süsteemi keskne väärtus, vaid sellele on ÜRO 
põhikirja vastuvõtmisega lisandunud uued väärtused.1 Samas on rahvusvaheline 
õigus endiselt riigikeskne süsteem, kus puuduvad praktilised hoovad riikide 
sisuliseks kontrollimiseks.2  
Riikide motivatsioon erinevate inimõiguste lepingutega ühinemiseks varieerub. 
Simmons analüüsis liitumiste põhjuseid ja leiab, et kuigi erinevad riigid 
loodavad selliste lepingutega ühinemisest saada erinevat kasu, toob liitumine 
alati kaasa mingi positiivse 3  arengu riigis. 4  Samas on inimõiguste süsteemi 
sisulise edu eeldus see, et riigid võtavad need normid praktiliste poliitiliste juhis-
tena kasutusse ning viivad riigis neile toetudes läbi vajalikud muuda-
tused.5Seega sõltub inimõiguste rakendamine lõppastmes siiski riigi erinevatest 
valikutest ning tegelikust rakenduspraktikast. 
                                                 
1  ÜRO põhikirja artikli 1 järgi on ÜRO eesmärgid “3. Arendada rahvusvahelist koostööd 
majandusliku, sotsiaalse, kultuurilise ja humanitaarse iseloomuga rahvusvaheliste prob-
leemide lahendamisel ning lugupidamise kasvatamisel ja süvendamisel inimõiguste ja 
kõigile mõeldud põhivabaduste vastu, tegemata vahet rassi, soo, keele ja usundi alusel.” 
Ühinenud Rahvaste Organisatsiooni põhikiri ning Rahvusvahelise Kohtu statuut, jõustunud 
17.09.1991, RT II 1996, 24, 95. 
2  On mitmeid autoreid, kes leiavad, et postmodernistlik rahvusvaheline õigus ei ole enam 
riigikeskne ja suveräänsust austav süsteem, vaid rahvusvaheline õigus on liikunud riigi 
kontrolli alt ära. Vt. nt. Janne Nijman ja André Nollkaemper, “Beyond the Divide,” New 
Perspectives on the Divide Between National and International Law, toim. Janne E. Nijman 
ja André Nollkaemper (Oxford University Press, 2007), 341–360. 
3  Positiivse arengu all on mh silmas peetud üksikisikute õiguste tugevamat kaitset. 
4  Beth A. Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 77–80. Simmons leiab, et riigid ootavad 
lepingutega ühinemisest mingit kasu. On selliseid riike, kelle jaoks inimõiguste parem 
tagamine ongi see loodetav kasu. Samas on ka nn valepositiivseid riike, kes ei jaga lepingu 
sisulisi väärtuseid ja liituvad lepinguga seetõttu, et nad saavad sellest mingit muud kasu – 
positiivset reklaami, investeeringuid vmt. 
5  Vt lähemalt Ibid., ptk. 4. 
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Doktoritöö eesmärk, meetod ja teoreetiline taust 
Käesoleva doktoritöö eesmärk on analüüsida valitud lapse õigustele antud 
tõlgendust ja rakenduspraktikat kolmes näiteriigis: Eestis, Soomes ja Venemaal 
ning leida, kas teoorias universaalsete õiguste rakenduspraktikate vahel esineb 
olulisi erinevusi. Kui sellised erinevused on olemas, siis üritatakse töös välja 
tuua nende põhjused. Töö hüpotees on, et isegi nii universaalselt toetatud 
lepingu kui ÜRO lapse õiguste konventsiooni6 puhul ei ole võimalik rääkida 
normide universaalsusest, kuna riikide poolt lepingu normidele antud tähendus 
ning tõlgenduspraktikad on väga erinevad ning seega ei ole võimalik tagada 
lepingus sisalduvaid õiguseid näiteriikides ühetaoliselt. Rakenduspraktika 
taustal ning selle analüüsimiseks ja selgitamiseks kasutatakse käesolevas dok-
toritöös kahte teoreetilist käsitlust. 
Esmalt omab tähtsust see, milline on rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste lepingute 
siseriiklik positsioon. Siinkohal on riikidel traditsiooniliselt kaks valikut – 
monism ja dualism. Käesoleva analüüsi näiteriikidest on formaalses mõttes 
monistlikud Eesti ja Venemaa ning dualistlik riik on Soome. Monistlikes riikides 
muutuvad lepingud kohe pärast jõustumist siseriikliku õiguse osaks ning seega 
peaks monistlikel riikidel olema vähem võimalusi lepingutes sisalduvaid norme 
rikkuda. Dualistlikes riikides on lepingu siseriiklikuks rakendamiseks vajalik 
täiendavate õigusaktide vastuvõtmine. Inimõiguste lepingute puhul on siseriik-
liku mõju üheks näitajaks see, kas lepingutele on võimalik siseriiklikus kohtu-
menetluses tugineda. Euroopa inimõiguste ja põhivabaduste konventsiooni 
raames on lepingu mõju debatt ära peetud ning kõik liikmesriigid, olenemata oma 
valitud koolkonnast, peavad tagama üksikisikutele konventsioonis sisalduvate 
õiguste osas kaebeõiguse. Teiste rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste lepingute puhul, 
millel ei ole taolist tugevat järelevalvesüsteemi, ei ole olukord nii selge – ÜRO 
egiidi all vastu võetud inimõiguste lepingute täitmist analüüsivad vastavad 
komiteed. Nende hinnangute ja tõlgenduspraktika tähendus ja mõju liikmes-
riikide õiguskordadele on oluliselt vähem selge ning tõenäoliselt saab sellist 
praktikat parimal juhul pidada mittesiduvaks õiguseks („soft law“). 
Teiseks sõltub rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste lepingute rakendamine lepingute 
siseriiklikust tõlgendamisest, see omakorda aga sellest, kas ja mil moel tõlgen-
davad ja jagavad riigid lepingute taustal olevat väärtussüsteemi. Siinkohal on 
olulised järgmised teoreetilised seisukohad: inimõiguste universaalsus, relatiiv-
sus ja minimaalne sisu. 7  Inimõiguste universaalsus on olnud rahvusvahelise 
inimõiguste kogukonna peavoolu keskne arusaam. 8  Samas on Inimõiguste 
Nõukogus nn traditsiooniliste väärtuste toetajate häältega vastu võetud kolm 
                                                 
6  RT II 1996, 16, 56. 
7  Minimaalse sisu (i.k. „minimum core“) järgi on igal rahvusvahelisel inimõigusel oma 
minimaalne sisu ning riigi rakenduspraktika ei tohiks sellest allapoole langeda. 
8  Vt nt World Conference on Human Rights and United Nations, “Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action.” 
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erinevat traditsioonilisi väärtuseid toetavat resolutsiooni9 ning nende järgi on 
inimõiguste rakendamisel oluline tunnustada ning austada ka liikmesriikide 
kultuurilist tausta. 
Ka siseriikliku rakenduspraktika analüüsil on kaks mõõdet.10 Esmalt näitab 
analüüs, kuidas Lapse õiguste komitee (LÕK komitee) analüüsib riikide rapor-
teid. Komitee kasutab riikidele üldsuuniste andmiseks üldkommentaare ning 
sealt on võimalik leida üksikute õiguste nn minimaalset tuuma. Võib eeldada, et 
riikide raportite analüüsimisel rakendab LÕK komitee neid minimaalseid 
standardeid, mis peaksid olema kõigis LÕKi liimesriikides universaalselt raken-
datavad. 11  Teiseks näitab analüüs liikmesriikide rakendamiseetikat – millise 
tähtsuse on liikmesriigid andnud LÕKile ja LÕK komitee praktikale. Siinjuures 
võib oluline olla ka see, kas liikmesriik peab LÕK komitee poolt välja toodut 
siduvaks. Kohustuste olemust aitavad selgeks teha erinevad kohustuste liigi-
tused. Siinse analüüsi jaoks olid ennekõike olulised printsiibi ja õigusreegli 
eristamine ja kohtustuste kolmikjaotus (i.k. „respect, protect, fulfill“). Järele-
valve komitee praktika siseriikliku mõju analüüsimisel oli abi ka nn pehme 
õiguse käsitlusest. 
Kuigi käesoleva doktoritöö näiteriikide arv on väike, on nende pinnalt 
võimalik siiski leida, milline on riigi argumentatsioon lepingute mittejärgmise 
puhul. Nii on töö selgelt kvalitatiivse iseloomuga. Töö teoreetiline osa pakub 
välja, et riikide rakenduspraktika erinevus võib tuleneda monismi/dualismi 
valikust ning sellest, kuidas nähakse inimõiguste rolli, sisu ning nende piiratust 
filosoofilises plaanis. 
                                                 
9  Human Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through 
a Better Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind,” October 12, 2009; Human 
Rights Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better 
Understanding of Traditional Values of Humankind,” April 8, 2011; and Human Rights 
Council, “Promoting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms through a Better Under-
standing of Traditional Values of Humankind: Best Practices,” October 9, 2012. 
10  Sarnaseid inimõiguste rakenduspraktika võrdlevaid analüüse on tehtud mitmeid, kuid 
enamasti keskenduvad sellised analüüsid mõnele kitsale õigusele ning ühele riigile. Samuti 
ei ole olemasolevad tööd üldiselt keskendunud lapse õiguste konventsioonile. Näiteks on aga 
Mikkola 2008. aastal võrdlevalt uurinud valitud lapse õiguste rakendamist Soomes ja 
Venemaal. Virge Mikkola, Lastensuojelu Euroopassa ja Venäjällä, (Helsinki: Helsingin 
yliopiston koulutus- ja kehittämiskeskus Palmenia, 2008). Heyns ja Viljonen analüüsisid 
2002. aastal kuue peamise inimõiguste lepingu formaalset rakendamist. Christof H. Heyns 
and Frans Viljoen, eds., The Impact of the United Nations Human Rights Treaties on the 
Domestic Level (The Hague [etc.]: Kluwer Law International, 2002). McGrogan on ana-
lüüsinud inimõiguste rakendamist Aasias universaalsuse-kultuurilise relativismi argumendi 
kontekstis. David McGrogan, “Cultural Values and Human Rights: A Matter of Inter-
pretation” (University of Liverpool, 2012). 
11  Käesolevas töös leitakse, et komitee praktika taustal on üleüldise harmoniseerimise idee. 
Vt nt CRC Committee, “General Comment No. 14 on the Right of the Child to Have His or 
Her Best Interests Taken as a Primary Consideration (art. 3, para. 1)” (CRC/C/GC/14, May 
19, 2013). 
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Käesolevas töös kasutatakse analüüsis kolme näiteriiki – Soomet, Eestit ja 
Venemaad. Neil kolmel riigil on ajalooline ühisosa, samas on need riigid ka 
väga erinevad. Kultuuriliste ja ajalooliste käsitluste põrkumine ühelt poolt ning 
teisalt ühtsete inimõiguste mõju pakub uurimiseks huvitavat materjali. Kolm 
naaberriiki kuuluvad Euroopa õigusruumi ning neil on mitmesaja-aastane ühine 
ajalugu Vene keisririigi koosseisus. Samas on kolmel riigil ka palju erinevusi – 
erinev usk, erinev ajalookäsitus ning erinevad riiklikud alusväärtused. Riigid 
erinevad ka oma ühiskondliku arengu poolest – Soome saab näidata pikaaegset 
stabiilset riiklikku arengut, Venemaa ja Eesti alustasid 20 aastat tagasi üle-
minekut kommunistlikust režiimist demokraatiasse. Kõik need asjaolud teevad 
võrdleva analüüsi huvitavaks ning võimaldavad analüüsida inimõiguste taga 
peituvaid väärtuseid. 
Näiteriikide lähenemine laste õigustele on samuti olnud erinev. Soome on 
läbi aegade rõhutanud lapse õiguste olulisust ning seda on peetud riigiks, kes 
austab ja kaitseb LÕKis sätestatud lapse õiguseid. 12  Eesti õigussüsteem on 
rahvusvahelistele inimõigustele olnud suhteliselt avatud. Samal ajal on suur osa 
normidest jäänud formaalseteks käitumisjuhisteks ning praktikas on need 
jäänud sisuliselt rakendamata. Laste õiguste rakendamine on samuti näidanud, 
et kuigi lapse õiguseid peetakse teoreetiliselt olulisteks, prevaleerivad täiskasva-
nute arvamused oluliselt rohkem ning laste seisukohale kaalu ei anta.13 Vene-
maa on viimastel aastatel rõhutanud laste õiguste tagamise vajalikkust enne-
kõike perekonna institutsiooni kaudu.14  
Näiteriikide valikut toetab ka nende kuulumine ühtsesse regionaalsesse 
õigusruumi – lisaks LÕKile on kõik kolm riiki Euroopa inimõiguste ja põhi-
vabaduste kaitse konventsiooni osalisriigid15 ning tunnustavad Euroopa Inim-
õiguste Kohtu jurisdiktsiooni, lisaks on nad ühinenud ka Euroopa täiendatud ja 
parandatud sotsiaalhartaga.16 
Töös analüüsitavad sisulised õigused on lapse õiguste üldprintsiibid – lapse 
definitsioon (LÕK art. 1) ning lapse parim huvi (LÕK art. 3 lg 1, „best interests 
of a child“). LÕK komitee on sisustanud nende sätete minimaalse sisu oma üld-
kommentaaridega ning töös analüüsitakse, kas riikide regulatsioonid vastavad 
                                                 
12  Vt nt Jasper Krommendijk, “Finnish Exceptionalism at Play? The Effectiveness of the 
Recommendations of UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies in Finland,” Nordic Journal of 
Human Rights 32, No. 1 (2014): 18–43. 
13  Marre Karu et al. Laste ja täiskasvanute küsitluse kokkuvõte (Poliitikauuringute Keskus 
Praxis, 2012). 
14  Vladimir V. Putin, “State Council Presidium Meeting on Family, Motherhood and 
Childhood Policy,” February 17, 2014, http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/6687. 
15  ECHR, Council of Europe, CETS No. 5. 
16  ESC (Revised), Council of Europe, CETS No 163. Euroopa sotsiaalsete õiguste komitee 
leidis kollektiivkaebuses International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) v. 
France, (asi nr 14/2003) 5. septembri 2003. a. otsuse p-s 36 järgmist: “Article 17 of the 
Charter is further directly inspired by the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child. It protects in a general manner the right of children and young persons, including 
unaccompanied minors, to care and assistance.” 
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nendele standarditele. Siinjuures on suureks abiks LÕK komiteele esitatud 
riikide raportid ning nende pinnalt riikidele antud soovitused. Siseriiklikust 
õigusest on töös piirdutud näiteriikide seadusandluse (Venemaa puhul vaadel-
dakse föderaalset regulatsiooni) ning riigi kõrgemate kohtute praktika ana-
lüüsiga.  
Uuritav valdkond asub rahvusvahelise avaliku õiguse ning konstitutsiooni-
õiguse piirimail – inimõiguste siseriiklik rakendamine on oluline mõlemale 
valdkonnale. Töö keskne uurimismeetod on võrdlev meetod. See aitab ana-
lüüsida nii rahvusvahelist normiloomet kui ka siseriiklikku rakenduspraktikat. 
Kuna töö keskendub kehtivale õigusele, kasutatakse ka analüütilist meetodit ja 
üldiseid õigusdogmaatika meetodeid. 
Töö on jagatud kaheks suureks peatükiks. Esimene peatükk avab töö teo-
reetilise tausta ning üldise õigusraamistiku. Töö teoreetilise tausta juures 
vaadeldakse kahte teooriate kompleksi. Monism või dualism annavad aimu 
sellest, milline on rahvusvahelise lepingu siseriiklik mõju. Eelduslikult on 
monistlikud riigid rahvusvaheliste lepingute ning rahvusvaheliste järelevalve-
institutsioonide rakenduspraktika suhtes avatumad kui dualistlikud riigid. Tei-
seks vaadeldakse inimõiguste lepingute enda teoreetilist tausta, analüüsitakse 
nende universaalsuse ja relatiivsuse väiteid ning normides siduvaid kohustusi. 
Oluline on ka see, milline on kultuuril või traditsioonilistel väärtustel põhineva 
argumentatsiooni teoreetiline lubatavus. Esimese peatüki kolmas osa annab 
ülevaate lapse õiguste rahvusvahelisõiguslikust raamistikust – lapse õiguste 
konventsioonist ning asjakohasest Euroopa nõukogu regulatsioonist.  
Esimese peatüki neljas osa vaatleb rahvusvahelise õiguse positsiooni näit-
riikide konstitutsiooniõiguses. Analüüsitakse nende õiguskordade alusväärtu-
seid ning rahvusvaheliste lepingute ja järelevalvepraktika rolli. Sisulisteks alli-
kateks on siin põhiseadused, seadusandlikud aktid ning kõrgemate kohtute otsu-
sed. Selgub, et kuigi Soome on formaalselt dualistlik riik, on rahvusvaheliste 
inimõiguste roll tema õiguskorras monistlikele riikidele väga sarnane. Analüüs 
näitab, et kõik kolm riiki viitavad rahvusvahelistele inimõigustele nii oma 
õiguses kui ka rakenduspraktikas. Kui Soome ja Venemaa puhul on need viited 
suhteliselt formaalsed, siis Eesti Riigikohus rakendab inimõiguseid sisuliste 
argumentidena. 
Teine peatükk keskendub lapse õiguste ja LÕKi siseriikliku praktika ana-
lüüsile. Esmalt defineeritakse asjakohaste põhimõtete minimaalne sisu ning see-
järel analüüsitakse, kuidas on liikmesriigid neid põhimõtteid oma siseriiklikus 
praktikas mõistnud ning sisustanud. Selle pinnalt on võimalik hinnata rakendus-
praktika vastavust rahvusvahelistele nõuetele ning seda, kuivõrd järjekindel on 
LÕK komitee riikide raportite hindamisel olnud ja millised argumendid on 
sellises debatis lubatavad. Lähemalt analüüsitakse lapse definitsiooni ning 




Rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste lepingute ja  
lapse õiguste positsioon näiteriikides 
Töö esimene alahüpotees oli see, et riikide valmisolek rahvusvaheliste inim-
õiguste rakendamiseks võib tuleneda sellest, kas tegemist on monistliku või 
dualistliku riigiga. Analüüs näitas, et sisulist mõju analüüsitud riikide praktikale 
valitud teooriast ei tulnud. Keerulistel juhtudel ei rakendanud monistlikud riigid 
lepingutes sätestatut otse, samuti ei tähenda monistlikkus seda, et riigi 
seadusandja ja kohtud rakendaksid probleemsetes küsimustes inimõiguseid otse. 
Dualistlik riik Soome rakendas endale võetud lepingulisi kohustusi väga sarna-
selt monistlikele näiteriikidele. Töös nenditakse, et erinevuse puudumine võib 
tuleneda sellest, et Soomet ei saa inimõiguste lepingute valdkonnas enam puh-
talt dualistlikuks riigiks pidada. Samal ajal on Venemaal ja Eestil väga palju 
erinevaid ühiskondlikke probleeme, mistõttu ei ole pidev otsene inimõiguste 
rakendamine võimalik.  
Kõik kolm näiteriiki on üldiselt LÕKi oma seadusandlikus- ja kohtuprakti-
kas rakendanud. Soome kohtupraktika on siin aga veidi piiratum. Selle põhjus 
võib olla õiguskultuurist tulenev asjaolu – Soomes ei peeta kohtuid poliitika-
küsimuste lahendamise kohaks ning ennekõike peab seadusandja tagama selle, 
et LÕK jõuab siseriiklikesse õigusnormidesse. Monistlikud Eesti ja Venemaa on 
inimõiguste osas suhteliselt vastuvõtlikumad ning lepingute normidele viida-
takse kohtupraktikas tihti. Eesti kohtud otsivad rahvusvahelisest praktikast oma 
järeldustele tuge ning viitavad üldiselt nii lepingute normidele kui ka kohtu-
praktikale. LÕKi rakenduspraktikale siiski ei viidata ning ka LÕKile viitamist 
on kohtupraktikas suhteliselt vähe. Vene kõrgemate kohtute praktika on sarnane – 
Venemaa Konstitutsioonikohus on isegi vastuolulistes kaasustes vähemalt viida-
nud rahvusvaheliste inimõiguste lepingute sätetele; sellised viited on tavaliselt 




Lapse definitsioon on lapse õiguste rakendamise üldine lähtekoht, LÕK artikkel 
1 ei anna siinjuures väga täpset juhist:  
Käesolevas konventsioonis mõistetakse lapse all iga alla 18 aastast inimolendit, 
kui lapse suhtes kohaldatava seaduse põhjal ei loeta teda varem täisealiseks. 
Seega on LÕK komitee oma praktikas täpsustanud, keda täpselt tuleb mingitel 
juhtudel lapseks pidada. Selline definitsioon sõltub vaadeldavast valdkonnast, 
üldpiiriks on siiski 18 eluaastat. Doktoritöös vaadeldi nelja valdkonda, kus lapse 
definitsioon on oluline ning kus LÕK komitee on riikidele andnud soovituslikud 
minimaalsed alampiirid – õigus abielluda (soovitatavalt 18 eluaastat, mini-
maalselt 16 eluaastat), legaalse seksuaalsuhte vanus (soovituslikult 16 eluaastat), 
töötamise alampiir (15 eluaastat) ning relvajõududesse värbamise vanus (18 
eluaastat).  
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Analüüs näitab, et üldiselt järgivad näiteriigid soovituslikku 18 eluaasta piiri 
ning laiendavad sellest vanusest noorematele lastele vajaliku kaitse, samas on 
ka olulisi erinevusi. Kõigis kolmes riigis andsid õigusaktid võimaluse abiellu-
misiga alandada. Erisusi oli riikide vahel küll selles osas, kas vanemate nõus-
olek oli asja otsustamisel määrav. Riikidel puudusid ka selged põhjendused, 
miks peaks alla 18-aastaste abiellumist lubama. Eriliselt paistis siin välja Vene-
maa, kus föderatsiooni subjektidel on endil õigus vastav iga defineerida ning 
siin on subjektide praktika erinev. 
Abiellumisiga on otseselt seotud sugulise läbikäimise lubatavusega. Soomes 
ja Venemaal on vastav iga 16, Eestis aga 14. Eesti praktika hälbib siin oluliselt 
euroopalikust tavast ning ei ole selge, miks selline vanusepiir on sätestatud. 
Töös pakutakse välja, et sellise madala vanusepiiri taga on Eesti üldiselt libe-
raalne maailmavaade. Venemaa paistab siin kurioosselt välja pigem paternalist-
liku riigina. Kui lubatud seksuaalse läbikäimise iga on 16, siis LGBT valdkonna 
seksuaalhariduse andmine on Venemaal piiratud 18 eluaastaga. Käärid nende 
kahe vanuse vahel toovad kaasa mitmeid praktilisi probleeme ning eba-
proportsionaalselt võib olla piiratud neisse vähemusgruppidesse kuuluvate laste 
õigus terviseharidusele. Märkimisväärne on ka, et Venemaa kasutas siinjuures 
tugevalt ka traditsiooniliste väärtuste argumenti. 
Sarnase tähepaneku võib teha tööea osas. Üldiselt on see enamikus Euroopa 
riikides seatud 15 eluaastale kooskõlas ILO konventsiooniga nr 138, Venemaal 
on vastav iga 16. Kõik vaadeldud riigid piiravad õigusaktides kooliealiste laste 
osalemist tööturul, küll on erinev nende nõuete praktiline elluviimine. Prob-
leeme on lepinguvälise tööga ning tasuta tööga. Lisaks on nii Venemaal kui ka 
Eestis tõsine probleem koolist välja langenud lastega ning nende mitteametliku 
töötamise ja selle kontrollimisega. Soome eristus siin selgelt positiivse näitena. 
Sõjaväkke värbamise praktika oli näiteriikides LÕKis sätestatuga üldiselt 
kooskõlas. Erisusena tuleb välja tuua Eesti, kus laste kaasamine sõjaliste ees-
märkidega Kaitseliidu allorganisatsioonide tegevusse võib olla problemaatiline. 
See oli ka ainus valdkond, kus Eesti kasutas ühiskondliku tava argumenti. 
 
Lapse parim huvi 
Lapse parima huvi arvesse võtmine iga last puudutava otsuse juures on teine 
üldpõhimõte, mille järgmist töös analüüsiti. LÕK artikkel 3 lg 1 on sõnastatud 
järgmiselt: 
Igasugustes lapsi puudutavates ettevõtmistes riiklike või erasotsiaalhoolekande-
asutuste, kohtute, täidesaatvate või seadusandlike organite poolt tuleb esikohale 
seada lapse huvid.17 
                                                 
17  Tuleb märkida, et konventsiooni eestikeelne termin ei ole täpne – autentsed tekstid räägi-
vad “lapse parimast huvist” (“best interest of a child”). See on töö autori hinnangul sisuliselt 
erinev lihtsalt lapse huvidest. Parim huvi sunnib otsustajat välja selgitama lapse kõik erinevad 
huvid ning siis hindama kogumis, mis on lapse jaoks konkreetsel juhul parim lahendus. 
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Seega peab lapse parim huvi asjakohastes õigusaktides olema nimetatud ning 
selle põhimõtte valguses tuleb asjakohaseid väärtuseid ning õiguseid igal 
konkreetsel juhul tõlgendada ning ka rakendada. Oluline on siinkohal märkida, 
et spetsiifilised õigused võivad täiendavalt reguleerida seda, mis on lapse pari-
mates huvides. Seega on ka näiteks valitud õiguste – hooldusõiguse piiramise 
ning perekonna taasühinemise – puhul võimalik, et teistest LÕK sätetest tule-
nevad täpsemad nõuded. Lapse parima huvi tagamise nõude täitmiseks piisab 
aga, kui eeltoodud miinimumnõuded on täidetud. 
Vaadeldud riikides oli probleeme juba lapse parima huvi mõistega. Eesti õigus-
aktid kasutavad terminit „lapse huvid“ 18 ning Venemaa õigusaktid räägivad „lapse 
seaduslikest huvidest“ 19. Soomes sarnaseid terminoloogilisi probleeme ei olnud. 
Varieeruv on ka printsiibi sisuline rakendamine. Soome praktika näitab, et 
lapse parimat huvi üritatakse igas last puudutavas asjas analüüsida ning leida, 
siiski on ka valdkondi, kus kiputakse liialt järgima tavapärast praktikat (nt vane-
mate hooldusõiguse piiramise või asenduskodusse paigutamise puhul), selmet 
analüüsida konkreetse lapse olukorda ning tema parimaid huve. Samas asjaolu, 
et lapse parima huviga kohtumenetluses siiski tegeldakse, näitab, et praktika 
arengusuund on õige.  
Eesti lastekaitseseadus läbis 2015. aastal sisulise uuenduskuuri ning alates 
2016. aastast peaks oluliselt paranema lapse õiguste sisuline tagatus.20 Samas ei 
ole ka uues seaduses lapse parima huvi põhimõte selgemini sätestatud (vt nt §-d 
2 ja 5). Lapse parima huvi väljaselgitamise vajadust on Eesti kohtud mõistnud 
ning sellele pööratakse lapsi puudutavates menetlustes varasemast suuremat 
tähelepanu. Samas ei ole näiteks lapse parima huvi väljaselgitamise nõudeid 
ning selle põhimõtte suhet teistesse põhiõigustesse kohtupraktikas veel avatud. 
Vene õiguskorras ning eriti õiguspraktikas ei ole lapse parima huvi põhi-
mõttel sellist tähendust nagu sellele on antud LÕKis. Vene õiguskorras sisalduv 
„lapse seaduslike huvide“ põhimõte võimaldab riigil otsustada, millised huvid 
on lubatud ja millised mitte. Piiratud on ka selle põhimõtte rakendamine 
siseriiklikes kohtutes. Lapse parima huviga arvestamist ohustab veel Venemaa 
viimaste aastate retoorika perekonna kaitseks, kus perekonna ning vanemate 
õigused on lapse õiguste ning huvide ees seatud prioriteetseteks.21 Samal ajal 
hakkab silma see, et vanemate hooldusõigust piiratakse Venemaal lihtsalt ning 
laste paigutamine hoolekandeasutustesse on ebaproportsionaalselt sage praktika 
                                                 
18 Vt nt lastekaitse seaduse § 3, RT I, 13.12.2013, 12, § 3 ja perekonnaseaduse § 123, RT I, 
27.06.2012, 12. 
19 Nt Federal’nyy zakon Rossiyskoy Federatsii “Ob obrazovanii v Rossiyskoy Federatsii” 
(Education Act), N 273-FZ (2012). 
20  Uus lastekaitseseadus, RT I, 06.12.2014, 1. 
21  President Vladimir Putin kinnitas vajadust olla perekonda puudutavates küsimustes 
konservatiivne näiteks Venemaa lapsevanemate kongressil. Prezident Rossii, “Vladimir 
Putin Vystupil Na Prokhodyashchem v Moskve S"yezde Roditeley Rossii” (2.09.2013), 
http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17469 (külastatud 24.05.2015). 
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(sh on seal ka palju „sotsiaalseid” orbusid) ning perekondade taasühinemist 
tuleb ette suhteliselt vähe. 
 
Kokkuvõtteks 
Kasutades Simmonsi sõnu, on LÕKiga ühinemine toonud vaadeldud riikidele 
kaasa erinevaid ühiskondlikke kulusid. 22  Analüüsitud riikide praktika erineb 
tihti sisuliselt ning oluliselt LÕK standarditest, kõik riigid viitavad oma 
siseriiklikus praktikas konventsioonile, kuid seda tehakse valikuliselt. 
Soome õiguskord oli vaadeldud riikidest LÕKis sätestatuga kõige paremini 
kooskõlas. Samas on ebaselge, kas õiguseid tagatakse kõigile lastele ühetaoliselt 
ning kuivõrd on igapäevane praktika nende nõuetega kooskõlas. Lisaks tegi 
uurimise keerulisemaks ka see, et Soome kõrgemad kohtud ei anna tihti sea-
dustes sätestatule põhjalikku tõlgendust. 
On selge, et Venemaa ei ole tänaseks jõudnud veel üleminekuajast välja (on 
tegelikult ebaselgegi, kas ta enam demokratiseerumise teel on); seega on LÕKi 
täitmine Venemaa jaoks väga kulukas ja eeldab nii õiguskorras kui ka õigus-
praktikas struktuurseid ning sisulisi muudatusi. Venemaa oli analüüsi põhjal ka 
selline näiteriik, kes kasutab siseriiklikus praktikas tihti traditsiooniliste väär-
tuste argumente. Samas LÕK komitee ees avalikult traditsiooniliste väärtuste 
argumenti välja ei toodud. 
Eesti on tänaseks demokraatlik riik, kes hakkab selgelt silma oma liberaalse 
suhtumisega õigustesse ning sh ka laste õigustesse. Selle hiljutiseks näiteks on 
ka valimisea langetamine kohalike omavalitsuste valimisel.23 Liigne liberaalsus 
võib aga ohustada laste õiguste tagamist ning võib juhtuda, et lapsi ei kaitsta 
võimalike ohtude eest piisavalt. 
Erinevused riikide rakenduspraktikas ei olnud aga otseselt seotud sellega, 
milline oli siseriikliku ja rahvusvahelise õiguse suhetsumine. Seega ei ole mo-
nismi ja dualismi teooriate praktilist väärtust. 
Töö teine hüpotees oli, et erineva rakenduspraktika taustal on erinevad ka 
väärtussüsteemid. Analüüs näitas, et tihti oli olemas seos LÕK sätete mitte-
järgimise ning traditsiooniliste väärtuste retoorika kasutamise vahel. Enamgi 
veel, LÕKi siseriiklik rakenduspraktika sõltus ka ühiskonna ning õiguskorra 
väärtustest. Nii Venemaa kui ka Eesti kasutasid sellistel juhtudel traditsiooni 
argumenti. Soome kasutas traditsiooni õigustavat argumenti aga vaid selleks, et 
põhjendada, miks mingeid küsimusi ei ole Soomes vaja õigusaktidesse otsesõnu 
kirjutada.24 
                                                 
22  Simmons, Mobilizing for Human Rights, 64–77. 
23  Vt nt M. Oll ja news.err.ee, “Voting age lowered to 16 in local elections”, 06.06.2015, 
(29 mai, 2015). 
24  CRC Committee, “State Party Report: Fourth Report of Finland,” para. 171. Näiteks 
rõhutas Soome seal järgmist: “self-regulation has long traditions in the Finnish mass media, 
and it has been considered to be suitable for monitoring the contents of the Internet and 
mobile phones as well.” 
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Seda, miks riigid LÕK komitee poolt välja toodud miinimumstandardeid ei 
järgi, võib põhjustada ka standardite endi hägusus. Selleks, et ka käesoleva töö 
tarvis välja tuua erinevate valdkondade miinimumnõuded, tuli analüüsida päris 
mitmeid LÕK komitee dokumente, kust vajalike standardite leidmine oli 
keerukas. Standardite täpsem ja selgem väljatoomine nii üldkommentaarides kui 
ka konstruktiivses dialoogis ning järeldustes aitaks riikidel paremini mõista, 
millistele kohustustele tuleb siseriiklikult rõhku panna. Siin oli üks negatiivne 
näide abiellumise iga. LÕK komitee ei ole oma praktikas käesoleva töö näite-
riikide puhul olemasolevat probleemset regulatsiooni ning praktikat välja 
toonud ega ka kritiseerinud.  
Analüüs näitas aga ka seda, et töö teoreetilises pooles välja toodud käsitlused 
inimõiguste universaalsusest ja relatiivsusest ei selgita riikide praktika erine-
vuse tegelikke põhjuseid. Veelgi enam – need teooriad eeldavad, et riik järgib 
järjekindlalt ühte neist polariseerunud lähenemisviisidest. Tegelik praktika on 
mitmekülgsem ning tuleb tunnistada, et õiguskorras tehtud valikuid mõjutab lai 
kompleks väärtuseid. Kultuuril ja traditsioonil põhinevad argumendid on sisu-
liselt olulised kõigile näiteriikidele ning näiteriikide puhul on õiguse ja kultuuri-
liste väärtuste omavaheline suhe kompleksne.  
Käesoleva doktoritöö põhjal võib väita, et sellised polariseerunud käsitused 
ei ole enam ajakohased, kuna riik ei vali poliitilisi otsuseid tehes kas universaal-
suse või relativismi poolt. Tihti on vähemalt laste õiguste valdkonnas küsimus 
pigem selles, kuivõrd kaitset vajavateks lapsi peetakse. Näiteriikidest kasutas 
Venemaa vägagi paternalistlikku lähenemist lastesse ning kippus seega range 
regulatsiooniga pigem pöörama tähelepanu laste kaitsmise vajadusele. Skaala 
teises otsas oli Eesti oma vastuolulise ja pigem liberaalse käsitusega lapsest, 
kellele tuleb anda juba nooremas eas võimalust rohkem vastutada (samas ka 
näiteks raskeid tagajärgi taluda). 
Töö üks olulisemaid järeldusi puudutas ka LÕK komitee praktikat. Komitee 
on oma praktika põhjal välja töötanud temaatilisi üldkommentaare, samas on 
mitmed küsimused selles praktikas jäänud väga üldsõnaliseks ning on palju 
valdkondi, kus selged standardid puuduvad. Lisaks valib komitee teemasid, 
millest erinevate riikidega rääkida ning kõiki välja toodud miinimume ei käsit-
leta samaväärsetena. Kõige selgemini ilmnes see vanusepiirangute seadmisel. 
LÕKiga kooskõlas olevate õigusaktide vastuvõtmine võiks olla ju riikide poolt 
võetav esmane meede ning selliste regulatsioonide olemasolu on komiteel ka 
kõige kergem hinnata. 
Tööst tuleneb, et ennekõike sõltub inimõiguste tagamine sellest, kuivõrd 
omased on vastavad õigused vaadeldavale õiguskorrale ning kuivõrd neid on 
võimalik olemasolevate tavade ja praktikatega seostada.25 Kultuur ja siseriik-
likud väärtused võivad inimõiguste vastuvõtmisele pigem kaasa aidata. Selleks 
                                                 
25  Siin nõustun Federico Lenzeriniga. The Culturalization of Human Rights Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2014), 217–18. 
212 
tuleks neid aga näha õiguskorrale omastena.26 Leian, et minimaalse sisu põhi-
mõtte kasutamine on selleks vägagi sobiv vahend.  
Käesolevas töös oli riikide hulk piiratud ning seega ei pruugi spetsiifilisi 
õiguseid puudutavad järeldused olla üldkehtivad. Samas on käesoleva analüüsi 
näiteriigid üldiselt aktsepteerinud lapse õiguste universaalsust. On aga ka 
küsimusi, kus riikide praktika on erinev ning keeruline on hinnata, kas riikide 
poolt välja toodud traditsioonile tuginevad argumendid olid alati vastuolus 
LÕKiga. On huvitav näha, kas siia toob mingit selgust LÕKi lisaprotokolliga 
loodud individuaalsete kaebuste süsteem. Lisaks on töö autori arvates 
inimõiguste universaalsusväite realiseerumise võti LÕK komitee käes, kes saaks 
selgema normiloome ning järelevalvepraktika kaudu riike paremini suunata. 
Hetkel on komitee praktika aga erinevate riikide osas väga erineva detailsus-
astmega. 
  
                                                 
26  Tom Zwart, “Using Local Culture to Further the Implementation of International 
Human Rights: The Receptor Approach,” Hum. Rts. Q. 34 (2012): 546. 
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